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Oil markets will likely be the next to undergo severe stress. Inventories have drawn at a record pace and now stand well below normal. Non-OPEC production growth has disappointed while strong demand continues to surprise.

Last quarter, we discussed the International Energy Agency’s latest climate policies and how they would produce unintended consequences. One consequence that has emerged even faster than we had expected: OPEC’s regain of market share and pricing power.

Despite having aggressively promoted legislation that echoed the IEA and discouraged domestic oil production, on August 11th 2021 the Biden administration called on OPEC to increase production to help ease high prices. OPEC rejected Biden’s request and crude prices having rallied over 20% since.

The energy crisis has just started. Over the next decade, this new cycle will unfold with many unanticipated twists and turns. The investment implications and opportunities remain incredibly large. In an ironic twist, institutional investors have little to no exposure to energy stocks. We would not be surprised if energy ended up representing investors’ single largest exposure at some point before the decade is over.

http://gorozen.com/research/commentaries/3Q2021_Commentary

The energy crisis unfolding across Europe, Asia, and South America caught almost everybody by surprise – but not our readers, we hope. Our 2Q20 Natural Resource Market Commentary was titled “On the Verge of an Energy Crisis.” Fast forward 14 months: the energy crisis we predicted has arrived with a vengeance...

We thought extremely strong oil demand, coupled with a feeble rebound in non-OPEC production, would lead to a situation never seen in 160 years of crude history: demand would actually surpass global pumping capability by the end of 2022. Even during the two energy crises of the 1970s (the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979), crude demand did not come close to exceeding global pumping capability. Recent data strongly suggests our modelling was correct: demand will exceed pumping capacity by the end of next year...

Investors need to recognize how interlocked energy markets have become. A crisis in one market is all but certain to spill over into another. European utilities are desperately switching from burning expensive natural gas to much less expensive crude oil, increasing demand by over 500,000 b/d. This additional source of demand has introduced even more tightness into an oil market that is already undersupplied. The oil crisis we had originally expected to emerge in 4Q22 will now likely come even sooner. As the natural gas shortage did, the coming oil crisis will seemingly come out of nowhere, taking much of the investment community by surprise...

How did this energy crisis emerge so quickly and unexpectedly? The most important cause has been the ongoing underestimation of global energy demand. In turn, this resulted in dramatic underinvestment in oil and gas development.

Over the last 20 years, there has been a surge of energy demand, a phenomenon we call the “S-Curve.” As a country gets richer, energy demand grows faster than economic activity for a period of time. We estimate that in 1995 approximately 700 mm people were in the midst of their “S-Curve.” Today, there are almost 4 billion people in this category – the most in history.

Coinciding with the explosion of energy-hungry consumers is the misguided focus on renewable energy over the last 10 years. Mounting ESG pressures forced energy companies to significantly reduce their traditional hydrocarbon investment while dramatically increasing commitments to renewable energy projects. Wind and solar have a fundamental problem: they are intermittent and therefore unsuited for baseload power.

We have argued that surging demand from the S-Curve combined with a reduction of traditional energy capital spending would prove unsustainable. The result is the energy crisis unfolding today. We are still in the very early innings of this new cycle...

Oil markets will likely be the next to undergo severe stress. Inventories have drawn at a record pace and now stand well below normal. Non-OPEC production growth has disappointed while strong demand continues to surprise.

Last quarter, we discussed the International Energy Agency’s latest climate policies and how they would produce unintended consequences. One consequence that has emerged even faster than we had expected: OPEC’s regain of market share and pricing power.

Despite having aggressively promoted legislation that echoed the IEA and discouraged domestic oil production, on August 11th 2021 the Biden administration called on OPEC to increase production to help ease high prices. OPEC rejected Biden’s request and crude prices having rallied over 20% since.

The energy crisis has just started. Over the next decade, this new cycle will unfold with many unanticipated twists and turns. The investment implications and opportunities remain incredibly large. In an ironic twist, institutional investors have little to no exposure to energy stocks. We would not be surprised if energy ended up representing investors’ single largest exposure at some point before the decade is over.

http://gorozen.com/research/commentaries/3Q2021_Commentary

The energy crisis unfolding across Europe, Asia, and South America caught almost everybody by surprise – but not our readers, we hope. Our 2Q20 Natural Resource Market Commentary was titled “On the Verge of an Energy Crisis.” Fast forward 14 months: the energy crisis we predicted has arrived with a vengeance...

We thought extremely strong oil demand, coupled with a feeble rebound in non-OPEC production, would lead to a situation never seen in 160 years of crude history: demand would actually surpass global pumping capability by the end of 2022. Even during the two energy crises of the 1970s (the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979), crude demand did not come close to exceeding global pumping capability. Recent data strongly suggests our modelling was correct: demand will exceed pumping capacity by the end of next year...

Investors need to recognize how interlocked energy markets have become. A crisis in one market is all but certain to spill over into another. European utilities are desperately switching from burning expensive natural gas to much less expensive crude oil, increasing demand by over 500,000 b/d. This additional source of demand has introduced even more tightness into an oil market that is already undersupplied. The oil crisis we had originally expected to emerge in 4Q22 will now likely come even sooner. As the natural gas shortage did, the coming oil crisis will seemingly come out of nowhere, taking much of the investment community by surprise...

How did this energy crisis emerge so quickly and unexpectedly? The most important cause has been the ongoing underestimation of global energy demand. In turn, this resulted in dramatic underinvestment in oil and gas development.

Over the last 20 years, there has been a surge of energy demand, a phenomenon we call the “S-Curve.” As a country gets richer, energy demand grows faster than economic activity for a period of time. We estimate that in 1995 approximately 700 mm people were in the midst of their “S-Curve.” Today, there are almost 4 billion people in this category – the most in history.

Coinciding with the explosion of energy-hungry consumers is the misguided focus on renewable energy over the last 10 years. Mounting ESG pressures forced energy companies to significantly reduce their traditional hydrocarbon investment while dramatically increasing commitments to renewable energy projects. Wind and solar have a fundamental problem: they are intermittent and therefore unsuited for baseload power.

We have argued that surging demand from the S-Curve combined with a reduction of traditional energy capital spending would prove unsustainable. The result is the energy crisis unfolding today. We are still in the very early innings of this new cycle...

Oil markets will likely be the next to undergo severe stress. Inventories have drawn at a record pace and now stand well below normal. Non-OPEC production growth has disappointed while strong demand continues to surprise.

Last quarter, we discussed the International Energy Agency’s latest climate policies and how they would produce unintended consequences. One consequence that has emerged even faster than we had expected: OPEC’s regain of market share and pricing power.

Despite having aggressively promoted legislation that echoed the IEA and discouraged domestic oil production, on August 11th 2021 the Biden administration called on OPEC to increase production to help ease high prices. OPEC rejected Biden’s request and crude prices having rallied over 20% since.

The energy crisis has just started. Over the next decade, this new cycle will unfold with many unanticipated twists and turns. The investment implications and opportunities remain incredibly large. In an ironic twist, institutional investors have little to no exposure to energy stocks. We would not be surprised if energy ended up representing investors’ single largest exposure at some point before the decade is over.

http://gorozen.com/research/commentaries/3Q2021_Commentary

The energy crisis unfolding across Europe, Asia, and South America caught almost everybody by surprise – but not our readers, we hope. Our 2Q20 Natural Resource Market Commentary was titled “On the Verge of an Energy Crisis.” Fast forward 14 months: the energy crisis we predicted has arrived with a vengeance...

We thought extremely strong oil demand, coupled with a feeble rebound in non-OPEC production, would lead to a situation never seen in 160 years of crude history: demand would actually surpass global pumping capability by the end of 2022. Even during the two energy crises of the 1970s (the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979), crude demand did not come close to exceeding global pumping capability. Recent data strongly suggests our modelling was correct: demand will exceed pumping capacity by the end of next year...

Investors need to recognize how interlocked energy markets have become. A crisis in one market is all but certain to spill over into another. European utilities are desperately switching from burning expensive natural gas to much less expensive crude oil, increasing demand by over 500,000 b/d. This additional source of demand has introduced even more tightness into an oil market that is already undersupplied. The oil crisis we had originally expected to emerge in 4Q22 will now likely come even sooner. As the natural gas shortage did, the coming oil crisis will seemingly come out of nowhere, taking much of the investment community by surprise...

How did this energy crisis emerge so quickly and unexpectedly? The most important cause has been the ongoing underestimation of global energy demand. In turn, this resulted in dramatic underinvestment in oil and gas development.

Over the last 20 years, there has been a surge of energy demand, a phenomenon we call the “S-Curve.” As a country gets richer, energy demand grows faster than economic activity for a period of time. We estimate that in 1995 approximately 700 mm people were in the midst of their “S-Curve.” Today, there are almost 4 billion people in this category – the most in history.

Coinciding with the explosion of energy-hungry consumers is the misguided focus on renewable energy over the last 10 years. Mounting ESG pressures forced energy companies to significantly reduce their traditional hydrocarbon investment while dramatically increasing commitments to renewable energy projects. Wind and solar have a fundamental problem: they are intermittent and therefore unsuited for baseload power.

We have argued that surging demand from the S-Curve combined with a reduction of traditional energy capital spending would prove unsustainable. The result is the energy crisis unfolding today. We are still in the very early innings of this new cycle...

Another source of LNG export growth has been the US which, since 2015, has represented more than half of global natural gas production growth and 40% of LNG supply growth. In that time, US LNG exports grew by 6 bcf/d and the feed gas for these exports was easily sourced--domestic production grew nearly 17 bcf/d over the same period. There is currently another 5 bcf/d of US LNG export capacity fully permitted and under construction and another 50 bcf/d proposed. Yet, US production peaked in November 2019 at 97.2 bcf/d and remains 2 bcf/d lower today. Over that time, growth in the Marcellus, Permian, and Haynesville has not been enough to offset declines in the rest of the country. Recent production trends suggest that growth may be coming back modestly, but it remains early, and our modelling continues to suggest production growth disappointments emerging in the next several years. Since November 2019, Marcellus production growth has averaged 26 mmcf/d per month, compared with 300 mmcf/d per month on average between 2017-2019 – a decline of 90%.

Going forward, LNG demand is again set to surge much more than analysts believe possible. Our base case assumes Chinese real GDP grows at 4% per annum while primary energy demand grows at 2%. If natural gas reaches 15% of total energy by 2030, consumption will more than double from 33 bcf/d today to 75 bcf/d by the end of the decade. If domestic production grows 5% per year and pipeline imports double again from here, LNG demand must grow nearly four-fold from 9.5 bcf/d in 2020 to 36 bcf/d by 2030. This alone would consume all the planned new LNG export capacity as wells as a portion of all proposed projects.

China is not the only country going through this phenomenon. Emerging markets around the world are moving as quickly as possible to LNG to improve air quality and reduce carbon emissions, just as our wealth models predicted. Global LNG demand growth outside of China and Japan (where demand has been heavily impacted by shut-down nuclear reactors) has exploded. Between 2010 and 2015, the rest of the world consumed approximately 19 bcf/d and exhibited no growth. Between 2015 and 2020, demand grew 50%, going from 19 bcf/d to 29 bcf/d in only five years. Going forward, these trends will continue resulting in ever-stronger global LNG demand.

Many energy analysts still do not properly understand these trends. For example, Wood Mackenzie recently published a note discussing Chinese LNG demand. In their report, they acknowledge that demand will grow, but upon closer inspection their estimates for 2030 are less than half what our models predict. If analysts had properly understood natural gas’s strong underlying demand factors, today’s crisis might not have been so unexpected.

Where will the supply come from to meet new LNG demand? Owing to their large upfront capital costs, historically LNG projects have been limited to the super-majors. Unfortunately, ESG pressures have left these companies unable to commit to new projects and they are now being forced to divest existing ones (as you read in “The Incredible Shrinking Majors Part II”). Natural gas production has been harder to come by as companies around the world continue to curtail capital spending. Leaving aside the US, which we will discuss in a moment, two-thirds of gas-producing countries, representing nearly 40% of global production, have seen their volumes decline over the last three years. These trends will likely get worse.

http://gorozen.com/research/commentaries/3Q2021_Commentary

Beginning in 2013, we wrote about the relationship between a country’s wealth and its demand for natural gas. When a country is poor, it must burn the cheapest energy available: coal. Compared with coal, natural gas is a much cleaner fuel – generating much less smog and CO2 – however, it is expensive. Not only is gas more expensive per mmbtu, but the infrastructure needed to handle a gas instead of a solid is dramatically higher. Therefore, poorer countries tend to use less natural gas as a percent of their energy mix. OECD countries generate 12% of their primary energy from coal compared with 37% for non-OECD countries.

As a country gets richer, its citizens demand a better quality of life – and air quality is extremely important. For example, in a recent survey of Chinese citizens, the top five concerns were dominated by issues of environmental degradation. In 2015, demonstrations erupted across China demanding cleaner air as hundreds of millions in and around major urban areas were subjected to endless smog and haze. Shortly thereafter, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced a plan to increase natural gas to 15% of its energy mix by 2030 from only 5% in 2015.

We first identified these trends back in 2010 and used the relationship between per capita wealth and natural gas share of the energy mix to build a global gas demand model projecting robust demand far greater than consensus. At the time, prevailing wisdom held that projected large increases in Qatar export capacity could not be absorbed by world markets and that LNG prices would be driven to sub $1 per mmbtu -- LNG’s marginal cost. This bearish argument took global planned import capacity, which was projected to grow far more slowly than LNG supply, as a proxy for demand. We argued instead that rising incomes, coupled with global growth, would be the factors driving consumption and that import infrastructure would grow to meet demand, not the other way around.

We have updated our models several times since then. Every time we do, our models become even more bullish. Between 2010 and 2020, Chinese gas demand tripled – far more than anyone believed possible. As China’s per capita wealth increased, Chinese LNG imports went up seven-fold as production and pipeline imports were unable to meet the increased demand resulting from the desire to switch away from burning coal. Last year, gas made up 8% of China’s energy mix – up from 4% in 2010 -- and is on track to reach 15% by 2030. Earlier this year China replaced Japan as the largest LNG importer for the first time ever.

Another source of LNG export growth has been the US which, since 2015, has represented more than half of global natural gas production growth and 40% of LNG supply growth. In that time, US LNG exports grew by 6 bcf/d and the feed gas for these exports was easily sourced--domestic production grew nearly 17 bcf/d over the same period. There is currently another 5 bcf/d of US LNG export capacity fully permitted and under construction and another 50 bcf/d proposed. Yet, US production peaked in November 2019 at 97.2 bcf/d and remains 2 bcf/d lower today. Over that time, growth in the Marcellus, Permian, and Haynesville has not been enough to offset declines in the rest of the country. Recent production trends suggest that growth may be coming back modestly, but it remains early, and our modelling continues to suggest production growth disappointments emerging in the next several years. Since November 2019, Marcellus production growth has averaged 26 mmcf/d per month, compared with 300 mmcf/d per month on average between 2017-2019 – a decline of 90%.

Going forward, LNG demand is again set to surge much more than analysts believe possible. Our base case assumes Chinese real GDP grows at 4% per annum while primary energy demand grows at 2%. If natural gas reaches 15% of total energy by 2030, consumption will more than double from 33 bcf/d today to 75 bcf/d by the end of the decade. If domestic production grows 5% per year and pipeline imports double again from here, LNG demand must grow nearly four-fold from 9.5 bcf/d in 2020 to 36 bcf/d by 2030. This alone would consume all the planned new LNG export capacity as wells as a portion of all proposed projects.

China is not the only country going through this phenomenon. Emerging markets around the world are moving as quickly as possible to LNG to improve air quality and reduce carbon emissions, just as our wealth models predicted. Global LNG demand growth outside of China and Japan (where demand has been heavily impacted by shut-down nuclear reactors) has exploded. Between 2010 and 2015, the rest of the world consumed approximately 19 bcf/d and exhibited no growth. Between 2015 and 2020, demand grew 50%, going from 19 bcf/d to 29 bcf/d in only five years. Going forward, these trends will continue resulting in ever-stronger global LNG demand.

Many energy analysts still do not properly understand these trends. For example, Wood Mackenzie recently published a note discussing Chinese LNG demand. In their report, they acknowledge that demand will grow, but upon closer inspection their estimates for 2030 are less than half what our models predict. If analysts had properly understood natural gas’s strong underlying demand factors, today’s crisis might not have been so unexpected.

Where will the supply come from to meet new LNG demand? Owing to their large upfront capital costs, historically LNG projects have been limited to the super-majors. Unfortunately, ESG pressures have left these companies unable to commit to new projects and they are now being forced to divest existing ones (as you read in “The Incredible Shrinking Majors Part II”). Natural gas production has been harder to come by as companies around the world continue to curtail capital spending. Leaving aside the US, which we will discuss in a moment, two-thirds of gas-producing countries, representing nearly 40% of global production, have seen their volumes decline over the last three years. These trends will likely get worse.

http://gorozen.com/research/commentaries/3Q2021_Commentary

Beginning in 2013, we wrote about the relationship between a country’s wealth and its demand for natural gas. When a country is poor, it must burn the cheapest energy available: coal. Compared with coal, natural gas is a much cleaner fuel – generating much less smog and CO2 – however, it is expensive. Not only is gas more expensive per mmbtu, but the infrastructure needed to handle a gas instead of a solid is dramatically higher. Therefore, poorer countries tend to use less natural gas as a percent of their energy mix. OECD countries generate 12% of their primary energy from coal compared with 37% for non-OECD countries.

As a country gets richer, its citizens demand a better quality of life – and air quality is extremely important. For example, in a recent survey of Chinese citizens, the top five concerns were dominated by issues of environmental degradation. In 2015, demonstrations erupted across China demanding cleaner air as hundreds of millions in and around major urban areas were subjected to endless smog and haze. Shortly thereafter, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced a plan to increase natural gas to 15% of its energy mix by 2030 from only 5% in 2015.

We first identified these trends back in 2010 and used the relationship between per capita wealth and natural gas share of the energy mix to build a global gas demand model projecting robust demand far greater than consensus. At the time, prevailing wisdom held that projected large increases in Qatar export capacity could not be absorbed by world markets and that LNG prices would be driven to sub $1 per mmbtu -- LNG’s marginal cost. This bearish argument took global planned import capacity, which was projected to grow far more slowly than LNG supply, as a proxy for demand. We argued instead that rising incomes, coupled with global growth, would be the factors driving consumption and that import infrastructure would grow to meet demand, not the other way around.

We have updated our models several times since then. Every time we do, our models become even more bullish. Between 2010 and 2020, Chinese gas demand tripled – far more than anyone believed possible. As China’s per capita wealth increased, Chinese LNG imports went up seven-fold as production and pipeline imports were unable to meet the increased demand resulting from the desire to switch away from burning coal. Last year, gas made up 8% of China’s energy mix – up from 4% in 2010 -- and is on track to reach 15% by 2030. Earlier this year China replaced Japan as the largest LNG importer for the first time ever.

Another source of LNG export growth has been the US which, since 2015, has represented more than half of global natural gas production growth and 40% of LNG supply growth. In that time, US LNG exports grew by 6 bcf/d and the feed gas for these exports was easily sourced--domestic production grew nearly 17 bcf/d over the same period. There is currently another 5 bcf/d of US LNG export capacity fully permitted and under construction and another 50 bcf/d proposed. Yet, US production peaked in November 2019 at 97.2 bcf/d and remains 2 bcf/d lower today. Over that time, growth in the Marcellus, Permian, and Haynesville has not been enough to offset declines in the rest of the country. Recent production
trends suggest that growth may be coming back modestly, but it remains early, and our modelling continues to suggest production growth disappointments emerging in the next several years. Since November 2019, Marcellus production growth has averaged 26 mmcf/d per month, compared with 300 mmcf/d per month on average between 2017-2019 – a
decline of 90%.

Going forward, LNG demand is again set to surge much more than analysts believe possible. Our base case assumes Chinese real GDP grows at 4% per annum while primary energy demand grows at 2%. If natural gas reaches 15% of total energy by 2030, consumption will more than double from 33 bcf/d today to 75 bcf/d by the end of the decade. If domestic
production grows 5% per year and pipeline imports double again from here, LNG demand must grow nearly four-fold from 9.5 bcf/d in 2020 to 36 bcf/d by 2030. This alone would consume all the planned new LNG export capacity as wells as a portion of all proposed projects.

China is not the only country going through this phenomenon. Emerging markets around the world are moving as quickly as possible to LNG to improve air quality and reduce carbon emissions, just as our wealth models predicted. Global LNG demand growth outside of China and Japan (where demand has been heavily impacted by shut-down nuclear reactors) has exploded. Between 2010 and 2015, the rest of the world consumed approximately 19 bcf/d and exhibited no growth. Between 2015 and 2020, demand grew 50%, going from 19 bcf/d to 29 bcf/d in only five years. Going forward, these trends will continue resulting in ever-stronger global LNG demand.

Many energy analysts still do not properly understand these trends. For example, Wood Mackenzie recently published a note discussing Chinese LNG demand. In their report, they acknowledge that demand will grow, but upon closer inspection their estimates for 2030 are less than half what our models predict. If analysts had properly understood natural gas’s strong underlying demand factors, today’s crisis might not have been so unexpected.

Where will the supply come from to meet new LNG demand? Owing to their large upfront capital costs, historically LNG projects have been limited to the super-majors. Unfortunately, ESG pressures have left these companies unable to commit to new projects and they are now being forced to divest existing ones (as you read in “The Incredible Shrinking Majors Part II”). Natural gas production has been harder to come by as companies around the world continue to curtail capital spending. Leaving aside the US, which we will discuss in a moment, two-thirds of gas-producing countries, representing nearly 40% of global production, have seen their volumes decline over the last three years. These trends will likely get worse.

http://gorozen.com/research/commentaries/3Q2021_Commentary

Beginning in 2013, we wrote about the relationship between a country’s wealth and its demand for natural gas. When a country is poor, it must burn the cheapest energy available: coal. Compared with coal, natural gas is a much cleaner fuel – generating much less smog and CO2 – however, it is expensive. Not only is gas more expensive per mmbtu, but the infrastructure needed to handle a gas instead of a solid is dramatically higher. Therefore, poorer countries tend to use less natural gas as a percent of their energy mix. OECD countries generate 12% of their primary energy from coal compared with 37% for non-OECD countries.

As a country gets richer, its citizens demand a better quality of life – and air quality is extremely important. For example, in a recent survey of Chinese citizens, the top five concerns were dominated by issues of environmental degradation. In 2015, demonstrations erupted across China demanding cleaner air as hundreds of millions in and around major urban areas were subjected to endless smog and haze. Shortly thereafter, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced a plan to increase natural gas to 15% of its energy mix by 2030 from only 5% in 2015.

We first identified these trends back in 2010 and used the relationship between per capita wealth and natural gas share of the energy mix to build a global gas demand model projecting robust demand far greater than consensus. At the time, prevailing wisdom held that projected large increases in Qatar export capacity could not be absorbed by world markets and that LNG prices would be driven to sub $1 per mmbtu -- LNG’s marginal cost. This bearish argument took global planned import capacity, which was projected to grow far more slowly than LNG supply, as a proxy for demand. We argued instead that rising incomes, coupled with global growth, would be the factors driving consumption and that import infrastructure would grow to meet demand, not the other way around.

We have updated our models several times since then. Every time we do, our models become even more bullish. Between 2010 and 2020, Chinese gas demand tripled – far more than anyone believed possible. As China’s per capita wealth increased, Chinese LNG imports went up seven-fold as production and pipeline imports were unable to meet the increased
demand resulting from the desire to switch away from burning coal. Last year, gas made up 8% of China’s energy mix – up from 4% in 2010 -- and is on track to reach 15% by 2030. Earlier this year China replaced Japan as the largest LNG importer for the first time ever.

MT posted a while back that according to Euroclear's Stock on Loan(short) Report some 0.43% of Savannah Energy shares are currently shorted. That's 4,284,556 shares that short sellers have been sweating on for the past 6 months (I'd rather them than me!).

No one here (to my knowledge) has yet discussed the impact that short covering will have on relisting, but I would assume there would be a stampede to exit i.e. a buying frenzy upon relisting by either the shorters themselves or their brokers closing the positions for them.

This matter not only highlights the risk of shorting smaller companies who may suddenly drop a big RTO RNS, but also the risk of trading in and out of such companies and "losing your position" (see the book Reminiscences of a Stock Operator) just before a transformational RTO.

There are various pages that have discussed dilution, suggest you flick through the chat pages and word search dilution.

This is a decent and recent overview of the company https://d1io3yog0oux5.cloudfront.net/_a3ae37c2b8c0500b71115c6d01e02256/dgoc/db/483/4522/presentation/Diversified+Energy+Capital+Markets+Day+2021.pdf

Biden to oil industry “what can I do to help you produce more oil”

Oil industry “let us build pipelines, storage facilities and give us drilling permits”

Biden “I won’t do that, and these high prices are your fault”

With the gas leak hit job blowing over a big benefit of it is it will likely further depress the price of future acquisitions of mature fields. DEC will certainly use this matter as leverage to get a better deal for shareholders

http://gorozen.com/research/commentaries/3Q2021_Commentary

This is always a thought provoking read that I would recommend people take the time to immerse themselves in.

"The Energy Crisis is Here
The Incredible Shrinking Oil Majors -- Part 2
Natural Resource Market Commentary -- 3rd Quarter 2021
Running Out of Global Pumping Capacity
Natural Gas: From the Cheapest Energy in History to the Most Expensive in 12
Months"