Member Info for BritishPeculeum

Manyaana on reflection the Board considered there was no need to risk Dubhe-1 turning out to be a non-commercial option. It would have put far too much pressure on PANR sp. The low hanging fruit is Kodiac so probably the right move from the Board to focus in on that rather than risking bad news elsewhere in the field.

Expected timeline for the benefit of posters on here thinking that a development of a mine from where Chibougamau currently is in its timeline:

2026-2027 - Baseline studies

2027-2028 - Submission work and detailed environmental assessment

2028-2029 - Regulatory review and approvals

2029 - Construction decision

2030-2031 - Build and commissioning

They are standard industry-wide base case timelines.

So there is nothing untoward to see here.

I would expect news from CAML regarding other potential income stream opportunities in Khazakstan before Quebec is income generating.

There is a lot of unknowns with Quebec at this stage and we don’t know what impact its development will have on capital requirements going forward, but assuming Kounrad continues to generate cash at its current rate, Cu price stays steady-state and AISC’s remain in control (all big assumptions I accept) then potentially CAML may well have just landed itself a relatively cost effective replacement in a tier 1 jurisdictionwhen Kounrad arrives at end of life of mine, relatively unscathed.

GLA

Optimistic… To be fair to McDermott, he’s got a lot of very tricky plates to spin. He will need every minute of that cash runway, to line everything up the way he needs it, to deliver a meaningful solution. There are a lot of stakeholders to satisfy, governance issues to resolve, and just to add insult to injury, the pockets of two of his former Board colleagues to empty. I would say that it’s in shareholders interests to afford him the time and patience to piece all of this together. You certainly don’t want to see NIU personnel in the saddle in his place.

GLA

SrGordo yes, the concern for the MPE investment case at this juncture has to be whether the FFB price slump is a transient blip or a structural adjustment. Only time will tell.

SrGordo yes, the concern for the MPE investment case at this juncture has to be whether the FFB price slump is a transient blip or a structural adjustment. Only time will tell.

No, I don’t think it will have a long term downside. Most people that are not on the gas network will continue to heat with kerosene fired boilers for central heating. Heat pump technology is a very expensive inefficient and unreliable alternative.

A good update for the year ending 31 Dec 2026 in this morning’s RNS:-

“The Board of Steppe Cement (AIM: STCM) is pleased to announce the Company's final results for the year ended 31 December 2025, which are set out below.

Highlights:

Strong Market Recovery and Volume Growth

The Kazakh cement market experienced significant growth in 2025, with consumption increasing by more than 20% to exceed 14 million tonnes, supported by residential construction, infrastructure projects and ongoing urbanisation. Steppe Cement maintained a 14.4% market share of the cement market while increasing sales volumes by 21% to approximately 2.07 million tonnes through improved operational reliability and increased clinker production.

Significant Improvement in Financial Performance

Revenue increased to USD 101.5 million, up 20% year-on-year, driven by higher sales volumes and improved pricing. Gross profit rose to USD 28.4 million, while EBITDA improved to USD 11.8 million from USD 7.5 million in 2024. Net profit increased to USD 3.2 million (2024: USD 1.0 million), reflecting improved operational efficiency, tighter cost control and a more favourable market environment. The Company ended the year with a strong cash position of USD 10.5 million.

Operational Progress and Capacity Expansion.

The operational improvements implemented on Line 6 continued to deliver strong results, with the Company's clinker production increasing to 1.63 million tonnes in 2025 from 1.47 million tonnes in 2024. Following this progress, the Board approved a USD 30 million expansion project to increase clinker production capacity from 3,000 to 4,500 tonnes per day, supporting future cement production capacity of approximately 2.5 million tonnes annually. Completion is expected by summer 2027.

Steppe Cement wishes to inform that its Annual General Meeting will take place at its Malaysian Office at Suite 10.1, 10th Floor, West Wing, Rohas Perkasa, 8 Jalan Perak, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on Friday, 26 June 2026 at 4.00 p.m. (UTC+8).

A copy of the Annual Report 2025 and the Notice of Annual General Meeting will shortly be made available on the Company's website at www.steppecement.com.

Well done STCM.

Gecko…

Hochschild faced a much more binary threat (mine closure / licence risk).

MPE’s issue is different:

not “business open vs closed” but potential margin / pricing / export-chain intervention risk.

That is a continuum, not an on/off event.

So I’m not convinced the HOC story is analogous to MPE’s specific situation but it does act as a reminder that markets can overreact to sovereign/political risk headlines in the short term.

Also worth noting that the information has materially evolved since the initial MPE sell-off. This is no longer just vague political rhetoric.

What has emerged from Jakarta is that:

* a transition phase begins 1 June 2026 (Stage 1)

* exporters must report transaction details through the new structure

* DSI is intended to become the central export trading vehicle / sole export channel for covered commodities which includes CPO (Stage 2). Implementation could now be as soon as September 2026, according to Reuters.

* existing contracts are said to be honoured initially, but pricing below global benchmarks may be reviewed

What remains missing — and this is the critical valuation question — is:

* how DSI actually sets pricing in Stage 2

* whether it merely administers transactions or extracts a commercial margin

* how much, if any, pressure gets passed upstream into domestic CPO pricing

The policy direction here appears real. It’s the economics that remain unresolved.

GLA

I think “just a proposal” understates where this has already got to.

The detailed implementation mechanics are clearly still unresolved — that is true.

But this is no longer merely an abstract idea.

We already have:

* Presidential policy signalling

* Trade Ministry drafting

* Danantara / DSI two-stage structure publicly described

* Reuters / ANTARA reporting DSI as eventual export trading principal

* industry groups already seeking clarification

So the honest position is:

policy direction is real; economic consequences remain uncertain.

That is a very different proposition from “nothing to see here.”

That’s exactly why the Suez comparison doesn’t work.

Indonesia is a major palm oil producer with significant pricing influence, yes.

But it does not control a globally irreplaceable strategic chokepoint in the way Suez did, nor does palm oil create the same macro dependency profile as crude oil.

Palm oil matters.

But countries are not existentially hostage to it.

There are substitution mechanisms at the margin, even if imperfect.

So the relevant debate is commodity policy risk / pricing distortion / sovereign intervention.

Not geopolitical coercion on a Suez scale.

GLA

So this is what came out of Chat GPT on the investment thesis for MPE this morning, proving that AI is only as bullish/bearish/balanced as its operator…

MPE remains, in my view, a very high-quality operator. That part of the bull case is intact.

The business fundamentals have not suddenly changed:

* strong management

* debt-free / net cash balance sheet

* disciplined capital allocation

* increasingly own-crop focused model

* younger estate profile than many peers

* solid dividend support

So the argument that this is suddenly a broken business is clearly wrong.

However, the opposite extreme (“nothing to see here, buy with both hands”) also feels too simplistic.

A few points worth keeping in mind:

1. MPE’s direct business model is less exposed than exporters — but not immune

MPE sells domestically into Indonesia.

That is helpful.

But the market’s concern is not direct export interruption.

It is whether the new Danantara / DSI model compresses economics further down the chain, with that pressure eventually passed upstream into domestic CPO pricing.

That remains unresolved.

2. Stage 2 is now clearly more interventionist than simple compliance oversight

The original hope was that this was mainly anti-under-invoicing supervision.

That thesis has weakened materially.

Reuters / ANTARA reporting now suggests DSI ultimately becomes the sole export trading channel / trading principal for affected commodities, not merely an auditor or clearing house.

That does not automatically equal disaster for MPE.

But it does mean sovereign policy risk is real.

3. The real unknown is pricing mechanics

This is the critical question.

If DSI simply introduces modest administrative friction:

manageable.

If DSI captures a meaningful trading spread / imposes political pricing:

more problematic.

We still do not know where reality lands.

4. Palm oil is not infinitely substitutable — but neither is it immune

Indonesia is the dominant global palm supplier.

That gives some pricing power.

If Indonesian exports become less efficient, global prices could rise.

But there are still substitution limits at the margin:

* soybean oil

* rapeseed

* sunflower

So Indonesia cannot impose unlimited economic friction without consequences.

5. The market itself is not treating MPE as structurally impaired

This matters.

Despite harder Jakarta headlines overnight, MPE did not collapse again this morning.

That suggests the market currently believes:

“policy risk is real, but direct economic impairment to MPE remains unproven.”

That feels about right.

Bottom line

MPE may still represent value here.

But the honest position is:

strong company + unresolved sovereign policy risk.

Not:

“obvious bargain with no downside.”

DYO(AI)R

Rpc yesterday’s treatment of MPE was too severe a reaction, and yet to be fair, the situation is by no means clear out of Jakarta overnight that completes the picture of what happens in how Stage 2 of the reported process plays out from Jan 27 going forward.

Danantara now says Stage 2, targeted from January 2027, would see DSI become the buyer of strategic commodities, not merely an intermediary.

The clarification required from Danantara is whether DSI replaces inefficient private toll collectors with a low-friction central utility, (if that is the case then fine) or

is it replacing them with a higher-cost fiscal extraction mechanism? (Not so fine).

I take the bounce back this morning (and rightly so) to be more a “worry about Stage 2 later, when more is known”. Hindsight is such a wonderful thing, last night before close, I was a finger press away from going long MPE with conviction, and didn’t, on the basis that DSI could have clarified Jakarta’s position overnight with a model that compresses margin for the refiners/exporters that are buying MPE product in-country, which in turn puts MPE selling price under pressure, which is I presume the main risk that sits behind the reason for yesterday’s market reaction.

All will become clear in due time of course. Let’s see what comes out of Jakarta over the coming days and weeks.

GLA

Stocks… 100% agreed.

Whichever way one looks at it, it’s “advantage NIU” and an early morning visit from the local constabulary for the former CFO and Chairman.

Stocks… PXC is still working toward a funding solution, otherwise NIU may well have chosen to escalate further rather than withdraw its requisition. That said, NIU has already demonstrated its willingness to intervene, so withdrawal should not automatically be read as a clean endorsement of management’s position. Whatever route emerges, the Company still appears to face multiple funding hurdles before Empire reaches production, so some form of material dilution or economic restructuring remains highly likely.

GLA

Ufo… There is no need to turn this into a personal attack, just because I have made an observation about the development of Ruvuma in which you and others are not in agreement. I can and do respect your opinion and the opinions of others on here without exception. I always have done in the 8 years I’ve been invested in AEX. So please kindly afford me the same courtesy.

Prospero…”Yet somehow we are supposed to believe there are “no signs” of commitment?”

Whatever I say on here is not intended to make you or anyone “suppose to believe” anything. Believe what you will.

I believe, no matter what, in the fact that the decision to invest/not invest remains with the operator, ARA. All the way to hook-up.

RogerJolly… “At present we are seeing:

pipeline construction physically underway

continued government engagement at ministerial level

discussions around accelerating drilling and production

references to additional wells

procurement activity relating to production infrastructure

rising domestic and regional gas demand signals”

I’ve no doubt about that, but not one line of what you have listed is material physical “boots on the ground” from ARA.

There’s nothing theoretical about what is happening viz a vis the attitude of Tanzanian Government towards existing O & G operators in-country. There’s nothing theoretical about ARA having the awareness of what is happening, and that as part of its due diligence, will undoubtedly be taking a long hard look at the risk profile of Ruvuma, to consider whether it’s a realistic and runnable project, given all the facts at its disposal. There is nothing theoretical about this approach at all. It happens all the time in this sector. If the risk analysis of the project, which includes without limitation the politics in-country, all things considered, is found to not fit the risk profile of the developer, they simply won’t do it. So far as the farm-in agreement is concerned, we don’t know what timelines on backstops there are, what repudiation clauses there are in the event of ARA’s non-performance or what surrender terms there are if ARA doesn’t have the belly for this project, but you can be sure that those eventualities will be covered.

Yes, you could say that there are no signs that ARA is looking to exit the project. At the same time, other than Charles Santos’ word a few weeks ago that its “full steam ahead” there are no signs that ARA is committed to deliver.

What impact on the AEX sp do you think there might be on the news that ARA was out at Ruvuma?

Prospero… “Now look at what is happening in real time. Pipeline construction is underway. The Minister of Energy publicly demanding first gas by September with no delays, the Tanzanian Ministry of Energy publicly meeting with ARA leadership to discuss accelerating drilling and production. The latest updates reference preparations for “new wells,” - plural, and clearly full field development- not retreat.“

No surprises, but you’ve completely missed the point that I was making in my post. And that point is connected to the real-time real-world commercial reality that Prosciutto has touched on regarding the unfolding situation viz a vis Orca, the Tanzanian Govt and Songo Songo. Of course ARA will be looking at that situation and considering all options of how best to protect its capital commitment at Ruvuma. It would be seriously remiss if ARA wasn’t. Of course one of the obvious options available to ARA is the timing of the development of the Ruvuma Basin. Of course ARA will only commit capital to the monetisation of the field at the point that it is: (1) ready to do so, and (2) satisfied that the risk that comes with the Tanzanian Government’s ability to pay is adequately protected.

Of course ARA’s negotiating position with the Tanzanian Government is significantly weakened once Ruvuma is developed and capital committed.

Call it scaremongering Prospero, call it what you will. I call it, commercial reality. If there are any lingering doubts in any minds at ARA that make the prospect marginal, Ruvuma simply won’t get commercialised. That’s not anything that Charles Santos or the AEX Board have the power to change. What impact any delay may have on the contractual commitments made by ARA to the Tanzanian Government we don’t know, but I can assure you that if, on balance, it makes more commercial sense not committing to the development of Ruvuma than the risk to do so, ARA simply won’t commit.

Wryape… Of course that’s true, and at the same time ARA will only be committed to deliver on the Farm-In agreement if it makes absolute commercial sense to do so. If they’re seeing anything substantive in the behaviour of the Tanzanian Government that is just cause for concern, then they simply won’t commit to the capital spend on makeovers, drilling and exploitation. I’m sure the farm-in agreement and any agreements with TPDC will be tightly drafted to protect ARA in the event it doesn’t want to commit resource to hook up to the pipeline. Bear in mind that the cost of the pipeline is on the Tanzanian Government, not ARA. Let’s hope that ARA/AEX can take the lessons that others working with Tanzanian Government have experienced, and look to de-risk wherever possible. ARA’s strongest leverage at the table with Tanzanian Government will be at the point that the pipeline is complete and ARA are nowhere to be found with the hook up to Ntorya.

Wryape… Of course that’s true, and at the same time ARA will only be committed to deliver on the Farm-In agreement if it makes absolute commercial sense to do so. If they’re seeing anything substantive in the behaviour of the Tanzanian Government that is just cause for concern, then they simply won’t commit to the capital spend on makeovers, drilling and exploitation. I’m sure the farm-in agreement and any agreements with TPDC will be tightly drafted to protect ARA in the event it doesn’t want to commit resource to hook up to the pipeline. Bear in mind that the cost of the pipeline is on the Tanzanian Government, not ARA.