RE: Leadership.21 Oct 2022 19:51
the purpose of expediency. A 5% holding is the minimum requirement under company law to requisition a meeting and we brought together a close, small group of initial shareholders for this purpose. Notwithstanding this, please be aware that we have significant support amongst the shareholder base, which we estimate currently accounts for more than 25% of the total voting rights. When it comes to the voting process, the requisitioning shareholders are optimistic in being able to persuade and convince most of the other shareholders to support the Requisition. Reabold was marketed as an innovative company taking a fresh approach to how AIM listed Oil & Gas companies should operate. As someone with extensive experience managing and investing in AIM listed companies, I was attracted by their purported fresh approach. However, I am really struggling to see how the existing team is implementing this fresh approach when you consider the following: How can a small cap publicly quoted company such as Reabold justify having a dual CEO function? In 2021, both CEOs received a base salary of £231,000, representing a combined salary for the CEO function of £462,000. This is significantly out of line with the AIM market for a company with such a small market cap; In addition to their base salary, both CEOs received a bonus of £50,000 and share based payments worth £66,000 during 2021, bringing their total remuneration package, including pension contributions, to £358,000 each despite the share price dropping significantly from 0.64p to 0.17p (a decline of over 70%) in the calendar year of 2021; Both CEOs, Sachin Oza and Stephen Williams, have significant conflicts of interest, holding board positions in associated companies and drawing an income from these roles in addition to the substantial packages they are currently drawing from Reabold. Both are non-executive directors of Rathlin Energy Limited. Stephen is also a non-executive director at Europa Oil and Gas plc. Sachin Oza is also a non-executive director of Corallian Energy; Additionally, given the recent sale process, the Corallian directors will be issued significant incentive bonuses. This significantly reduces the size of the cash that will be distributed to the Reabold shareholders. This incentive structure brings about inherent conflicts of interest questions, most notably the potential for the Directors to be more focussed on maximising their bonuses rather than representing the best interests of shareholders. In my opinion, across several recent deals and transactions involving Reabold, a more experienced, seasoned and hands-on Board would have produced a much better result for shareholders. Clear examples of the inability of the Board to maximise shareholder value include: The conditional sale of Corallian Energy is significantly lower than expected and guided by the management team. It was previously stated by that Corallian's updated 2C economic valuation of Victory, based on an historical averag