Scancell founder says the company is ready to commercialise novel medicines to counteract cancer. Watch the video here.
Sipp10, an interesting idea. I don't know the sum of all the profits generated in the UK, but I do know the quantity of oil and gas produced (NST Authority data - other sources are available).
Over the last 12 months 526.5 million boe (oil and gas) was produced on the UK continental shelf.
For 2022 the government was looking for £5B (starting 25th May 2022) and for 2023 £12m - those are the numbers I've seen but stand to be corrected.
So, let's apply £12b to the last 12 months of production:
£12b/526.5m = £22.8/boe, or US$26/boe
At the interims ENQ had 43,422 boe UK production, or 15.8m boe.
Therefore, if the £12b was solely due to production Enquest's share of contributions to the UK tax coffers is 15.8m x $26 = $410m. Ouch!
Of course, the £12b due to the EPL in 2023 will come from production, refining and other value-added components, but I thought it would be interesting to compute it back to the produced barrel.
(This was a 10min exercise so apologies for any obvious or gross errors)
* For the record I do not agree with the common view expressed on this board that the EPL charge to Enquest will be, nil, negligible, or not a major issue. IMO it will be substantial, though, thankfully, well below $410m.
e121, great work all round. It isn’t about right or wrong. You introduced the topic and within a couple of hours we had good input from other posters. That’s the power of the board.
Back to the RBL detail. Do you know the interest rate? Probably expressed as US Libor plus a margin. Perhaps with other conditionalities.
This would represent Enquest’s marginal interest rate.
Thanks, e121. That’s exactly the level of detail I was looking for.
And yes, hedging obligations are less onerous than under the old RBL.
I guess the hedging obligation is from today – utilisation of the RBL – but there might be some phasing allowed rather than a rigid implementation. Either way Enquest would know ahead of time and have a remit to pursue hedging ahead of any RBL obligation if they wished. So, largely detail I can ignore.
I see ups and downs in production from the various assets through 2023, but rather than get into the detail I ran two very different processes to get to my hedging expectation for 2023. One resulted in a 6.4m hedging requirement for 2023 and the other 6.5m, so I’ve confidence in my numbers.
Subtracting 3.5m ($57-$77) already in place for 2023 H1 leaves 3.0m for 2023 H2.
In a recent call HBR stated that in the oil futures market they saw straightforward swaps as a better option than costless collars. However, Enquest has shown a preference for the latter so I’m going to assume they stick to costless collars.
Today, I see an Oct 2023 (midpoint 2023 H2) strike at $83, so I’m going with a costless spread of $73 floor and $93 ceiling. (Pricing isn’t this simplistic but a balance around strike is a good working assumption).
In the Feb update we should get guidance on 2023. Assuming 48K boepd midpoint on production I expect hedging as follows:
2023 H1 – c.3.5 MMbbls $57 floor and $77 ceiling
2023 H2 – c.3.0 MMbbls $73 floor and $93 ceiling
2023 total – c6.5 MMbbls $66 floor and $86 ceiling (This is now my spreadsheet number)
* This assumes current oil pricing, costless collars, and Enquest don’t go above RBL hedging obligations.
Hi e121,
Interesting detail on the covenants.
I assume it is the Bonds prospectus you're reading. Anything on hedging? I'd assume that is one for the RBL. Do you have access to the detail of the new 'revised and amended' RBL?
Reading the Moody's report reminded me of my end of term school reports.
I particularly liked this bit, "Moody's acknowledges that EnQuest's financial performance will continue to be influenced by industry cycles as well as by consequences arising from global initiatives to limit adverse effects from climate change, such as the gradual constraint in the use of hydrocarbons and the acceleration in the shift to less environmentally damaging energy sources. Once these initiatives begin to change the trajectory of future oil and gas demand, Moody's expects EnQuest's future profitability and cash flow to be lower at future cyclical peaks and worse at future cyclical troughs. Nevertheless, the rating agency also expects this shift to occur over a period of decades and that global oil demand will continue to grow through at least the latter half of the 2030's, thus limiting to some extent the impact of these risks to EnQuest's credit profile in the short to medium term."
Moody's, in the long term I'm dead, in the medium term of outa here!
* The numbers around gross debt looked odd against my normal metrics but I'm guessing Moody's include non-current liabilities such as Decom expenses within their gross debt figures.
smidtol,
Mosman is one of several stocks I follow out of interest rather than for any expectation of an investment case developing, though I don’t exclude the possibility. In some cases, I have small holding for ‘skin in the game’ as I had in Mosman a few years back.
Other examples include PMG which I follow to see if Tom Cross can replicate his early oil success in Dana – was it luck or skill, the jury’s out, and BAY where UK aggregate legends Peter Tom and David Williams have initiated a cash shell looking for acquisitions. I don’t doubt their skill and experience, I’m interested in how they proceed, particularly as I’m invested in one of their early creations. BAY is a good example of early enthusiasm, which I worked in my favour resulting in ‘skin in the game’ on a free carry.
I log my thoughts on each, but rarely post them.
On the specifics of your question, what would get me to invest in Mosman again? I don’t know, but any investment would be small. The small scale of Mosman and the high risk doesn’t align with my usual investment criteria. Twenty years ago, I had a different approach.
But expanding on my ‘better entry point’ comment. I’ll describe what I see as the likely extremes of the next steps.
A cautious route would be to allow cash to build so a 2nd Cinnabar well can be drilled 2023 Q3, or earlier if farmed out. IMO this follows the model that has largely been pursued to date. It pays the bills keeping Mosman solvent but does little for LTHs.
At the other extreme, assuming C1 flows at c120bopd (gross), funds are raised to pursue a more aggressive build out of Cinnabar (2+ wells) (though other high impact opportunities might be available). If successful, this could get Mosman to more critical scale, which would benefit LTHs. Of course, this comes at higher risk.
Botham raises the possibility of funding another well via warrants (I'll pass on commenting on GE). The nearest warrants are those released last May @ 0.16p. I don’t see it. Those warrants are a long way out of the money. If I was an investor in last May’s placing, as an example, I might be holding 10m shares purchased at 0.08p, albeit at a discount to the 0.11p price before the placing, with 5m warrants @ 0.16p. Today, I can only sell those shares for 0.06p. If my assessment of cash balance, cash flows and the path forward are correct then if the price rose towards 0.1p I’d be selling into it on an expectation that either I have an opportunity of another placing at discount, with more warrants on top, or my existing 0.16p warrants come into the money.
I don’t believe 120bopd (gross) confirmed from Cinnabar is a catalyst for such a pop in the SP. Double that might be, so anything is possible.
Dec 31st 2021 cash AU$948K equivalent US$665K
May 2022 £1.1m placing equivalent US$1,375K
Jun 30th cash AU$2,400K equivalent US$1,680K
Implies 6 months to 310th Jun 2022 spend: 665+1,375-1,680 = US$360k (cash flow out)
I’d guess the Aussi spend in the 6 months to 30th Jun isn’t repeated in the 2nd calendar half year. Overall production is down, with lower sales price, but oil volumes have been maintained at c2,900 bo for each of this year’s calendar quarters. Hard to judge the weighting of work over cash costs. There is a deferred cash payment (US$100K) (2nd July?) to be made for the Nadsoilco acquisition. All considered, I assume cash flow out (pre-Cinnabar) will be similar to first calendar half year, say US$300k.
I think Mosman are responsible for c85% of Cinnabar drilling and build out, 85% x 1,600K = US$1,360K.
End year cash position (pre-Cinnabar production) = 1,680-1,360-300 = US$20K.
I can easily see my numbers out by US$100K, so let’s go to the positive side and say, US$120K net cash year end.
If Cinnabar flows at 120 bopd through Dec and a net-back of $75, then cash flow = 120 x 75% (net) x 75% (after royalties) x $75 x 31 = US$157K. (I don't know the royalties due on Cinnabar but followed on from another poster's comment. Clearly, this is an important consideration. A bonus if 25% royalties are not due and would impact my closing remarks.)
Therefore, with Cinnabar production Mosman cash flows into 2023 are (157-(300/6)) = US$107K / month.
This would be the best cash flow position in Mosman’s history, but within the oil sector FCF yields of 30% are standard, At a $4m Mkt Cap that requires a FCF of US$1.2m p.a. (US$100K / month)
On those assumptions Mosman is fairly valued.
What next?
Cinnabar needs to produce at c120 bopd (that’s oil, not gas).
Another drill is required. If it’s another 85% x 1,000 = US$850K, this isn’t supported by cash flows till late 2023, so I expect a placing within 3 months. As I said in an earlier post, I think that could be a better entry point for longer term holders.
(A follow up I'd missed)
Smidtol, your $2.1m calculation assumes the quarter to Jun 2022 sales prices applies for the full year. They don’t. The reported revenue from projects come out significantly below what could be expected from the sales price. I’m at a loss to explain this. One possibility is that the difference is due to royalties, but I can’t make that fit. Besides, I think royalties are included in the ‘Lease operating expenses’- I can make that fit more easily.
I have been invested here but not currently. A few years back I contacted JB with a query on the application of royalty costs. He instructed his accountant to reply but it was still unclear to me. I subsequently sold out so didn’t pursue my query. However, I enjoy following the Mosman story. I’ve noticed that in the last couple of years the detail and quality of Mosman reporting has improved significantly. This msg board is useful for following production activities and given the low liquidity in the stock can help the day traders in their bets. But if you consider yourself a long-term investor then the accounts would be a better reference than this board. Between the RNSs and accounts (albeit very delayed) it’s possible to get a good grasp of Mosman’s activities.
We’ll see the accounts to Jun 2022 later this year, but a key number has already been reported:
“Mosman further advises that at its financial year end, 30 June 2022, it had circa AUD2.4 million in cash.” (c. US$1,680K)
Production in the quarter to 30th June 2022 was 8,815 boe (net). The production numbers for the quarter to 30th Sept are due anytime. Largely, they will reflect the loss of Falcon and the result of work over activities on Stanley. I can only guess, but I think it’s reasonable to assume current cash flows do not cover the normal operating costs – a positive cash flow position was reported 10th May 2022.
Cinnabar drilling costs are US1,000K and on a successful drill and completion costs are US$600K. I think Mosman are in for 85% of these costs.
I expect some level of success on Cinnabar. I’d bet Cinnabar will be producing oil and gas in Q4. But the unknowns are the volumes and the oil/gas mix. I think Mosman has been unlucky with recent wells, F1, S5 and W2, so due a break with Cinnabar.
One for the day traders.
If Cinnabar is close to estimates - 100 bopd and 200 Mcfd (gross), I’d be looking for an acceleration on C2 before mid-2023 (one well per year isn’t enough), but that would require another placing, at which point Mosman could offer something to the longer-term investor.
GLA
smidtol, I’ll focus on your first paragraph which concludes with “Total annual sales $2.1m.”
6 months ending 31st Dec 2021.
“The average sale prices achieved during the period was US$71.07 per barrel for oil, and US$3.74 per MMBtu for gas (in each case after transport and processing costs and prior to royalties).”
The average market prices during the period were WTI $74.2 and HH Gas $4.55 per MMBtu ($26/boe).
Page 19 of report
(i) Project performance Stanley $ Falcon $ Winters $ Livingston $ Arkoma $ Other Projects $ Total $ Half-Year Ended 31 December 2021 Revenue Oil and gas project related revenue 321,220 322,803 6,390 7,455 41,386 46,536 745,790 Producing assets revenue 321,220 322,803 6,390 7,455 41,386 46,536 745,790 Project-related expenses - Cost of sales (15,008) (22,307) (294) (344) (2,980) - (40,933) - Lease operating expenses (223,615) (138,701) (3,956) (6,483) (8,133) (135,482) (516,370) Project cost of sales (238,623) (161,008) (4,250) (6,827) (11,113) (135,482) (557,303) Project gross profit Gross profit 82,597 161,795 2,140 628 30,273 (88,946) 188,487.
Formatting is poor so I’ll extract the revenue for each project and using the net production volume (boe) from each project I’ll also present average US$/boe for each project:
Falcon AU$321,220 US$20.4 Mainly gas
Stanley AU$322,803 US$54.3 Mainly oil
Livingston AU$7,455 US$52.2 Mainly oil.
Winters AU$6,390 US$44.3 Mainly oil. Post period Winters 2 (W2) on stream producing mainly gas at volumes >> W1.
Arkoma AU$41,386 US$15.2 Mainly gas.
In the report Mosman said, “The average sale prices achieved during the period was US$71.07 per barrel for oil, and US$3.74 per MMBtu for gas (in each case after transport and processing costs and prior to royalties).”
US$3.74 per MMBtu for gas, equates to US$21.7/boe.
The total reported revenue for the period was AU$745,790 (c. US$520K)
The gross profit from projects was AU$188,487 (c. US$132K)
The last two lines represent the first 6 months of the year to end June 2022. Total net production in the period was 17,344 boe, which is 46% of the 37,915 boe reported for the full 12 months (H2 19% higher than H1). I estimate that Mosman’s average sales prices in the 6 months to June was US$100 oil and US$5.0 (US$29/boe) gas. This is an increase of 41% on oil and 34% on gas. Production volumes are weighted towards gas, largely due to Falcon, but I’ll use a mid-way price increase of 37.5%.
Applying these numbers to the US$520K revenue number in the first 6 month, for the final 6 months I get:
520x1.19x1.375 = US$851K, for a 12-month total of US$1,371K. This is my expectation for total project revenues.
The full year report will be published 31st Dec 2022 latest.
Da_Gee, yesterday you asked a very relevant question, "Any guesses to how much we have left in the kitty?"
I'll post my assessment shortly. A while back I wrote a couple of entries to my log, which I didn't post, but I think provide a detailed backdrop to how cash flows might be determined, given the long delays between ARs.
Here's the first:
Be nice! (8/8/22 not posted)
I note several deleted posts.
Concerns over Falcon being off-line seem warranted, given Falcon accounted for nearly 60% of net production in the FY. But talk of another placing is probably 6-9 months early.
The timing of the Cinnabar Development Drilling might not seem important – late August or early September – but it is important. Production from Cinnabar and any Stanley workovers are needed to put a positive handle on the Sept quarter production update. A c.10K boe net number in 2021 Sept quarter (Mosman’s Q1 quarter) will be hard to beat given current production, particularly with the loss of Falcon, unless the new Cinnabar well steps up.
Initial flow rates from Stanley workovers frequently get a headline, as S4 did today, but the rates decline fast. The gross Stanley numbers provide a clearer picture, 26,212 boe for the latest FY against 45,309 boe the previous year – a significant decline.
The case for Cinnabar is it is a larger reservoir than the Stanleys and therefore subject to a lower rate of decline. Mosman shareholders must be hoping that is the outcome. They deserve a break.
Dunbly, in your post (09:50) it was your apparent belief that Enquest WOULDN’T attract the attention of the Labour party that got my attention. I’ll come back to this shortly.
I see the current political focus on ‘energy tax’, as on the pursuit of the gains renewable energy companies are making on the ‘marginal cost’ of supply structure around the current high price of gas. It appears that the UK government is taking a ‘windfall’ revenue approach rather than a windfall tax approach, largely it seems to me, for ideological reasons. Either way, not of much interest to me as that isn’t an area I’m invested.
I was pleased with the change in approach on UK energy price subsidies from 2 years to just next April, subject to a review of the market. It was IMO a hugely expensive energy subsidy for those that can pay, with little incentive to cut UK consumer energy demand. I know that’s a political point, but it’s mine.
I struggle to see how Europe, or the UK will influence the local price of gas, given the global connections, but I can envisage a new pricing structure on renewables currently piggybacking the high gas price. Though I also see risks in short term politics interfering in the market, which prior to the Russian invasion had worked in the interests of consumers if not energy supply security.
Back to the Labour party.
When a windfall tax was discussed last May, many, including Enquest, thought the existing tax structure would leave them in the clear. When the detail was released, I knew that assessment was wrong and largely sold down my position in Enquest. I’ve since rebuilt it.
Last week I presented my assessment of the windfall tax (EPL) due on Enquest. My numbers were challenged by one poster who didn’t substantiate his $10m estimate for 2022. I subsequently detailed my numbers but didn’t need to post them. It should be plain to anyone, that if the impact on Enquest of the EPL was only $10m in 2022 the SP wouldn’t have crashed last May.
One of the biggest challenges to an investment in Enquest is political risk. If Labour gets Enquest might get hammered. This week the SNP released their ‘vision’ for an independent Scotland. A key element is a socialist ‘wet dream’ of a £20b investment in dubious infrastructure plans which will be largely funded by NS oil and gas.
Going back to my previous post. If having assessed the pollical risk, Equinor proceed with a buy of CNNOC NS assets and subsequently proceed beyond the Bressay FDP, I’ll feel considerably more comfortable with my investment in Enquest.
I see Equinor are again in the frame as a possible bidder for CNNOC’s North Sea assets. An obvious link to Enquest is that I’d guess the NS assets include Golden Eagle. CNNOC has a 36.5% operator interest in Golden Eagle. Enquest’s interest is 26.7%. Let’s see what plays out.
But my wider interest is the potential partnership with Equinor on a Bressay development. Enquest hold 42% and Equinor hold 42%, but the terms are interesting. My understanding is that on approval of an FDP Enquest would pay a further $15m to Equinor. However, if Equinor decides not to proceed after the FDP then Enquest has the option to take Equinor’s share for an additional $15m on a ‘sole risk’ basis, following which Enquest would have an 82% interest in Bressay.
While the terms might look attractive; given the political risk that has attached itself to North Sea developments, I’d prefer Equinor, having assessed the political risk choose to close out a CNNOC buy, and buy into a Bressay FDP. IMO it lowers the development risk.
Early days, but something to watch.
Yes, it was positive commentary from Ibstock, but no numbers (at least that I could see) on the Q3 or full year expectations.
I'm a Breedon shareholder so look across the sector company updates for some insight to 'bottom line' performance. Something beyond the confidence surveys, ONS measures etc. Useful as they are.
I'm looking forward to Sigmaroc's update on Thursday. I hope it is positive, but I'm confident Max will at least give us a Q3 revenue number - something to work with. Anything else would be a bonus.
Tigar, Sipp10,
Interesting points on Magnus, which prompted me to look at the notes in the latest interim accounts.
"Within the statement of cash flows, the profit share element of the repayment, nil (2021: $1.0 million), is disclosed separately under investing activities. At 30 June 2022, the contingent consideration was $392.4 million (31 December 2021: $344.6 million). The contingent profit sharing arrangement cap of $1 billion was not met as at 30 June 2022 in the present value calculations (2021: cap was not met)."
The clearest point is the reference to "contingent profit sharing arrangement cap of $1 billion", so we can exclude certain payments made to BP from the $1b figure, but while present expectations continue as "cap was not met" our expectation should be that BP will retain a 37.5% share of Magnus cash flows for the foreseeable future, unless you choose to use numbers different to Enquest.
What is in the foreseeable future?
The two obvious elements are oil price and volumes.
Oil price
The contingent consideration is based on present and future oil price expectations. As we know, these are noisy. In Oct 2021 expectations for Brent in 2023 & 2024 were $69 and $66 respectively, and today are $83 and $80 respectively (Ref McD. & Associates)
Volumes
Enquest released a table of anticipated Magnus volumes on proven plus probable reserves
https://www.enquest.com/fileadmin/content/Corporate_actionsPDFs/Rights_Issue/RIProspectus.pdf
Refer to page 203.
Note the CapEx out to 2025. This includes the current well drilling and over the next few years.
The contingent consideration to BP's profit share captures these numbers and revised expectations for the foreseeable future, which is tabulated on page 203 of the link. If you are wondering why the $392m number is so far off the £1b cap it's because future expected payments are shown at present value in the balance sheet at a discount rate of 11% p.a.
Sipp10, your reference to 800m barrels of moveable oil takes us to 2C territory and perhaps beyond. One day those reserves might close out the obligation to BP's profit share. It's another option available to Enquest, and the on-rig drilling facility could support a low-cost route to addition barrels.
I wrote the last line with Kraken and Bressay in mind, alongside a recent comment that Golden Eagle might move to an on-rig drilling option for future wells.
A consequence of any sudden rush to drill in the NS are restrictions on the supply of services, rigs, etc. There will be cost inflation. All the more reason for believing Bressay will be a lower cost phased development than might have been considered at the time of the Kraken development. We shouldn't have to wait long for the answer. I'm expecting a Bressay FDP within the next 12 months.
Tigar, good spot on the $350m net cash flow benefit from Magnus. Excluding any discrepancy between the alignment of the first tranche purchase and the second, I interpret that as a net payment to BP of $210m to the end of 2021.
However, still a long way to $1b. (Sipp10, yes, from BP’s perspective, subject to a 40% tax, it’s ‘only’ worth $600m to them, but on first look I don’t see any beneficial impact to Enquest from the EPL. I haven’t looked very hard.)
Based on recent oil price expectations and Magnus production, Enquest doesn’t expect the $1b to be repaid so, unless that position changes a good assumption is that BP will ‘forever’ maintain an entitlement to 37.5% of Magnus free cash flows.
What is clear from the financial metrics of transactions like Kraken, Magnus and Golden Eagle is that good early year’s production numbers are vital to the eventual return on investment. Any early mishaps are difficult to make-up. (To be clear, the nature of the Magnus transaction, doesn't lead to any loss, but the potential for lost opportunity)
A good contrast with Kraken is Premier Oil’s development of Catcher. Both projects operated along similar time frames and so were impacted by the 2014 collapse in the oil price, but while Kraken fell well short of its initial 50K boepd target, Catcher exceeded theirs by a similar amount. Consequently, Premier Oil were able to announce payback on the Catcher project within two years of first production. Premier Oil got a lot wrong, but their Catcher project was a good one.
In 2019 I estimated Kraken would never get full payback on the project due to the fast build-up of finance costs. (I posted my numbers here) But I hadn’t anticipated a potential extension to Bressay. Perhaps the ugly duckling will have its moment.
• Tigar, you agree with my interpretation that only one well has been drilled on Magnus in 2021. I note SIPP and L3 have referred to two wells. Reference?
I don’t know the reasons AB participated in the RBL, but it does not represent an ‘equity’ component. The risk to us as shareholders is that AB is taking an unfair advantage of his position. Within a ‘premium listing’ the FCA offers other shareholders safeguards. Quoting the FCA, “The safeguards are intended to prevent a related party from taking advantage of its position and also to prevent any perception that it may have done so.”
I believe, as do others on this board, that AB’s actions through various transactions over recent years has been in support of shareholders' interests, and no doubt adds to creditor confidence, which, typically, at the margin reduces costs.
AB is the founder of Enquest and no doubt has an interest beyond the usual CEO renumerations to see Enquest succeed – or at least get the SP back above the 100p listing price.
I don’t have any insights to the terms of the new bond or RBL but having read the terms of previous versions I can make an educated guess:
- I didn’t note a date for the expiry of the $305m bond but I’m assuming it aligns with the RB in Oct 2027.
- The RBL facility closes in April 2027, ahead of the Bonds.
- Repayment of the $305m bond isn’t permitted unless the RBL drawdown is zero.
- In the early years Enquest would need to pay a premium for a full or partial buy back of the new bonds,
- In the last one or two years, before Oct 2027, there is no premium on buy backs.
In summary, it is a little early to be looking at a refinance of the refinancing.
Hi ukbbb,
yes, 2022. Good spot.
I'm surprised your EPL number is so low. I'm dashing out but appreciate if you could elaborate on your number. I haven't seen the Jeffries number. I'll come back to this later.
Bish, bash, bosh – job done! (Okay, 25/10/22 if you want to be picky)
I guess that is what Enquest finance meant when they said, “ready to move when market conditions are right”.
I prefer the lower sizing ($305m) than some expected, even if it might be at a marginally higher coupon than could have been obtained a month or two back, which would have been at a higher sizing.
Some interesting detail:
$400m of the $425m RBL to be utilised (assuming $75m restricted to Letters of Credit)
A $300m accordion facility – this represents additional optional financing at a premium to the basic RBL terms. This is likely to have added to the fee, but no interest charge unless utilised. A ‘nice to have’ if an M&A opportunity arises, an earlier development (Bressay, or Kraken WF) makes sense, or the oil price crashes.
PYUECK. Your ‘headscratch’.
Unless I misunderstood your comment, Enquest has not been buying ENQ1 bonds in the market. They have been buying the US$ HY Bonds.
I didn’t anticipate the move earlier this year to ‘exchange’ the 2023 Retail Bond, with a 2027 RB at the higher coupon (9%), but I read it as an astute move. I guess they would have liked a higher take up on both the new issuance and the exchange, but it removed an unknown element from the overall restructuring.
I think Enquest has been clear in their comments on ENQ1. The offer of exchange has been made (it is no longer open) and the balance of ENQ1 will be repaid Oct 2023.
We’ll get some clarity on cash flows over the coming months, in particular the cash cost of the EPL – I have $75m in mind for 2021, and $150m for 2023. A $50m payment to Suncor in 2023 H1 and c$125m payment on the RB in Oct 2023.
I don’t expect any of these payments to require a dip into the accordion facility.
Given AB’s recent comment I’d be very surprised if the new arrangements materially impact potential returns to shareholders. I look forward to the detail on any hedging obligations.