SP Angel note on sxx8 Oct 2019 14:03
Sirius Minerals has hit the headlines again this time with the laying off of some 300 staff just two days after Sirius announced work was to slow at its sites. The project is reported to have involved some 1,200 staff and contractors who were employed to build a mine which was evidently unfunded to completion.
Sirius management claim to be trying to solve the crisis but, sadly, we see little chance of a rescue and our thoughts are with those who have lost their jobs and the job losses that are likely to follow. On one level we admire the determination of management and the workforce to look to build the Woodsmith project and if willpower was enough on its own then the workers determination could get the job done.
But:
Why did Sirius management start a project where a key component of the funding was not secured?
Why did Sirius go for such a large scale construction plan (est. US$3bn) – multi-billion dollar capital cost plans are not easy to fund for single project companies with no positive cash flow from existing mining operations?
Why did Sirius make the assumption that it could get sufficient offtake commitments for its Poly 4 (polyhalite) product?
Why would investors agree to finance a mine where offtake commitments could fail causing significant financial damage and potential collapse of the mining company?
Why did Sirius assume that offtake commitments would be sufficient to satisfy bond investors for a $500m bond?
Sirius were not just short of a few quid, they failed to secure a US$500m bond issue on which a US$400m convertible was contingent.
Why did Sirius assume that a $500m bond placement would be successful on a single project company making its entrance into the fertilizer market?
We speculate that some bankers may have offered assurances on the US$500m but we would consider it ill-judged to take these assurances as firm money in the bank.
Why did Sirius assume that it could ramp up production to 10mt and sell this into a market which is currently estimated to be around 2.5mtpa for potassium magnesium sulphate (SOPM) fertilizers?
Re: Capital costs: in the Apr 2017 prospectus SRK’s Technical report used total capex of $3,546.4m including $857.5m for the tunnel to the port and a further $640.5m for the port and materials handling facilities.
In July 2019, RPA (Roscoe Postle) wrote an “Independent Technical Engineer Phase 2 Due Diligence Report on the North Yorkshire Polyhalite Project, UK ” – on the company’s website at: https://siriusminerals.com/downloads/rpa-report/ which did not include a breakdown but reported the overall capital for the project as $4,056m
Given that BHP has had its giant Jansen potash mine in Canada on hold for some years despite the expenditure of $2.7bn over the six years give some idea of the risks of trying to enter the fertilizer market in this sort of scale.
BHP has said it would consider selling a stake in the Jansen mine but no successful offer has stepped fo