Member Info for komakino

You can buy 64 50mg sildenafil tablets for £61 plus p&p. Depending on the dosage you need you can then split the tablets with a pill cutter, so you can get 128 25mg doses for the same amount.

https://www.doctorfox.co.uk/erectile-dysfunction/sildenafil.html

ex-s, yes the advantage of Eroxon is that it should be side-effect free, though at the current price point I'd personally be sticking with sildenafil if side effects were not an issue. The key to the success of this is how many people switch and that's the million dollar question that we won't know till we get some sales data.

B_F, yes I did read your comment and all I was doing was pointing out that Barder's comment in your post : 'So Mr Barder' video conference this morning was clear that a lot of Men don't want to go to the doctor etc about what may be perceived as an 'embarassing' condition.' was not relevant to the UK and so doesn't not give an advantage to Eroxon as you can get generic viagra/viagra without seeing anybody. You seemed to have erroneously assumed I was 'correcting' you, which I wasn't at all. A lot of people on here seem to be under the impression you have to see a doctor to get viagra/sildenafil, but that is not the case.

B_F, you don't need to go to the doctor to get viagra or generic viagra. You can just fill in a health questionnaire at an online pharmacy, which is reviewed by a doctor, and if they approve it you get sent the medication, so the argument about embarrassment doesn't apply these days. Check out Lloyds pharmacy online for example

Bushman on ADVFN posted a couple of snippets:

'Africa Energy.com 02 April.

An article by James Gavin advises SAVE’s bid “ expected to move ahead as planned. “ completing H1 as we know from SAVE

Also mentions SAVE will be receiving revenues from Chad Cameron pipeline which “. is not affected by recent news “.'

Last 2 Full year results were posted 7th June so I reckon we'll get those before the conference anyway, and you would suspect they would have to give an update on Chad/SS in those, so the 14th June just might be a ceremonial procedure for the benefit of the conference. Who knows, but all we can do at the moment is speculate to temper the boredom :-)

There is an AIM rule that states that the listing will be cancelled if the shares are suspended for 6 months, but I don't believe that applies in the case of a reverse takeover (although it's not explicit in the rules). Savannah were suspended for slightly longer than 6 months for the Seven Energy transaction (8th June 2017 - 22nd Dec 2017) so I guess it's possible that we could have the admission document published on the 14th June if the deal is signed at the conference, something which would hopefully dispel any concerns over ministerial consent before we started trading again.

05-04-2023

Meeting in plenary to examine the socio-economic and financial situation of Chad, the political parties members of the Groupe de Concertation des Acteurs Politiques (GCAP) are concerned about the outcome that awaits Chad following the nationalization of Esso's assets.

For the political parties members of the GCAP, instead of focusing on correcting the failures induced by their "desire to confiscate power that dangerously compromises a return to peaceful constitutional order, the transitional system is descending into disastrous profiteering". For them, the decision to nationalize the oil assets of Esso Chad is "ill-considered after the scandal of the SHT by which, the same have set up and organized a misappropriation of hundreds of billions remained so far unpunished but whose authors are catapulted to the top of the State in a position of quasi-leader".

And to wonder how a sub-program state of the World Bank and the IMF and in financial distress, largely asphyxiated by private and public debts, unable to pay only domestic debt, can manage to allow itself such an act? "This is an act that will poison the business climate as long as it is deeply and will undermine the legal and judicial security of investments that may either lead to the cascading departure of the other members of the consortium or render null the rating of the level of investment in Chad with its corollary of chaotic socio-economic consequences."

For the political parties that are members of the GCAP, Chad no longer deserves to be engaged in another financial disaster after the deal with Glencore where civil servants continue to pay the heavy price with immeasurable effects relating to the 16 measures. "The same horsemen of the apocalypse who are at the origin of this deal still want to precipitate Chad towards chaos if the other members of the consortium, because of the legal and judicial insecurity in the oil contract, decide to leave Chad to avoid suffering the same incarcerations of approximate management of a state," worry the political parties.

Thus, while considering that such a decision, even justified, does not fall within the competence of a de facto power and a transitional legislative body, the political parties members of GCAP demand the urgent retraction of this "smokey, thoughtless and unseemly" law 003, nationalizing all assets and rights. "Otherwise, beyond the national petition to boycott the entire ongoing process, a special national petition against the sale of oil resources will be launched at the same time in order to require the maximum number of signatures in order to bring this matter to the attention of the World Bank, to request sanctions because of sanctionable practices including fraud, embezzlement and corruption, anti-social acts that have become the favorite sport of the leaders of the transition," they threaten.

https://tchadinfos.com/tchad-les-partis-politiques-membres-du-gcap-exigent-la-retractation-en-urgence-de-la-

Just noticed that the deal signing session at the South Sudan conference, which was originally the last session on day 2, has now been brought forward to the first session on day 1, after the opening ceremony. Small wins :-)

Just for clarity, I suspect that IR were being disingenuous not Porschefund, who is a star :-)

To be honest I don't think we ever get anything meaningful from IR other than perhaps an indication that some update is coming in a vague timeframe. The last person to contact IR who shared their reply was PF if I recall, who posted that IR said there would be news flow in February. What did we get? An appointment of a non-exec director on the 1st and nothing else, so either they were being disingenuous or something changed. I suspect the former.

Yes, good point TiL. Hopefully that won't be too far away.

Yes, agree TiL. You would have to assume that the govt. have a plan to take some form of control away from Savannah, otherwise it would just be an empty gesture that Savannah would ignore, whilst continuing to operate the fields, receive the money and progress the case at arbitration. Would be good to hear something from SAVE but don't think we will until there is either some form of agreement or, if not, then hopefully something before we relist or later in June when we get the end of year results.

Cont...

... in any case, and while waiting to decide on the strategy to be adopted, there is an urgency for the government to operate the nationalized assets and prepare for a possible takeover by a new acquientor or consortium, and for this, it must urgently put in Implementing several actions, including a comprehensive asset evaluation, recruitment and training of qualified personnel, strengthening governance and transparency in the management of nationalized assets, but also the exploration of new strategic partnerships. It is also urgent to diversify markets and customers and think of investment solutions aimed at improving existing infrastructure. All of this will help prepare the transition, for the time when the government should hand over control of the oil assets to a new buyer or consortium, when the legal situation will be resolved... so there is work .... and it will if we are serious.. Chad gold, we know each other!

Amine Adriss is worth following on FB

https://www.facebook.com/aminidriss

Here are his latest thoughts:

... nationalisation has been acted, and as bad and stupid as it is, and assuming that the government is willing to continue straight in its boots, to limit the damage to our economy and country, it will have to quickly imagine solutions and ways out... here are three possible ones:
... First, the government can propose Savannah Energy to reform a strategic partnership, which would allow it to retain some of the oil assets and benefit from the UK company's expertise and network. The partnership could take the form of a production-sharing agreement or a joint venture, respecting Chad’s interests and rights. This type of solution was adopted by Algeria, which signed contracts with foreign companies like Total or BP after nationalizing its oil in 1971... This means renegotiation of existing conventions. Savannah, who has already invested more than $400 million in buying Esso's assets, also doesn't want to waste much time in a long, expensive lawsuits... she might take the idea of renegotiating...
... The second option is the one where the government asks Savannah Energy to pay it financial compensation for the transfer of the oil assets, which would take into account the present and future value of the resources, as well as the damage suffered by Chad, in the transfer with This. This compensation could be negotiated amicably or determined by an arbitration court, depending on applicable law. This type of solution has been adopted by Venezuela, for example, which compensated foreign companies like ExxonMobil or ConocoPhillips after nationalizing its oil. A friendly agreement at minimum is always better than a good but very long trial.
... third option, government can also decide to maintain nationalization of oil assets in the state, and look for other partners to exploit them. This is the most complex and difficult solution to consider. They could be national or regional companies, such as the SNH in Cameroon, for example, that would be willing to cooperate with Chad and comply with its requirements, within the framework of regional and community agreements such as those of CEMAC. It could also be international companies, juniors like Perenco, who would be interested in the potential of Lake Chad's sedimentary basin, in addition to Doba oil, and could be willing to take additional risks, in a rather complicated context characterized by a large trial, but with a pretty decent Return on Investment. This type of solution has been adopted by Nigeria, which created its own national company NNPC and established partnerships with companies like Shell or Chevron after nationalisation of its oil... and their prior eviction... but Nigeria's volumes and reserves were such that for majors, renegotiate was the only option to be able to remain in the country.. Doba oil gold is almost finished...

Well my take on it is that Savannah obviously do have the technical and financial capacity. The funds were available long since from the loan and they spent 6 months transferring the IT knowledge/systems from Exxon. The staff that are running the operation are previous Exxon staff , staff who the govt seem to be happy to run it on their behalf! As said previously, my view is that Exxon&Savannah will have tied this up legally and will undoubtedly win the arbitration. Can't see Chad doing this as anything as trying to leverage a brown paper bag cash settlement. A pain more than anything else imo

Savannah agreed to pay $1.25 billion for Petronas’ interests in South Sudan. The final amount will depend on completion adjustments, depending on the effective date of the transaction. This should reduce the actual amount paid quite substantially.

The company has not provided a net figure for production from Petronas’ South Sudan interests. The Malaysian company is the country’s largest producer, largely as a result of its 40% stake in Block 3 and 7.

Kelty said South Sudan was difficult, but no more so than other parts of Africa. “I don’t see it as being any more difficult – although still a challenge – in which to operate.”

The country has struggled to boost production and would be eager to secure new investments. However, it is seen as the third most corrupt country in the world.

Petronas has come under fire by a German NGO for oil spills and pollution of drinking water in the country. While there is scope to increase oil production, Savannah would need also to demonstrate its environmental bona fides.

Debt plans
Savannah said it would carry out this deal using its cash – which stood at around $193mn in late 2022 – and debt.

The company has had some success in using debt for acquisitions in the past. The company’s productive base is in Nigeria, where it acquired the former assets of Seven Energy.

It has made progress on paying down its overall debt levels. In 2019, net debt was $484mn, which fell to $408.7mn in 2020, $370mn in 2021 and $310.1mn in 2022.

Savannah has not yet published its 2022 figures. However, at the end of 2021, its Accugas debt facility stood at $371mn.

The company has been trying to refinance this, with the aim of shifting from a US dollar-denominated facility to naira-denominated, which would allow it to avoid foreign exchange pressures. Talks have been under way for some time, with Savannah hoping that it might make progress within the next three months.

Gas reliant
For now, Savannah continues to be reliant on its Nigerian assets – of which gas production accounts for 90% – for cash flow. While the company has grown a substantial position in terms of providing feedstock for gas-fired power, local sales have missed out on much of the international rise in prices.

While the company’s Chad plans have moved away, it has taken ownership of the Cameroon section of the pipeline. This around 70% of the length, around 900km, with associated infrastructure.

While Chad is signed up to arbitration at the ICC, Cameroon is also signed up to the New York Convention, giving some additional assurances against expropriation.

With Chad in the weeds, the pressure is on South Sudan to come through with the goods. The hope is that the deal will complete within the first half of the year.

Operations in South Sudan would bring their own challenges, not least around political risk, but Savannah needs to diversify its operations.

htTps://www.energyvoice.com/oilandgas/africa/ep-africa/493663/savannah-ba

The pressure has been building over the last few months. N’Djamena expelled Savannah’s eight employees in December. Savannah secured an initial arbitration ruling from the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in January.

Setback
A note from FinnCap said the loss of Chad was “clearly disappointing” and that the country was now essentially “uninvestable”.

Savannah had “expended huge effort and considerable monies on the transaction. It is even more disappointing given asset performance has been strong since Savannah assumed operatorship from ExxonMobil, with production up ~9% since and an investment programme initiated to significantly increase production further over coming years.”

In the first half of 2022, Savannah spent $14.6mn as a deposit for the Exxon transaction.

Chad analyst Amine Idriss described the nationalisation as a mistake. The move exposes the Chadian state to potential retaliation, he said, but also “sends an extremely negative political signal. Investing in Chad is now perceived as riskier than ever”.

He also questioned whether the government had the technical skill to manage the mature Doba fields and said it raised the prospect for more corruption.

Seeking security
In addition to raising warnings over the appeal of Chad, the country will also not benefit from Savannah’s planned renewable energy plans. The company had planned to build up to 500 MW of solar and wind power in the country.

Africa analyst Ben Hunter at Verisk Maplecroft said the nationalisation was “likely linked to President Mahamat Deby’s drive to gain more control over the country’s lucrative oil sector. Deby is attempting to achieve this via a range of a measures, from purchasing stakes owned by foreign firms to outright nationalisation.”

Part of the challenge for Deby is that his position, gained following the death of his father via a coup, is not entirely secure, Hunter said.

Deby “is likely to ignore” the ICC ruling, the analyst said. “He will view greater control over Chad’s primary income stream as more important to his political survival than respecting an international arbitration award.”

Petronas
Savannah had also struck a deal to buy out Malaysian Petronas’ assets in Chad in December 2021 for around $266mn. It announced a mutual agreement to cancel this plan in December 2022, at the same time as announcing the closure of the Exxon deal.

Petronas said, in March, that it was selling down its Chad assets – with the rumour being that Chad’s state-owned Societe des Hydrocarbures du Tchad (SHT) is the buyer. Some sources have suggested Perenco is funding SHT’s acquisition from Petronas. Petronas has not responded to a request for comment.

At the same time that Savannah was announcing the cancellation of its deal to buy the Petronas assets in Chad, it set out an even more ambitious plan with the Malaysian company.

Savannah battered by Chad, focuses on South Sudan
At the same time that Savannah was announcing the cancellation of its deal to buy the Petronas assets in Chad, it set out an even more ambitious plan with the Malaysian company.

Savannah Energy is an independent with a plan for growth, but the plan has taken some knocks with Chad nationalising its assets.

The Chad move is a “real challenge and setback” for Savannah, Panmure Gordon’s Ashley Kelty said. The company has an “extremely strong case” at the ICC tribunal, he said, but “the resolution for Savannah will take years to achieve by legal routes”.

Sources have guided an ICC ruling to be around 18-24 months.

“Consequently, the outlook in the near term is now centred around revenues from Nigeria and the Chad-Cameroon pipeline,” said the Panmure Gordon analyst.

The UK-listed independent signed a deal with ExxonMobil in December 2021 to buy the Doba oil project, which produced around 28,000 barrels per day gross in 2022. It also agreed to buy Exxon’s share of export infrastructure, in the Chad-Cameroon pipeline. This link carries Doba production to a terminal offshore Kribi.

Exxon had encountered problems with Chad in the past. Perhaps most famously, Chad attempted to levy a $74 billion fine on the US supermajor in 2016 in a dispute over royalties.

As Exxon was heading for the exit, these worries did not dissipate with Chad seeking to extract additional taxes. The company announced its withdrawal from Chad in December, with Savannah announcing the deal’s completion. Savannah valued the deal at $407 million, with Exxon providing $170mn via a pre-payment facility.

Conditions
The sale agreement came with a number of provisos, though. Savannah said it, and Exxon, agreed to waive the condition requiring ministerial consent for the deal. They also agreed to waive a requirement that Exxon’s local unit settle disputed taxes with the government.

Under the upstream and midstream contracts, Chad Minister of Petroleum and Mining Djerassem le Bemadjiel had 60 days to approve – or not – a sale, Savannah said. With no word from the minister, the buyer and seller agreed this was tacit acceptance.

Le Bemadjiel, speaking this week in Chad, defended the move to nationalise the assets. The decision to seize the fields and pipeline was, he said, to protect Chad’s heritage and natural resources.

Exxon, a local news site reported the minister as saying, had violated provisions of Article 30, paragraph 1 which requires state approval for such a transfer. Exxon decided to leave Chad unilaterally and without government approval, he continued.

Savannah “does not have the technical and financial capacity to effectively continue the management of the Chadian pipeline”, the minister said.

Exxon has not yet responded to a request for comment.

Lack of consideration for the Chadian state

For the ministers present, by acting in this way, Savannah, together with Esso – ExxonMobil, not only flouted the prerogatives of the State but also knowingly violated the right of pre-emption enjoyed by the Société des Hydrocarbures du Tchad (SHT), under its commercial agreements with Esso Exploration and Production Chad Inc.

« Beyond this act considered unacceptable by the government, Savannah and Esso – ExxonMobil have committed acts that pose serious and immediate threats to Chadian public order as well as to all actors in this economic sector crucial to the stability and development of Chad, all of which depend on pipeline services. In such a situation, the Chadian government has no choice but to take a strong decision to guarantee the sovereignty, security and general interest of our country," he said.

He recalled that in the history of the Chadian oil sector, there have been many disposals between different companies and in 2022 alone, there have been three requests for divestitures, two of which have been approved. He cited examples such as Glencore with Perenco, United Hydrocarbon with CGI, Encana with CNPCIC. And to wonder why these divestments did not pose a problem but the one between Esso – ExxonMobil and Savannah?

https://tchadinfos.com/la-chronologie-des-faits-obligeant-letat-tchadien-a-nationaliser-les-actifs-desso/?fbclid=IwAR3pV_08xt7kHA7KzkTxehY2augfX6wWG1by9AZgiv7iLZPV--sPpR5Ws8g