Member Info for Etotheipi

Here's hoping, 128pps would do nicely thnak-you.

I have to take issue with this statement: "Nor is there much evidence of optimism among the board of directors of this disaster. Despite one of them serving since 2015 and their annual fees ranging between £31,000 and £48,000, only two out of five have more invested in INOV"

Here are their quoted holdings on ii:

Dr. Scott Selby Durrand Brown: 78,269

Mr. Stephen Cohen: 309,737

Ms. Jane Tufnell: 500,000

Mr. Tim Edwards: 210,230

I don't think any of these directors bought at today's prices, which is the price Ian is using. They more than likely bought at a much higher price which paints a completely different picture. Like us they are probably sitting on big loses. I don't know why he presented it this way given he's a holder.

Having got lucky with Bacanora and unlucky with EML, CWR and FDBK, I realise that fishing in the AIM pond is a dangerous game best left to the experts. In this case Richard Staveley. I'm very happy to pay a fee for Richard to search the pond, engage with the boards of AIM companies with the expectation that he will be much better placed to identify the winners. So far he's done a great job. Their half sister IT OIT has worked out sell for me, one of my few shares in the black, just. DYOR but won't be wasted time.

Similar to others, I am always learning. I read this today in the interim report:

"Pursuant to the terms of the Portfolio Management Agreement, the Portfolio Manager is entitled, with effect from Initial Admission, to receive an annual management fee equal to the lower of: (i) 1.0% of the net asset value (calculated before deduction of any accrued but unpaid management fee and any performance fee) per annum; or (ii) 1.0% per annum of the Company's market capitalisation. The annual management fee is calculated and accrues daily and is payable quarterly in arrears."

I don't know of any other ITs where the management fee is based on the share price when there's a discount. Add that to the fact that both managers own a lot of shares, they are strongly aligned to the success of the IT.

Thanks for the thought legsofman but these articles are only available to subscribers.

It could be that the potential upside is medium to long-term. The actual sale won't happen until mid 2024, if it does and the potential additional £100m won't be seen until 2027. So I'm guessing the dividend won't be reinstated until post sale once the balance sheet has been sorted out. I'm reluctant to take a loss but not confident enough to average down. The could be big capital gains to be made over a 3 year period if VG hit their EBITA targets but I'm guessing we won't be able to see the progress.

It's 27th November and the half year report for the period ending 31st August is being released. Pathetic. It's so out of date it's not worth reading.

From my limited experience I think that this is premature, usually the IT fails the continuation vote then the board performs a strategic review. I get the impression that they've had an offer: "Following this announcement, the Company is now considered to be in an "offer period" as defined in the Code".

It's always good to see NEDs buying shares, I can't quite work out how good it is here. Maybe it's a case of 'shutting the barn door after the horse has bolted'.

Dividend received 3rd November, Hargreaves Lansdown ISA. Probably not a SMIF problem.

There's many other investment trusts in a similar position, e.g. AUGM, CHRY, HGEN. In general now that cash interest rates are very high the risk premium for these growth capital trusts is considered too high. Add to this the fact that many investors are keeping money in cash liquidity is low so sellers out weigh buyers leading to a reduced share price. I'm sitting on huge unrealised loses expecting the shares to rise sharply when central banks start reducing base rates. Unfortunatley my proportional costs are too high to buy anymore to average down. If you've done your research and are confident that the discount is wrong then you know what to do.

The dividend is not dependent on the share price, it's paid from rental income which is unrelated to the share price. It's a reasonable assumption that they are prioritising the sale of empty properties which won't affect rental income but will reduce debt with in turn will reduce interest payments. The dividend is sustainable, it's the share price which is out of sync.

CaneToad, let's be clear about the worst case scenario for RGL. Continuation vote fails, the board then have 6 months to present alternatives to shareholders, shareholders choose wind down. The assets are then sold over a long period of time (not a fire sale), the investors get returns over a long period of time. It's a judgement call on whether these assets would be sold at a 60% discount, I think not. Hardly a disappearing act.

The board hold a lot of shares in the trust, about 4 million, probably averaging £1 per share so they stand to lose or gain a lot money. They are on our side if a stupid offer is made to buy the REIT.

Maybe the results are a little downbeat but absolutely nothing to justify the ridiculous 60% discount, so compared to market sentiment they are a fantastic set of results. Basically with interest rates so high and stock market volumes so low it's going to take a while until the share price recovers. The other problem is that lazy investors and journalists will look at the yield and assume the company is in trouble "any company yielding more than 7% must be in trouble".

Interesting to note the change of purpose of the Glasgow offices, this probably won't be possible for out of town buildings but shows there's value in some/many of the unused offices.

As soon as I get some cash I'll be averaging down.

please buy more shares in the company to demonstrate your belief and be more aligned with us shareholders. especially patrick maxwell and gillian el****.

All the more reason to invest in an outside London property Investment trust (not a fund where redemptions are forced) with a 82.5% occupancy rate, 99% rent collection and long leases at a 63% discount to NAV yielding 18%. Looks to me like the bad news is already in the price then some.

The Non-executive directors have just been given a big pay rise to a minimum of £82,500 on the very high side for a UK IT. How much scrutiny have they given to this? Surely they have access to the finer detail of these agreements?

In my opinion both the board and the management company are at fault here, my preference is for the trust to wind up. Hopefully the sale of the assets will be some time off when interest rates are a lot lower and the return will be somewhere between the current share price and the NAV.

And in the 2019 report:

“Contingent consideration

Under the terms of the acquisition agreements for Catalogues, contingent consideration may be payable dependent on future independent valuations of the Catalogues or revenue received within a specific time frame of acquiring the Catalogues. Contingent consideration will be recognised when performance conditions are met or the amount is a deferred liability. In such cases, a liability will be recognised alongside an associated finance charge which will be accrued over the respective deferral period.”

As far as I can tell there is no reference to this in the prospectus or accompanying documents.

So it appears that when some catalogues were bought there was an additional amount to the be paid in the future if the catalogue performed better than expected. It would be usual that the performance bonus would be less than the actual performance. Surely the idiots aren’t paying out a bonus that is higher than the actual performance increase? I think the board are duty bound to provide more information about the bonus arrangements.

In the above definitions there are comments about the expected level of future performance bonuses, basically saying there is nothing to worry about. This is what was said in the 2023 annual report:

“As a result of the strong performance of certain Catalogues, a Catalogue bonus provision was

recognised. This is based on actual and expected future Catalogue performance that is highly probable. Whilst these liabilities are recognised in the current year, the Company doesn’t anticipate that these liabilities will be incurred at a material level in future years.”

Compare this to yesterday’s RNS:

“It has been determined that the Catalogue bonus provision is expected to increase by approximately $23 million to $68 million at 30 September 2023 as there are now ten (31 March 2023: six) out of the Company's 146 Catalogues likely to meet performance hurdles as defined in their acquisition agreements.”

Given the completely incompetent assessment of these liabilities this is really worrying:

“In addition, there are a further nineteen Catalogues with active bonus provisions totalling $75 million, that are unlikely to meet performance hurdles; these are not recognised as provisions but are contingent liabilities and will be disclosed in the forthcoming interim results with associated sensitivity analysis.”

The problem is that there is not sufficient information in the pubic domain for shareholders to understand the implications of this. Going back to my main concern, is it possible that the bonus payments are higher than the actual out performance, which would be the only sensible reason to stop the dividend. If the forecasted revenue for the relevant catalogues was below the performance threshold then now that the catalogues have performed better than expected then revenues will be higher, not 10% lower.

As a holder of SONG shares I thought I would share the results of my research into the latest RNS.

As far as I can tell the phrase Catalogue bonus provision first appeared in the 2023 annual report:

“i) Catalogue bonus provision

Under the terms of the acquisition agreements for Catalogues, the Group recognises a financial liability for consideration that may be payable in line with the acquisition agreements that are dependent on the performance of the respective Catalogues. Such financial liabilities are initially recognised at fair value and subsequently carried at amortised cost. Management consider both the revenue forecasts used in the independent valuation and their expectation of revenue expected to be received within the specified performance time frame of acquiring the Catalogues when assessing the initial recognition of this financial liability. At 31 March 2023 a provision for the financial

liability of $45.0 million was recognised as a Catalogue bonus provision given the likelihood of economic outflow being triggered through respective Catalogue performance (31 March 2022: $1.3 million).” Page 133.

Prior to this the phrase used was contingent bonuses in the 2022 annual report:

“The Group have a number of contingent bonuses which are dependent on the individual catalogues meeting certain defined performance hurdles as defined in the catalogue acquisition agreement. Management’s assessment based on the underlying catalogue acquisition agreement and catalogue performance to date, is that there is a remote probability that a number of contingent bonuses will become payable. The fair value of this contingent liability is $5.8 million.” Page 149. Note the actual value in the report $939,000.

Then contingent consideration in the 2021 annual report:

“i) Contingent consideration

Under the terms of the acquisition agreements for Catalogues, contingent consideration may be payable dependent on future independent valuations of the Catalogues or revenue received within a specific time frame of acquiring the Catalogues that reach agreed upon revenue targets. At 31 March 2021 the likelihood of the aforementioned performance condition to be met was deemed remote and hence the possibility of economic outflows remote, and therefore no contingent consideration was disclosed.” Page 133.

Similar in 2020:

“h) Contingent consideration

Under the terms of the acquisition agreements for Catalogues, contingent consideration may be payable dependent on future independent valuations of the Catalogues or revenue received within a specific time frame of acquiring the Catalogues that reach agreed upon revenue targets. At 31 March 2020 the likelihood of the aforementioned performance condition to be met was deemed remote and hence the possibility of economic outflows remote, and therefore no contingent consideration was disclosed.” Page 94.

If I've understood the rns correctly, when Hipgnosis bought the catalogues there was provision for extra payments if the catalogue performed above a certain hurdle. Some of these are now due for payment and there might be some due at a later date which means no dividends will be paid this financial year. Before buying this share I did some research but didn't spot this. Was this information publically available before today?