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Petropavlovsk's directors look for its shareholders Home � Industrial News Save Today The board of directors of the gold-mining Petropavlovsk, formed in the summer of 2017 with the support of the former shareholders - Renova and the Prudential group, continues to assert that the minority shareholders of CABS Platform and Slevin Ltd requiring it do not disclose the true owners. Minority shareholders are supported by the main shareholder Kenes Rakishev (together they have about 31% of Petropavlovsk shares), and the board has already achieved the resignation of the representative of the businessman. At the same time, the gold miner, against the backdrop of the conflict, went up by 15% on the London Stock Exchange, to $ 361 million. Gold-mining Petropavlovsk on June 8 disclosed information about the beneficiaries of its minority shareholder, Gibraltar's CABS Platform Limited (owns a 4.55% stake). According to the data provided by CABS itself, its final owners in equal shares are five natural persons: Eugene Khata, Victoria Grynova, Erica Gordysheva, Yulia Mangusheva and Mikhail Volkov. Mrs. Grynova, as well as Nikolay Lustiger are authorized to negotiate with the Petropavlovsk Council, but they do not have the right to make decisions "without prior approval," Petropavlovsk said. The board of directors of the gold miner in this regard noted that "it is not clear who should give approval if these people are indeed beneficiaries." Therefore, the council again stated that it does not believe in disclosing the CABS and expects that behind the "next veil of secrecy" are other layers hiding the true owner or owners of the company. informed the board that she owns Patia Trading, whose legal owner is Olena Dorati. Yevgeny Khata - Chairman of the Board of Directors of CyberTrust SA, which deals with crypto-currencies, on the company's website says that Mr. Khata previously worked in Boston Consulting Group, KPMG, Salomon Brothers. Victoria Grynova, according to the registry of legal entities of Great Britain, together with Nikolay Lustiger act as directors of Cyberex Limited (established in September 2017 by Mr. Lustiger and Yevgeny Hatoy, since December belongs to Summit SA, SPF, originally called Cybertrust Cryptocurrency Solutions UK Limited). Interfax notes that Nikolai Lustiger is an ex-adviser to the Governor of the Chelyabinsk region, together with Mr. Khatoy they were on the board of directors of Kamchatnefteprodukt, and are also co-owners of the company T8 Publishing Technologies, whose main shareholders are the head of the Ripol Classic publishing house Sergei Makarenkov and the general director of Rusagro Maxim Basov. CABS together with another offshore company Slevin Ltd (Anguilla, owns 4.55% Petropavlovsk) propose to the shareholders meeting on June 29 to replace the existing board of directors of the gold miner, appointed in the summer of 2017 Renova Viktor Vekselberg (owned 22.4% of

On the contrary, last year Renova & cohorts only controlled c32%.of the total voting rights. It was probably a combination of PI apathy and misguided (IMO) voting which swung it against Peter & Pavel, by quite a wide margin. The result this time could be closer, so every vote might well count.

You would not be voting for anonymous nominees. They are listed in full via Proposals 13-15 as Pavel Maslovskiy and the two directors ousted in last year's coup. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/06/06/ex-petropavlovsk-boss-pavel-maslovskiy-slams-board-power-struggle/

It still amazes me that some on here will support a board installed at the behest primarily of Renova, and their controller, Viktor Vekselberg. At this time last year it was pointed out here the dubious corporate practices of the usurpers, with links to articles supporting the claims. That Peter and Pavel made serious mistakes at the height of the last metals bull cannot be denied, but the convertible terms of the bonds were no doubt forced upon them by the parlous financial state of the company. However, it is worth remembering that both founders had (and probably still have) material stakes in POG, and that their paper losses after 2011 would make the combined total of all losses suffered by posters here seem like petty cash. Compare that with the current board who have little, if any, skin in the game. Had there not been the disruption caused by the coup last year, I am of the opinion that the SP would have continued to make steady progress upwards under the old team. Why did Renova sell out? Could it be that Mr. Vekselberg has run into a spot of bother elsewhere, and could be having his collar felt by the FBI. In any event, I voted against the 2017 coup, and will certainly vote in favour of the resolutions to oust the Renova puppets this time round.

Let us look at their achievements in the first six months. H2 production down YoY Head Office expenses up 38% YoY! Director Bonuses awarded (for what?) This lot were installed by the Renova/M&G/Sothic concert party, after which Renova sold out and ran for the hills, closely followed I understand, by M&G reducing their holdings. That the mine employees seem to want Pavel back is further indication that the old board had managed to bring the company back from the brink with a bright future beckoning. Support the current Board? You cannot be serious!

The new board have managed since their June 17 appointment to � � Reduce H2 production � Increase Central Admin (Boardroom Pay?) costs by 38% � Award themselves a well earned (?) bonus Why would any sensible shareholder want the old team back?

I note that RB below quotes the AISC for this year at $750/oz. I have searched the RNS and cannot find any reference to AISC for either the 2017 or 2018 years. I can however find reference to TCC at $700-$750 projected for 2018. If the figures for AISC were not given, and considering their importance, one must ask why the omission?

Are these conditions specified by the Company to prevent upside for bond holders? Or, are they conditions imposed by the bond holders to inhibit early redemption? As the Company was on its knees in 2015 with very little, if any, bargaining power, I would suggest that it was the prospective bond holders who dictated the terms.

The price above which, if sustained for 20 dealing days out of 30, the company can issue a redemption notice for all the convertible bonds in issue, is c12.4p. If the SP threatens to maintain a level above this for the prescribed time period, it would be in the bond holder�s interests to convert a tranche of bonds and sell in the market. This would have to be done carefully so as not to depress the SP too rapidly, but sufficient to bring it below the 12.4p threshold. Thus if the company does well prior to 2020 it is inevitable that an extra 800M ordinary shares (c25%) will be issued to satisfy bond conversions, and this will depress the SP for months as many, if not all converters, attempt to realise their gains. Obviously if the SP remains below 10p or so until the 2020 redemption date, then there is a chance the bondholders might not find it worth their while to convert, unless either they fancy POG as a long term investment, or have the patience to attempt to sell over a long period of time. POG represents a highly geared play on the gold price. If gold soars, so will POG � big time, hopefully far higher than your 24p breakeven.

Sorry to perpetuate this item, but it is important for shareholders to understand why there is probably no chance of the Convertible Bonds being redeemed until the official redemption date in 2020, and are most likely to be at least partially converted at some stage if the SP should rise above 12p The clause 9b(i), as posted here recently, has to be read in conjunction with the definition of Aggregate Value, which is as follows - 4 Definitions (OC 15/3/2015 Page 26) Aggregate Value means, in respect of any dealing day, the US Dollar amount calculated as follows: AV = OS x MP Where AV = the Aggregate Value OS = the number of Ordinary Shares that would fall to be delivered in relation to the exercise of Conversion Rights in respect of a Bond in the principal amount of US$1,000. MP = the Volume Weighted Average Price of an Ordinary Share on such dealing day (provided that if on any such dealing day the Ordinary Shares shall have been quoted cum-Dividend or cum-any other entitlement the Volume Weighted Average Price of an Ordinary Share on such dealing day shall be deemed to be the amount thereof reduced by an amount equal to the Fair Market Value of any such Dividend or entitlement per Ordinary Share as at the first date on which the Ordinary Shares are traded ex-the relevant Dividend or other entitlement on the Relevant Stock Exchange (determined on a gross basis and disregarding any withholding or deduction required to be made on account of tax and disregarding any associated tax credit)), translated into US Dollars at the Prevailing Rate on such dealing day. This means (if my calculations (1500/1.5171)/(1000/1.5171/0.0826) are correct) that the ordinary SP must be above 12.4p for at least 20 of 30 consecutive days for redemption of all the bonds by the Company to be allowable. Of course the bondholders, on seeing the redemption threat and not being stupid, would convert a portion and sell in the market at a decent profit, thus depressing the SP, possibly bringing AV below the $1500 redemption level. If the SP remains above 12.4p, just rinse and repeat. Should the SP threaten to remain above the redemption threshold come what may, the bondholders might choose to convert and either retain as an investment or hope to dribble sales over time to as not to depress the price too quickly. Either way we face serious dilution if the SP rises too much before 2020. This clause was obviously designed to make redemption at par by the Company very difficult, if not impossible prior to 2020.

Thank you ladies for your enthusiastic efforts to answer my query, but I must confess I am still none the wiser. I agree that the information given in the presentation is not relevant as regards the contractual obligation of the bond issuer, but of course ordinary shareholders might have a case if misled. However, if the Offering Circular of March 2015 forms the basis of the terms for the bond issue, I still have a problem with clause 9b(i). If that is the only reference to early redemption (and I can find no other, although Contrarian seems to have come up with a different one from an undisclosed source), then said early redemption after 18th March is conditional on the bond value exceeding $1500 for a minimum period (unless I misunderstand this completely). These bonds are thinly traded, and according to the LSE page are currently at 17% over nominal value, assumed to be $1000 despite the LSE showing them at $100. The only reason I can see for the bond value exceeding $1500 is because the ordinary SP has risen sufficiently above the conversion price to add an intrinsic additional value to the bond, based on the potential profit which could be realised by conversion at the fixed price and subsequent sale of the ordinaries. Here it gets complicated, as no bondholder would hold onto the bonds if the tradable value was over $1500 and liable for redemption at par. They would be keen to either attempt a sale in the market or convert in order to retain their thoroughly undeserved gains. This might cause a rush to convert and sell, which could then lead to a collapse in the ordinary SP as the new shares swamp the market. That would of course reduce the premium value of the unconverted bonds quite sharply and discourage further conversion until (and if) the ordinary SP again rises sufficiently above the conversion price. As conversion would be seriously dilutive for POG holders, it is in our interests that the SP does not rise too far until such time as redemption is allowed under the terms of the issue. I was of the opinion that the recent bond issue might be partly to fund said repayment. However, the question of the conditions outlined in 9b(i) of the OCMar2015 remains, and I would be most grateful if someone is able clarify this.

My source was - Offering Circular dated 16 March 2015 (Condition 9b) Do you have a different source or have you found your quoted text within the above document?

The terms of the 2015 Bond conversion as briefly described in the 2015 presentation linked below seem to differ from the actual bond prospectus. From the 100 pages of bumf the relevant clause (I think) is - On giving not less than 30 nor more than 60 days� notice (an Optional Redemption Notice) to the Trustee and to the Bondholders in accordance with Condition 19, the Issuer may redeem all but not some only of the Bonds on the date (the Optional Redemption Date) specified in the Optional Redemption Notice at their principal amount, together with accrued interest to such date: (i) at any time on or after 18 March 2018, if the Aggregate Value for not less than 20 dealing days in any period of 30 consecutive dealing days ending not more than 14 days prior to the giving of the relevant Optional Redemption Notice, exceeds US$1,500; or (ii) if, at any time prior to the date the relevant Optional Redemption Notice is given, Conversion Rights shall have been exercised and/or purchases and/or redemptions effected in respect of 90 per cent or more in principal amount of the Bonds originally issued. This seems to infer that redemption of the bonds is only possible in certain conditions, and that a partial redemption of the total bond in issue cannot be made. However, it is section (i) that causes most concern as I not only fail to understand why it was deemed necessary to include it, but what effect it may have on optional redemption after 18th March 2018. Any idea anyone?

According to the 2015 prospectus, the interest is paid quarterly.

https://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/prices-and-markets/debt-securities/company-summary/XS1201840326LUUSDCWNU.html?ds=0

Pipeline? Pipe dream! Glad I sold when TW slated PC. I hope poor John Wisbey has managed to dump most of his holding in this shambles.

Many thanks for the tip. My first bet this year (and probably my last). Bet placed at 6/1 but Paddy paid 10s. Something about a price guarantee???

Those of you who are a bit depressed along with the current gold price, might take heart from the following two links - https://youtu.be/NIFDuud36aA https://goldsilver.com/blog/mike-maloney-the-top-10-reasons-i-own-gold-and-silver-new-video-series/ They are both amusing and educational, although Harry Dent would of course disagree with their conclusions (that should not cause too much dismay). For what it's worth, I think the next leg up for the greatest gold bull run ever will begin towards the end of this year.

All achieved by the ousted management

25% at IG