Member Info for Dsam55

Thanks PP - go on impress me! Let’s hear some balanced technical information! Only one hand showing on your post! I guess the other is at work! Hence why we all know you as a w#nk€# - happy days! PP is having a break down 🤣😉

Give us a wave PP (Potty Porters1) 🤣

Quite enjoying watching potty @porters1 have a breakdown infront of the people he/she/it has been mocking! Clearly has zero threshold to take what he/she/it gives out! Lovely viewing! Keep it coming 🤣🤣🤣

Cont

Rough Economics

Let’s imagine:

Pilot plant: 5 MMscf/d capacity = ~1.8 Bcf/year.

At $9/Mcf netback, Predator could see ~$16m annual gross revenue.

If Predator ramps up to 20–30 MMscf/d, revenues could exceed $60–100m annually at Moroccan prices.

For Vivo, this is attractive because they capture the margin on distribution and supply Moroccan industry (where demand is growing and prices are high).

⚖️ Bottom Line

What Vivo could pay: If they wanted outright exposure, they could afford $10m–$20m upfront for a stake (small for them). But their real “payment” is infrastructure + offtake.

What they’re likely to pay:

Build the plant (tens of millions capex).

Give Predator ~$8–10/Mcf sales price.

Possibly offer debt/carry finance against future gas.

Unlikely to hand Predator a big upfront cheque unless they want equity in Guercif.

This is why Predator’s RNS wording is careful: the value is in the structured deal (Vivo taking the risk/cost of downstream), not a simple sale price.

Cont

Who Vivo Is (financially & strategically)

Ownership: Vivo is majority-owned by Vitol, one of the largest global energy traders. That gives them deep financial firepower.

Business scale: Operates across 20+ African countries, 2,600+ service stations. 2021 revenues were $9.2bn before being taken private by Vitol in a $2.3bn deal【en.wikipedia】.

Track record: Vivo invests in downstream infrastructure — LPG, LNG-to-industry, fuel depots, service stations. They aren’t an “upstream” explorer, they are a downstream distributor/operator.

💰 What Could Vivo Pay (or Invest)

There are three realistic types of payment/investment:

Infrastructure CAPEX (most likely):

Vivo funds, builds, and operates the micro-LNG/CNG facility and distribution network.

Typical capex for a small LNG plant in Africa could be $10m–$30m for a 5 MMscf/d “pilot” facility.

If scaled up to 50–100 MMscf/d, that could reach $100m+.

Predator doesn’t pay – Vivo takes on that capex, in exchange for buying gas under a sales agreement.

Gas Offtake / Pricing (contractual “payment”):

Moroccan industrial gas prices are high — typically $10–12/Mcf (versus ~$2–3/Mcf in US).

Predator might get $7–9/Mcf netback after distribution margins.

If Predator proves ~100 Bcf of recoverable shallow gas, that’s $700m–$900m gross sales potential over life of project.

Vivo’s role is to guarantee market access at that price, which derisks Predator’s resource.

Equity / JV stake (possible, less likely at early stage):

Vivo could take a direct equity stake in the Guercif licence or in a midstream JV (SPV that owns the LNG facility).

If they do, Predator might get a cash payment upfront ($5m–$20m range typical for African gas pre-FEED farm-ins) plus carried costs.

But Vivo tends to avoid “buying the geology” — they prefer downstream.

🎯 What Vivo is Likely to Pay Predator

Based on precedent (e.g. Vivo’s deal with Chariot Energy in Morocco for the Loukos licence【energycapitalpower】):

Not cash-heavy upfront. More likely: Vivo commits to funding downstream infrastructure, Predator commits to supplying gas at agreed terms.

Offtake guarantee. Predator gets a floor price for gas, probably $8–10/Mcf. That’s the real “payment.”

Optional JV/loan facility. Vivo could offer Predator access to a lending facility secured against gas resources — mentioned in Predator’s RNS. That would mean Vivo helps finance appraisal drilling indirectly.

Cont

Conclusion: Yes, Vivo Has Done Similar Deals, Which Bodes Well

Given the above, I think:

It is quite plausible that Vivo would engage in the kind of deal Predator proposes, because they have the track record (especially the Chariot agreement).

Vivo’s past behavior suggests they prefer to take downstream infrastructure & offtake risk/cost where possible, which aligns with Predator’s MoU description (“no cost to Predator” for the pilot facility).

The fact these similar agreements exist in Morocco (like Chariot) is particularly encouraging: regulators, customers, market are somewhat known; Vivo has already played in similar territory.

What We Learn From These About Vivo’s Capability & Behaviour

Putting these together, here's what we can infer, especially as relevant to the Predator / Vivo MoU:

Vivo has precedent for downstream infrastructure deals

They’re not new to the idea of building storage, distribution, offtake for gaseous fuels. Even if LPG is simpler than LNG or natural gas to handle, the fundamentals (regulation, permits, logistics, customer contracts, safety, etc.) are similar, though more complicated for LNG.

They operate in Morocco already in gas-to-industry / virtual network style agreements

The Chariot-Vivo deal in Loukos is especially relevant: same geography, same kind of industry demand, same model (Vivo builds the downstream infrastructure, operates it, and buys gas from upstream producer). That suggests there's existing regulatory and logistical precedent in Morocco for the kind of agreement Predator is proposing.

Vivo tends to structure deals where it takes downstream risk / cost

In many agreements (e.g. Chariot, Uganda LPG, etc.), Vivo is committing to fund and operate downstream infrastructure/distribution, rather than upstream upstream exploration. That fits with the Predator-Vivo MoU narrative (“pilot micro-LNG business… at no cost to Predator”) — Vivo doing what they’ve done before, with Predator taking upstream risk.

Vivo works with special vehicles / long-term offtake / SPVs / virtual networks / offtake heads of terms

Many deals are set up via SPVs, Heads of Terms, virtual distribution networks. The Chariot Heads of Terms is one example. That suggests that the legal / commercial framework for these kinds of arrangements is known territory for them. So, the hurdles may be known, which reduces risk somewhat.

Limits / Differences

There are also things Vivo hasn’t (yet) visibly done (or at least publicly) that match exactly the Predator deal, so those are risk points:

I couldn’t find a public precedent where Vivo has done micro-LNG import, liquefaction & downstream/local LNG distribution from an upstream gas production pilot, especially onshore, exactly in the style Predator proposes. Many deals are around CNG / LPG / virtual networks / industrial gas supply rather than actual liquefaction of upstream gas into LNG or micro-LNG.

Vivo’s downstream gas deals often depend on existing pipeline infrastructure or existing stable supply; Predator may be more in exploration / appraisal stage (which carries more upstream technical risk).

The fiscal / regulatory environment in Morocco for LNG vs CNG / pipeline gas vs LPG may differ. There may be legal/permitting/safety/transport issues that are more challenging for LNG (cryogenic liquefaction, storage, shipping etc.).

Cont

Cont

4. Signs of Confidentiality

By regulation, if Predator had a binding contract in Morocco, they would need to RNS it. The fact they skirt the line with “MoU” language and avoid naming Vivo directly in the AGM notes suggests they’re in a quiet period under NDA.

The “Notes to Editors” section reads less like a shareholder update and more like a sales pitch summary — highlighting why Morocco is attractive without saying who’s lined up to take it forward.

5. My View

Yes — the wording again points to Predator holding something back. Between the interim report and this AGM notice:

Morocco language is consistently vague, promotional, but nonspecific.

They avoid repeating the Vivo deal in plain terms here, which is unusual if there was no restriction.

The repeated emphasis on Morocco’s “potential” and “fiscal terms” sounds like positioning for a bigger partnership, JV, or outright sale.

In short: Paul is almost certainly bound by confidentiality. The AGM notes are crafted to keep Morocco attractive in shareholder minds while stalling on disclosure until a deal is formalised.

Same again for AGM - 1. Tone of the RNS

This is a very “procedural” RNS — about the AGM and shareholder voting — but the Notes to Editors section is where the clues are. That section is usually boilerplate, but the wording choices are telling:

Morocco description:

“Morocco offers a potentially faster route to commercialisation of shallow biogenic gas through a CNG or micro-LNG development.”

That exact phrasing mirrors what was said in the interim report — but again no detail on counterparties or next steps. It’s deliberately vague.

Focus on MOU-3:

“The MOU-3 well is currently the focus of rigless well testing… shut in… to observe for potential reservoir clean-up and pressure build-up.”

That wording makes Morocco sound “in progress,” but actually says nothing concrete about flow results or forward commercialisation. That’s avoidance.

Gas prices / fiscal terms:

They remind shareholders that “Moroccan gas prices are high, and the fiscal terms are some of the best in the world.”

This is marketing language — almost like they’re selling the asset’s attractiveness to a potential partner or buyer, rather than updating on operations.

2. What’s Different / What’s Missing

No mention of Vivo Energy here, even though the interim results disclosed the micro-LNG MoU later in the notes. If this was just an AGM notice, they could have repeated the Vivo name — but instead they avoid it. That strengthens the case that there’s a confidentiality restriction around naming Vivo until something bigger is signed.

No mention of Triassic potential, salt, or helium here. In contrast, the interim results leaned on those technical points. Their omission in this RNS suggests Predator is tailoring language: the AGM notes are written to keep investors interested, but carefully avoid any new disclosures that could breach an NDA.

3. Comparison with Trinidad Notes

For Trinidad, the Notes to Editors openly highlight “significant legacy tax losses, economies of scale, and new technologies improving margins.”

Morocco is kept more general: no talk of counterparties, no mention of commitments, just “potentially faster route.”

→ This imbalance is the same pattern as in the interim results: open and detailed on Trinidad, vague and promotional on Morocco. CONT

Cont - 4. Signs of Confidentiality / Pending Deal

Execution of an MoU with a downstream “pan-African entity” for gas distribution is almost certainly Vivo Energy Maroc SA, which was disclosed later in the Going Concern section. The RNS avoids naming them at the top – highly unusual if Predator had full disclosure freedom. That screams NDA.

The RNS mentions “M&A is also a strategy at corporate level if and when the right opportunities present themselves”. This is Paul hinting without saying – Predator could be positioning itself for either:

a farm-out / JV deal in Morocco, or

outright sale of Moroccan assets to a bigger player once appraisal confirms gas deliverability.

The statement: “At some point in the growth cycle critical mass may be reached that potentially generates a divestment opportunity of a well-managed asset.” looks almost tailor-written as a breadcrumb. He wouldn’t put that in unless discussions were happening.

5. My View

Yes – I think Paul is deliberately holding back due to a confidentiality agreement. The contrast in openness (naming names in Trinidad vs vague terms in Morocco), plus the careful “pan-African entity” wording, and the avoidance of commercial detail on Moroccan gas sales, all point to ongoing negotiations.

This could be:

A farm-out partner for Guercif,

A gas offtake / LNG distribution JV, or

Even a larger company circling Predator’s Moroccan acreage (asset purchase).

The tone is “we’ve de-risked, we’re fully funded, and now we’re in talks but can’t tell you yet.” Classic “something’s brewing” RNS.

I’ve read through the interim report and compared the tone, wording, and structure with previous RNS styles from Predator. Let me share a “between-the-lines” read of what’s going on with Morocco and whether Paul Griffiths (Pal) could be holding something back under confidentiality:

1. Morocco Wording

The RNS goes out of its way to mention “Memorandum of Understanding executed with a downstream pan-African entity” to design, fund, construct, and operate a pilot micro-LNG business in Morocco at no cost to Predator.

→ That’s unusually careful phrasing: they name NABI repeatedly in Trinidad, but they avoid naming this counterparty for Morocco. That is a flag. Normally Predator has been direct with who they’re partnering with (e.g., NABI, Challenger). Avoiding the name here suggests a confidentiality agreement.

The Morocco section also uses forward-looking language without giving specifics:

“Potential Triassic target… desktop studies… preparations to test… limited seismic coverage required…”

This is classic “holding pattern” wording: enough to keep shareholders interested, but carefully avoiding hard commitments.

The emphasis on helium shows and the unexpected salt discovery feels like deliberate distraction—geological upside to talk about while avoiding a bigger commercial negotiation being finalised.

2. What They’re Not Saying

No update on gas sales agreements or pricing, beyond the vague LNG MoU. Normally if they were free to disclose, you’d expect details of offtake terms, counterparties, or indicative volumes. The silence suggests something is active but under wraps.

They explicitly note “There has been no change in biogenic gas resources from the last Independent Technical Report”. This seems like “we can’t talk reserves up right now” – perhaps because another party is doing due diligence.

The repetition of “fully funded” for 12 months is interesting. In previous RNS, Predator has often raised funds opportunistically. Now they are making a big deal that they don’t need to raise. That might be signaling to potential partners that Predator is not desperate and can wait for better terms.

3. Comparison with Trinidad Communication

In Trinidad, they are openly naming NABI, Challenger, detailing percentages of revenues, describing workovers and wells in detail.

In Morocco, it’s much vaguer – they talk about “desktop studies” and “potential” but no hard plans beyond MOU-3 perforation. This imbalance is very deliberate.

4. Signs of Confidentiality / Pending Deal

Execution of an MoU with a downstream “pan-African entity” for gas distribution is almost certainly Vivo Energy Maroc SA, which was disclosed later in the Going Concern section. The RNS avoids naming them at the top – highly unusual if Predator had full disclosure freedom. That screams NDA.

The RNS mentions “M&A is also a strategy at corporate level if and when the right oppo

Can someone put together a list of the trolls who clearly hold no shares, yet seem to revel in every price drop? It would be useful so genuine investors can block them and actually read posts from fellow shareholders rather than the same old drivel.

Frankly, this board is becoming a joke. I know several investors who’ve already set up private groups on other platforms just to escape the childish antics of the non-shareholding brigade.

I’m all for healthy debate with real investors, but not for listening to gloaters who neither have the money nor the guts to put their own cash on the line. Frankly, there should be a system where only current shareholders can post—cruise lines manage it perfectly well for shareholder perks, so why not here?

And as for the sad case known as Porters1… I almost feel sorry for them. Never anything intelligent to say, just the same tired lines on repeat. I can only assume they’re skint, bored, and possibly a bit forgetful these days.

I assume this has been seen -

9 Sept 2025 – TV/YouTube bulletin: A Moroccan Arabic news segment discussed gas/helium at Guercif and referenced Predator’s operations (uploaded 9 Sept). It’s a brief roundup rather than a detailed article.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=98pgANc5edw&pp=4gcNEgtjaGF0Z3B0LmNvbQ%3D%3D

This is GPTs thoughts on appointment, timing and wording!

Here’s what I can gather from the RNS you shared after reading between the lines:

1. Is this an expensive company?

• The appointment is of Equiom Corporate Secretaries (Jersey) Limited, which operates across 12 global locations. Their services sound like high-end corporate governance and regulatory compliance support.

• Predator is stressing Equiom’s expertise and its role in supporting strategic acquisitions and growth strategy, so yes, this isn’t a budget provider — it’s more in line with professional, well-structured corporate governance.

• However, there is no direct suggestion that Predator itself has suddenly become “expensive” operationally — this looks more like a strategic administrative strengthening.

2. Experience levels:

• Predator itself is described as having:

• A diversified portfolio across Morocco and Trinidad.

• Experienced management with knowledge of sub-surface operations and regulatory frameworks in these regions.

• Equiom is highlighted as having:

• A global team in 12 locations.

• Deep knowledge of corporate governance, regulatory compliance, and administration.

• It implies Predator is moving into a more mature corporate phase, potentially gearing up for larger transactions, expansions, or strategic partnerships.

3. Why now if a secretary isn’t compulsory?

• UK law doesn’t require a company secretary for private companies, but public listed companies like PRD often appoint one for:

• Governance compliance (especially for M&A, corporate restructuring, and institutional investors).

• Smooth handling of regulatory filings and cross-border operations (Jersey HQ, Morocco, Trinidad).

• Timing hints at upcoming corporate developments — possibly acquisitions or financing events, given the reference to a “near-term growth strategy, which includes strategic acquisitions.”

4. Final notes compared to previous RNS releases:

• Past RNS updates focused heavily on drilling activities, exploration updates, or financial milestones.

• This one shifts tone to corporate infrastructure and future-proofing governance for growth.

• New details include:

• Explicit reference to MOU-3 testing progress (“rigless well testing following the perforation”).

• Mention of potential commercialisation routes for Moroccan gas (CNG or micro-LNG).

• Stronger emphasis on building partnerships and strategic acquisitions, not just drilling milestones.

My take:

This RNS feels like Predator is positioning itself for bigger corporate moves — possibly M&A, financing, or JV agreements. It’s not about day-to-day exploration but about institutional readiness for whatever is coming next.

A public limited company (PLC) incorporated in Jersey can legally wait up to 18 months between AGMs.

That’s the key difference compared to a UK-incorporated PLC, which must usually hold its AGM within 6 months of year-end.

C357. My thoughts - Re: Fees, testing strategy, and overbalanced drilling

Just to clarify for those following closely:

1. Moroccan State Fees – ONHYM’s Back-In Rights

When a discovery is made in Morocco, ONHYM (the state hydrocarbons authority) has a right to back in for up to 25% of the project after a commercial discovery is declared. This isn’t an upfront cash fee but means that ONHYM would then pay 25% of development costs going forward in exchange for that equity stake.

Importantly, this back-in is not triggered until a commercial declaration is made—so PRD has time to shape the narrative and present its case to potential suitors before declaring commerciality. That’s a significant strategic tool.

2. On the “Overbalanced Drilling” Theory

I understand the frustration, but saying PRD “weren’t actually drilling for gas” isn’t a fair characterisation. The company has clearly been targeting gas, but it appears that formation damage from overbalanced drilling (higher mud weight than formation pressure) has compromised testing results on some wells.

This doesn’t mean the gas isn’t there—log data, gas shows, and DST (drill stem test) flares confirm presence. But overbalanced conditions can reduce permeability near the wellbore, affecting flow during short tests. It’s a technical mistake, not a deception. The company has hinted at this before, albeit not always clearly.

It’s likely they’ve learned from this. MOU-6 is expected to be drilled underbalanced or balanced to allow better testing. If that succeeds, it validates the resource and unlocks commerciality.

So yes—mistakes were made, but not maliciously. There’s still a huge prize on the table, and the gas is evidently there. The key now is proving flow, which may require a re-test of MOU-3 or -5 as well as success at MOU-6.

One take on this - The recent ONHYM recruitment drive — particularly the 2025 intake for midstream-focused roles — appears closely linked to developments with Predator Oil & Gas (PRD) at the Guercif licence in Morocco. PRD holds a 75% interest in this onshore gas project, with ONHYM retaining a 25% stake. Following successful drilling at MOU-1, MOU-3, and most recently MOU-5, Predator has confirmed the presence of gas and is awaiting final drill stem test (DST) results. Should these confirm commercial potential, the project would move from exploration into appraisal and early-stage development.

ONHYM’s recruitment of midstream personnel is a strong signal that they are preparing for the next phase of activity — specifically, the infrastructure and logistics required to transport, process, or monetise discovered gas. This aligns with Predator’s plans to commercialise gas via compressed natural gas (CNG) and potentially tap into local industrial demand. Such progress would require ONHYM to increase in-house expertise to manage their operational role and facilitate integration with Morocco’s broader energy strategy.

The Moroccan government continues to push for energy independence, and low-cost onshore gas is central to that plan. Guercif’s proximity to existing pipeline infrastructure makes it strategically attractive. ONHYM’s hiring spree may therefore indicate confidence in near-term gas production from the Predator-led project and a proactive move to ensure capacity and compliance in upcoming midstream operations.

In summary, ONHYM’s recruitment likely reflects direct support for the advancing Guercif project. It signals a shift from pure exploration toward gas development, commercial readiness, and infrastructure planning. For PRD shareholders, this can be interpreted as a positive indicator that the project is maturing and that ONHYM is preparing for a more active role in what could soon become a producing gas asset.

This is probably old news - https://www.businesspost.ie/companies/energy-firm-boss-says-governments-e900m-floating-gas-storage-unit-plan-is-commercially-unviable/

Also reported, stops me wanting to read LSE, how many repetitive posts will the admin allow.?

You may find this …. Of interest — Some might recall that my dear friend Adnan Samarrai… Well they are going to bring a big change to the energy supply in Morocco. Predator Oil and Gas