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Nothing bearish or bullish stated. Just separating verifiable information from expectation. RNS will resolve it either way.

Worth separating fundamentals from tone.

Funding risk, timelines and eventual capex are legitimate questions for any junior explorer — agreed. But repeating the same conclusions on every tick doesn’t change the underlying facts.

CMRS is funded to reach its first technical milestone (JORC). That’s the next valuation inflection, not production, not mine build.

Until then the market will oscillate between fear and expectation. The data will decide which narrative survives.

Listing the regulatory steps isn’t the same as evidencing progress.

If timelines are “usually measured in weeks”, the relevant question is which of those steps have actually been completed to date. That’s only knowable via RNS.

Quick take on post-placing trading

Looking at the trading since the placing shares came on, there have clearly been some large sells (100k–400k blocks) around 2.4–2.6p, which is normal placing stock being recycled.

What matters is that these sells are being met by steady buying at the same levels and higher. Despite visible supply and intraday spread widening, 2.5p is acting as a defended level, with buyers stepping into supply rather than waiting lower.

If this was uncontrolled placing overhang, the price would already be below the placing price. Instead, demand is absorbing supply.

Net effect: placing pressure looks to be easing, not increasing. On current volumes, the bulk of the overhang should clear over the next couple of months, potentially sooner if drilling / JORC momentum picks up.

(The next set of assay results are expected in early February.)

Once this phase ends, the share price should start reacting properly to news again.

Classic prompt post to restart speculation when there’s no news.

While Peel Hunt are clearly active on the sell side, forum speculation about peripheral events doesn’t change the disclosed position.

If someone claims to have increased by 25%, that should be visible in reported trades unless the starting position was immaterial.

Beyond that, “expecting newsflow at anytime” isn’t information — it’s sentiment. The only things that will matter are what’s delivered in RNS: CPR outcome, binding off-takes and transaction terms.

Until then, there’s nothing to confirm or refute.

Never assume

Amadan filling the vacuum with speculation to stay relevant on the BB.

Is there much to read into the director appointment on its own?

Yes, directors can be appointed ahead of strategic events, but AMG already has a clearly signposted one in progress — the proposed UPSA acquisition, drilling programme and CPR upgrade have all been explicitly flagged in RNS, with timelines into early 2026. You don’t really need to infer anything extra from a routine board change when the company itself has already laid out the roadmap.

On the “director for hire” point, having multiple appointments is pretty common on AIM, particularly for NEDs brought in for governance, compliance or transaction experience. Unless there’s disclosure of equity incentives, warrants or deal-linked remuneration (which would normally require an RNS), it’s hard to conclude much beyond standard housekeeping.

If anything, adding another director while progressing a potentially transformational acquisition is fairly normal — especially with a CPR, off-take discussions and possible re-admission considerations ahead.

The material questions remain the same as before:

• quality of the upgraded CPR (measured vs inferred),

• conversion of LOIs into binding off-take,

• and the final structure/dilution of the UPSA transaction.

The director appointment feels like background noise compared to those.

Worth separating what is confirmed by RNS from what is inferred.

Prior to the Shard-led raise, CMRS did not have balance sheet capacity to pursue acquisitions and aggressively drill Agadir Melloul. After the raise £2.925m gross does allow selective bolt-on acquisitions. But not “large” or transformational deals without further equity or JV structures.

Morocco is genuinely rich in under-explored copper/gold assets. CMRS does have in-country expertise Mr Noureddine, but quality assets are not cheap unless distressed, and competition from majors/juniors is rising.

Majors and mid-tiers are re-entering the country, looking for advanced, low-risk projects (eg CMRS after JORC)

Juniors are trying to lock up ground early and competing for the best sediment-hosted systems. This does not mean majors are buying early-stage explorers left and right. It means Good assets get noticed faster once they cross certain technical thresholds.

JORC is the first of those thresholds, not the last, which is where CMRS is aiming to be by mid–late 2026. CMRS would be more JV-friendly than outright M&A at this stage

Majors and credible mid-tiers care about five things, in roughly this order:

1. Scale (tonnage potential, not just grade)

2. Mining simplicity (open pit, low strip)

3. Capex intensity (can it be built cheaply?)

4. Jurisdiction (Morocco scores well)

5. Strategic fit (district control or mill feed)

The investment case strengthens materially if CMRS ticks all five.

Gillini has been a strategic supporter. Post-prospectus approval, insiders can participate. RNS confirms continued support of a strategic major shareholder, but that could be equity, loan, or structured.

“£9m at 3.45 is likely plus £0.725m due this quarter from Gillini”

Is this supported by any RNS ?

What is actually confirmed £2.925m raised at 2.25p, not 3.45p.

Warrants at 4.5p are potential future cash, not current.

Serious interest does exist, but £10m is not in the bank.

CMRS is properly funded to reach JORC. Acquisition optionality now exists. Insider alignment is likely positive.

Currently maybe don’t price in a £9-£10 Million war chest or guaranteed Gillini funding beyond disclosed terms.

However the market will value CMRS on JORC quality, not BB arithmetic.

Amadan you mean the proposed acquisition of Universal Pozzolanic Silica Alumina Ltd….. if we’re being pedantic

The RTO is fragile, not firm. A clean RTO path does not usually involve repeated “no certainty” language.

In related regulatory news, the London Stock Exchange and FCA have been concerned with misleading bulletin board commentary and potential market abuse. The FCA stresses that false or misleading statements online can breach Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) — positive or negative.

That context matters:

If a poster uses general regulatory changes to imply specific insider knowledge, that could itself be viewed as misleading commentary under MAR.

The inference that this FCA bulletin is a near-term catalyst for share price movement in AMG is not supported directly by the bulletin itself.

AMG — as an AIM-listed company — will eventually operate under the new admissions/prospectus regime once POATRs takes effect 19 January 2026.

But it is not a catalyst specific to AMG. It’s a general rule change for the market at large.

PMB 58 does not announce:

Specific regulatory approval for AMG operations or permits

A timetable for any decision affecting AMG

Inside information about upcoming FCA action on AMG.

So there is no direct regulatory inflection point for AMG spelled out in PMB 58.

The inference that this FCA bulletin is a near-term catalyst for share price movement in AMG is not supported directly by the bulletin itself.

PMB 58 is procedural and structural, not company-specific. It doesn’t contain approved news about AMG or any impending regulatory event. It’s a framework shift affecting most UK listed issuers, not a targeted development.

If AMG intends to raise money or issue new securities, the new rules might eventually be beneficial — but not as an immediate trigger.

What PMB 58 does NOT mean for AMG- It does not announce regulatory approval. It does not provide inside information. It is not a company-specific catalyst.

Posters may be trying to imply that regulatory reform broadly makes raising capital easier and that this could increase speculative interest or confidence.

But assigning that as a short-term share price catalyst for AMG is not supported by the document itself.

Be wary of classic bulletin-board shorthand aimed at traders, not fundamentals investors. Those who constantly seeking to reassure holders that recent selling is “smart” or “managed”, not distressed. Those who constantly frame price action as constructive accumulation, not distribution. Trying to anchor expectations to a near-term catalyst (“next week”). This is soft ramping, not blatant hype.

The motivation is to frame current trading as bullish smart-money positioning ahead of a catalyst, thereby supporting sentiment and near-term price expectations. It’s not evidence, but it is a useful tell about how the stock is being talked up into the next trading window.

There is deliberate phrasing to justify Short-term volatility, Broker stock movement, Holding through uncertainty. This is doing a lot of work psychologically, but crucially, no details are provided, which allows readers to fill in the blanks with optimism.

That strongly suggests a trader already positioned, or looking to exit into strength, or trying to stabilise sentiment before a catalyst (real or hoped-for).

The repeated broker / volume behaviour claim without - Rising volume without VWAP drifting down - Late-day strength (not fades) - Sellers disappearing on dips - No spike in free float via RNS - would suggest recycling.

If instead you see - Volume spikes + price capping - PEEL persistently on the offer - Close-at-low prints -

then it’s distribution, not recycling. Does the predicted “regulatory inflection point” outcome change project economics? Or does it just allow the story to continue? If the latter expect recycling again.

Why “regulatory inflection” is BB gold. It sounds binary and asymmetric, excuses volatility, can’t easily be disproven short-term, and creates a time anchor (“next week”)

This is speculation-driven, not information-driven phrasing.

Be wary of position-protective posting, not malicious, but not neutral.

Typical motivations are prevent weak hands selling into their exit, encourage “one more week” holding behaviour, and frame noise as opportunity. Which is classic pre-event BB psychology.

Such comments appear plausible, but not provable.

It is sentiment management, not insight.

SmoothOperator cites the CPR and its £1.63bn NPV, but project-level NPV is not the same as public-market equity value. Until funding, dilution, execution risk, and market discounting are considered, the true equity value is uncertain. Scenario-based analysis of upside and downside remains the rational approach for investors; relying solely on CPR numbers or broker holdings is misleading.

Thanks for citing the CPR and its £1.63bn NPV. My point remains: project-level NPV is not the same as public-market equity value. Until funding, dilution, execution risk, and market discounting are accounted for, using that number as a proxy for equity pricing is misleading.

Scenario analysis with upside and downside ranges is standard investor discipline, not speculation. The CPR supports understanding the project, but it does not eliminate valuation risk — which is why caution remains justified.

I’ll leave it there.

But to add. Peel Hunt is not a passive investor(As you already know😉) Their holding does not imply conviction in valuation. They are incentivised for completion, not price optimisation. Saying otherwise is empirically false assumption. There are countless examples where brokers held stock, transactions completed, shares underperformed materially post-admission.

An “inferred CPR” is not a CPR.

NPV ≠ equity valuation Even if an NPV were £1.6bn (big if): That is project-level, long-dated, risked cash flow. It must be funded, diluted, execution-adjusted, time-discounted to equity.

Using NPV numbers at this stage is highly misleading for equity pricing.

“The upgraded CPR to measured will have a discount around 10% or less… NPV could be £2bn+ just by using less discount”

This is aspirational modelling, not market reality. You ignore capex inflation, funding dilution, construction risk, customer risk.

Reducing discount rates does not automatically increase equity value if funding terms worsen, dilution increases, execution risk remains high. This is project-finance optimism, not public-market pricing logic.

You are projecting best-case CPR outcomes, ignoring how public markets discount early-stage risk, anchoring PI’s to very large numbers (£1.6–2bn) without context.

This is anchoring bias, not valuation discipline.

Your reply reply sounds analytical but relies on speculative CPR assumptions, inappropriate use of NPV figures, and broker behaviour as validation. It does not negate valuation risk — it inadvertently confirms it.

Fair enough — You are correct the main risk is the RTO doesn’t complete - no bun fight needed.

My point was never that valuation won’t be tested at CPR or bookbuild, but that valuation risk exists today and can be analysed probabilistically, even with incomplete information. That’s standard investment discipline, not narrative-building.

If the CPR, prospectus and bookbuild ultimately support the current implied valuation, that will become evident in due course. Until then, acknowledging downside scenarios alongside upside is simply risk management.

Happy to leave it there.

Smooth

No one is disputing that the formal admission valuation is tested via the CPR, prospectus and bookbuild — that’s standard process. The point being made is that those processes do not guarantee a favourable outcome, nor do they operate independently of commercial substance.

Without disclosed, binding offtakes, funding terms and unit economics, valuation inevitably relies on scenario analysis. That applies equally to upside and downside. Dismissing downside ranges as “made up” while assuming the bookbuild will validate a materially higher valuation is selective scepticism rather than analysis.

Adviser quality improves execution, not valuation certainty. There are numerous AIM and Main Market admissions with reputable sponsors and brokers where the CPR and bookbuild resulted in pricing well below retail expectations. Until evidence is visible that supports an £80–90m implied market cap, caution is rational.

LostMyMind

That’s all you have? That’s the extent of your discussion?

Another easily led assumption about a moniker.

Keep pumping.

Your reply is rhetorical, defensive, and partially evasive.

“In your haste to troll…” avoids engaging with the discussion. A Common bulletin-board tactic when factual ground is weak.

Turning discussion personal, usually signals the poster cannot advance the analysis further. You sound authoritative but add no new insight. Bookbuilds can fail, downsize, or price far lower than expected. CPRs often highlight risks that reduce valuation.

“The prices you have come up with are just your own made up opinion…”

No credible analyst claims early-stage valuations are exact. Valuation is always a range. Not my own numbers, but Scenario-based valuation using market comparables and stage risk. You respond with dismissal without counter-analysis.

“…dressed up as factual with no credibility due to the missing available information to make such a price in the first instance.”

This undermines the your own argument. If “There is missing information” then “No one can credibly price it yet” Current 10–11.5p trading is also speculative. The “clean-up phase” narrative loses foundation. Peel Hunt’s holding cannot be used as valuation validation.

It sounds like you’re applying valuation scepticism selectively. Skepticism for downside estimates, but Certainty for upside expectations.

You reply avoiding every hard question:

• What valuation range would institutions accept without binding offtakes?

• What happens if the bookbuild prices materially below current levels?

• Why is a £1bn SPA compatible with early-stage risk?

• How much downside exists if admission disappoints?

Silence on these points is not accidental.

You imply valuation risk cannot be assessed today (untrue) downside analysis is illegitimate (untrue) and avoid acknowledging that bookbuilds frequently disappoint.

Your reply is defensive rather than analytical, dismisses downside without refuting it, and relies on process credibility to imply valuation safety that does not yet exist.

Wonder why?

Admission valuation is not “set” — it is tested by the market.

The admission document + CPR + bookbuild influence price discovery. If the market does not accept the implied valuation, the share price adjusts, not the ownership.

The market does not ignore: lack of revenue, lack of offtake, funding risk.

Institutions will not pay £80–100m unless they can justify it internally. That valuation can simply be “decided” later and magically be higher. It can’t. It must be earned.

If the bookbuild price is far above prevailing sentiment, either it fails, or it is downsized, or it leads to a sharp post-admission fall.

Weak pre-admission price action makes bookbuilding harder, not easier.

Strand Hanson/Peel Hunt : They do not guarantee valuation. They do not underwrite price. They act if the transaction is admissible, not cheap.

Plenty of AIM/Main Market deals with top-tier advisers have: re-rated down, disappointed badly, destroyed value post-admission.

Peel is incentivised to:

• support the transaction

• maintain an orderly market

• earn fees on admission and fundraises

Not to:

• maximise long-term share price

• protect retail holders

Ownership is fixed, but valuation will be tested at admission. That valuation will depend heavily on the strength of offtakes, funding visibility and CPR conclusions. Adviser involvement improves execution quality but does not guarantee price support. Current selling may be clean-up, but it also signals real risk that the market is already discounting.