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I'm confused at your comment re PHNX. They haven't produced any IFRS17 figures to date, so future (reserve) profit is not known. Also from a quick scan of their numbers, much of the div seems to be from takeover activity rather than 'real' cash generation in ongoing business.
LGEN has very strong cash generation and has been ahead of the game on producing IFRS17 figures, which to me shows a strength in operations. DYOR
WHilst I understand many of your comments, it is interesting to note that after 10 years of not 'backing themselves' the LGEN mngt seem to have woken up to the market sentiment. This may have some impact going forward on the share price. If you look at the last slide in the Annual Results presentation you finally see an attack about performance of the business not being represented in the share price.
They do a whole page reflecting the different treatment between LGEN & Blackrock. Try taking a look.
If the market treated LGEN price to book like Blackrock we'd have a price twice as high, Price against earnings would be 2.5 x higher. May not happen so quick but mngt need to press their case!
https://group.legalandgeneral.com/media/vecnul4n/fy22-results-slides.pdf
I know much has been said about the risk to LGEN from the LDI near melt down - especially potential fault. The UK Government Actuary has released a report into what happened - these are a few extracts to calm nerves.
'In the case of September gilt yield rises, most schemes would have identified this as a risk but underestimated the potential pace and level of yield rises. This risk will now be mitigated, and the challenge is to identify the next risk'
'The government has the same challenge as trustees, it must balance risk with the perceived return. It’s not possible to remove all risks, but government is uniquely placed to make those assessments and intervene where it believes mitigations must be imposed.
The general shift towards a liability focused approach to investing for UK defined benefit schemes has led to one of the healthiest sets of defined benefit schemes in the world. The challenge some schemes faced with quickly raising collateral LDI could be resolved in several ways that preserves the healthy funding position. This could include more flexibility in the type of assets that can be posted as collateral and how trustees manage their operational risks and stress test.'
A pretty balanced report that praises the longer term effect of LDI investment and doesn't allocate blame to the Investment Managers. For the nerds go to https://actuaries.blog.gov.uk/2022/10/24/liability-driven-investments/
HITS
In a way you're correct, however the D4E didn't lose them money (except on paper) because they took total control of the company. The present share value is irrelevant (to them) because they are looking at a bigger picture and they obviously believe there is a future for AVN that will see them get more value later rather than breaking it up for a 'fire sale' now.
HITS
Just a thought... A year ago the company was owned by the then shareholders - after the D4E the company is owned by the former bond holders without a need to make it go under and have only assets left....
That means the business "turning around" last year would have seen the reward go to the old shareholders, any upturn now will see the bond holders gain both income/interest and capital return
Why would they now lend AVN money - because they win both ways if it succeeds.
This appears to be old news replayed
see https://www.ashfords.co.uk/news-and-events/general/avanti-communications-group-plc-us-bankruptcy-court-enforces-nonconsensual-third-party-releases-in-chapter-15-proceeding from June.
This was part of the D4E
HIS - to answer your question on EBITDA swing....
This resulted in EBITDA of $4.7 million for the six-month period compared to an EBITDA loss of $26.2 million primarily driven by the Government of Indonesia settlement. EBITDA adjusted for the Government of Indonesia bad debt provision and subsequent reversal for the six-month period was $7.8 million loss (2017: $12.3 million loss).
HYLAS 4 was successfully launched by Arianespace on 6 April from French Guyana. After a 90-day stop at 21.5E to bring that slot back into use, HYLAS 4 arrived at its final position at 31.5W in August and is now in service.
From today's update
From today's results:
'Cash flow
The Group has recently signed contracts for new business in excess of $100m and obtained a commitment for an additional $34.5m of debt, which is expected to close within the next month. After closing this facility, the Group may require a modest amount of additional funding over the next year and a half, the amount of which will depend on various operating and strategic developments. Although it is never certain that funds will be available when they are needed, the Group believes it has ample ability to obtain this additional funding from multiple different sources, including but not limited to, sales of additional second lien debt and/or equity. The Group is currently reviewing its plans to raise additional capital in light of these positive material developments and has prepared these interim financial statements under a going concern basis.'
So now you can stop stressing about the company going under this weekend......
AL_17
You ask people to stick to facts... I wish you would follow your own guidance... I have no gripes about comments that accurate - both negative & positive - but as you say accuracy is key.
AVN has signed a 2 year deal at $5M per year with Viasat. You mention this negatively at per Mbps value rather than total. This also means your $2-3M in 2-3 years is inaccurate.
AVN has also collected just over $20M from Indonesia (slightly more than they claimed). This of course affects management accounts not financial accounts (given it was probably accounted in the past).
Of course the position is precarious - no one (except the most blinded) doubts that.
Next you will quote from the documents earlier this year....
"Furthermore, if the Restructuring completes but the Company is unable to raise Additional Funds of at least US$50 million and secure US$40 million infrequently recurring revenue in pipeline by 30 June 2018 then based on the projected cash flows of the Group, the Company will, within the 3 months following 30 June 2018, be highly likely to be unable to pay its creditors, as and when they fall due for payment."
In that documentation AVN also explained the "Additional funds" were available within existing agreements - although this was tied up in the legal jargon. Therefore the company needed to find $40M. Viasat reduces this.
Time will tell on this stock... I think (like several others) it is still BINARY
Buko
No - AVN own 3 slots.
In the recent Trading Update Paul Walsh noted that "I am also pleased to confirm that HYLAS 4 is in excellent health and is currently undergoing in-orbit testing at 21.5E whilst at the same time securing that slot for future business. The satellite will move to its operational position of 33.5W in July." i.e they had extended the life of 21.5E by placing H4 there during testing thereby retaining the right for another 3 years.
H2B & H3 are not AVN satellites (they have part of the payload) are therefore do not give ownership to their slots.
Hope that helps.
Romaron
To answer your question I would quote from a research note 2 years old....
"It should be noted that geostationary orbital slots are limited, and are registered and overseen by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which allows operators rights in perpetuity once a slot and spectrum has been allocated. Providing the slot is used, the maintained register provides significant frequency protection. Artemis provided Avanti with its third orbital position at 21.5oE, adding to HYLAS 1 at 33.5oW and HYLAS 2 at 31.0oE. Avanti must place a satellite in that slot within three years of its deorbiting to maintain its rights. Several satellites can be co-located on orbital slots by the same company if frequencies do not interfere. This gives Avanti the potential to develop its network in the long term.
These slots have a value, as they can effectively be traded. Intelsat, the largest global satellite company based in the US, includes them on its balance sheets as a non-depreciating intangible asset at around $60m per slot. This implies an unrecognised asset value for Avanti of $180m."
I think people are confused - Solus would have taken up the open offer if there was a profit. They cannot make a deliberate loss for their underlying clients (try TCF & equivalents) - therefore they would not be allowed to participate in the open offer when the price was above the market. The open offer was only for the original holders (pre D4E) therefore I dont understand why people seem to think Solus would be in for more. AVN will need to raise the additional funds in the open market!! This should be possible now that debt is reduced and the company has more book & asset value. Just trying to help understanding.....
Gents, All this information (except the open offer) was in the documentation presented to Bond holders last month. It was all in the public domain. In essence this is the mopping up of the restructure.
MTB - you're being a bit naughty with your use of statistics... AVN's real market cap at present is approx �275mil This is the current cap of 20.6 which is for 7.5% of the restructure value. The market has already factored in the restructure. And yes, I agree there will be sizeable debt - it's up to the new management to resolve the income conundrum. The positive message is that they are experts in the African market. Recent news of developments in Nigeria are certainly positive. I don't have 'rose tinted' glasses - but I'd like to think I'm 'informed' - certainlt I have read the documentation from the restructure which clearly explained the debt holders had no option if they wanted a reasonable return. They have been pulling the strings for the past year and that's why there is a new management team with real focus. Time will tell......
Sorry guys, but you've got it wrong - this is a very high level description of where we are & how we got here I have a long position here - read the D4E documentation and you will see it's true. The real message is that the company can survive now - it's like a fresh start. But we are owned by the 3 hedge funds that provided the debt in the past. Some may say they paid a lot to take over the business!
The debt for equity swap is for the c $557m of outstanding 2023 Notes. These will convert into around 2bn (2,000m) of new 1p shares. The outstanding 2021 bondholders were asked to accept a reduction in the coupons paid, as well as an extension to the term and changes to covenants and restrictions. In aggregate, the package should reduce the annual interest burden from $128.7m to just $36.6m. The outstanding debt after the restructure will be $423.3m down from $980.3m.
I find it amazing that people who post continuous positive comments about this company do not understand what is happening - there has been so much information published. Hopefully in plain English the RNS means: The bondholders have voted in favour of the D4E swap for the main debt tranche. The other tranche has accepted the reduction of interest rate on the bonds. In return the bond holders get a small interim payment. The main point is that providing the equity holders now accept the restructure (TINA - there is no alternative) - the company has a chance of surviving. Providing Hylas4 launch is successful and income can be generated, then AVN can become a normal company again.
SS - yes you're incorrect.... A debt for equity swap is being proposed for the c $557m of outstanding 2023 Notes. These will convert into around 2bn (2,000m) of new 1p shares. Essentially, the nominal value is being converted to equity at c 21p a share, although the value being accepted is more like c 9p per share. In effect, the bondholders appear to be accepting the potential gearing of equity stakes over the greater security of interest payments, which threaten maintenance of the operations, hugely increasing risk. The $81m annual interest savings will be retained for the benefit of the company and its owners, including equity holders. In addition, the outstanding 2021 bondholders are being asked to accept a reduction in the coupons paid, as well as an extension to the term and changes to covenants and restrictions. In aggregate, the package should reduce the annual interest burden from $128.7m to just $36.6m. The outstanding debt after the restructure will be $423.3m down from $980.3m.