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Hi Gambitxjs,
It's complicated but in essence, if we take the H1 2020 figures at their word then essentially yes.
Core production C1 cost was $17.20 at ZAR 16.60 / $ at 1,218 mtV produced. Vametco only.
This year the Rand has strengthened and we are at YTD ZAR 14.90. So we need to adjust to c. $19 per kg against that one parameter.
If FY production was double H1 2020, then we are talking 2,436 mtV.
That means 1% = 24.36 mtV.
400 mtV/24.36 = 16.40%
So a revised $19 per kg C1 production cost, should (in very simple terms) reduce by 16.40%. So $19 becomes $3 per kg.
It's important to employ the C1 production cost because that is a fully Rand denominated cost. The other costs, such as sales and distribution, which aren't fully Rand denominated and so complicate things a tad.
Of course, things like investment and expansion of the plant, plus other areas/demands within the business, will undoubtedly skew things but what we are trying to do is establish how mean and lean the operation will be, once each stage of work completes.
Hope that helps.
I would like to repeat something because it likely got lost in all the detail.
"In 2020, a fully operational Vametco with a completed kiln off-gas project under its belt was deemed capable of delivering ave. c 3,150 mtV. De-bottlenecking and an extended shutdown should only add to that capability."
It's important to stress that said kiln off-gas project (which again I remind us all was designed to recover the 1 month lost to the Covid shutdown, so is a production enhancer), was originally planned to be completed in H1 2020.
"Commissioning is planned to be completed during H1 2020." (RNS 30th Jan 2020). So in delivering that ave. 3,150 mtV, was supposed to contribute at least 6 months to the plant production.
This year, apart from the 35-day shutdown, it will be contributing for c. 11 months and yet FY guidance is only c. 100 mtV above what was achieved in 2020. I don't buy it. Especially when the actual 35-day shutdown is also supposed to be adding to production, a point FM indicated towards in that Q4 analysts call, when asked about the phase 3 Vametco expansion.
So either Vametco is going to beat its guidance this year, which means costs are already coming down and profitability will be up or, next yea guidance is going to be markedly higher than 2021 because that's what the wording strongly suggests.
2/2
However, what's also important to appreciate is that those costs were against a Vametoc operation running at c. 2,436 mtV.
What we are talking about in 2021, should be minimum top-end guidance of 2,850 mtV with at least several hundred more mtV to come next year.
So on a basic production cost level ($17.20 per kg H1 2020), when employing the 2,850 mtV figure, we are talking a c. 16.5% improvement meaning on a like for like basis the production C1 cost drops to c. $14.40 per kg. An improvement of around $2.80 per kg.
What that does is take the up to date figure of $26.40 per kg (defined by employing the 2021 YTD ave. Rand/dollar exchange of 14.90) and deducts $2.80, giving a revised Vametco total cash cost of c. $23.60 per kg at Vametco production of 2,850 mtV.
From that figure must then be deducted the costs of Covid, which are clearly marked under note 4 of the Vametco interims but I'll leave that in as a nice to have.
Now the above is not a concrete figure but it's certainly a strong one, given that it's based on the most recent figures from Vametco.
The higher that Vametco production goes above the 2,850 mtV base case, the better that the total cash cost figure becomes.
This is just one example at Vametco. I am of course abundantly aware that Vanchem is likely a different story right now but there's only so much one can deal with at any one time.
What this example is designed to do is demonstrate just how effective, expanded and assured production at Vametco can be and what it can do for their production profile.
Next year we should a Vametco that delivers upwards of 3,200 mtV or more. That means in theory another minimum $2.40 per kg could be removed from that C1 production cost, pushing Vametco's total cash cost down close to $21 per kg.
That's 3,200 mtV. Vametco is fully funded for 4,200 mtV. So another 1,000mtV of cost reduction to come.
Again it is always more complicated than what I have described but the essence of what I am explaining is certainly true.
The majority of the pain that needs to be felt to start to realise these sorts of results will come in H1 this year. H2 should be a completely different story and will lay the foundations for what 2022 and beyond can bring.
The same applies to Vanchem be it that its path is slightly different but the end result should be the same.
Patience is required to see this through but it's truly about implementation only.
A BMN delivering the sorts of total cash costs I have explained, in even a $35 per kg environment, is going to do very well indeed, and that's only its mining results nothing else.
I hope that I didn't lose you in all of that.
1/2
Afternoon everyone,
Something that may be of interest to some.
BMN FY2020 guidance (RNS 30th Jan), so prior to Covid.
"Expected to produce between 3,000 mtV and 3,200 mtV, a 6 per cent to 13 per cent increase relative to FY2019, with volumes weighted towards H2 2020."
Interims update dated 30th Sept 2020 ;
"Among those impacted was the timing of the commissioning of the Kiln-Off Gas project at Vametco, which was a key part of our ability to catch up on the lost month of production earlier in the year and meet our original guidance for 2020."
and ;
"we halted production at Vametco and Vanchem for almost a full month under the South African government's lockdown measures imposed in late March 2020, followed by a ramp-up towards previous production levels."
From 8th Feb 2021 RNS update ;
Vametco "12M 2020 production in the form of Nitrovan and Ferrovanadium was 2,654 mtV."
Furthermore,
"Q4 2020 production of 703 mtV was 20 per cent below Q4 2019 (880 mtV) due to heavy rainfall affecting overall throughput, incidents at the shaft furnaces due to Eskom power failures and commissioning issues at the new kiln off-gas which have been resolved."
In 2020 Vametco was supposed to conduct a 10-day maintenance programme but in the end, this was swallowed up by the enforced shutdown. Still, Vametco lost an additional c. 20 days + it underwent a ramp-up period and Q4 suffered from a multitude of one-off events but also commissioning issues with the very kiln off-gas project that was supposed to give the plant the "ability to catch up on the lost month of production."
FY Vametco guidance for 2021 with a planned 35-day shutdown ( including de-bottlenecking) is between 2,750 mtV and 2,850 mtV, which at the lower end sits just 100 mtV above what was achieved in that interruption riddled 2020. A year that saw a c. 30-day full shutdown, a subsequent ramp-up and a heavily interrupted Q4.
This year, all being well, the kiln off-gas is doing the full job it was intended to do and that 35-day programme delivers the desired de-bottlenecking and added production, which befits such an extended shutdown.
CEO Mojapelo stated in the Q4 analysts call, his awareness that BMN needed to start delivering on its production guidance and that this year was about under-promising and overachieving.
In 2020, a fully operational Vametco with a completed kiln off-gas project under its belt was deemed capable of delivering ave. c 3,150 mtV. De-bottlenecking and an extended shutdown should only add to that capability.
Why is that important?
In the 2020 interims, Vametco demonstrated total cash costs of $23.90 per kg. This cost "excludes depreciation, movements in finished goods inventories and sales commissions." only. So essentially their cost to operate.
That cost was at ZAR 16.60. YTD we are at c. 14.90, meaning that the overall cost is closer to $26.40 per kg.
Thanks everyone. Really appreciate the positive feedback.
One other thing worth chewing over, during the long weekend, is that said 25.25% indirect ownership in Enerox, makes BMN a 50.5% (so majority) owner of VRFB Holdings Ltd.
A rather broad based business title don't you think?
Everything happens for a reason. There's a reason for the title and a reason for being majority owners, just like their deal with the IDC, one might say.
@DarrylJ
From the 8th Feb RNS ;
"§ Enerox GmbH
In Q3 2020, the Company successfully completed the acquisition by Enerox Holdings Limited ("EHL") of a further 65.1 per cent of the share capital of Enerox. EHL is an investment vehicle formed by a consortium of investors, including Bushveld Energy Limited. On 31 December 2020, EHL owned 100 per cent of Enerox, with Bushveld Energy a minority shareholder in EHL. Under a separate agreement Bushveld secured a right of first refusal to supply vanadium oxide, vanadium electrolyte and vanadium electrolyte rental products to Enerox."
EHL owns 100% of Enerox, not 90%. So BMN owns 25.25% of the whole entity.
Have a lovely weekend everyone.
Excellent post Floyd81 and thank you for sharing.
In all this noise it is being lost.
All 3 BESS tenders now on their system, with deadlines for bids set at just 1 week apart.
Total size = 827MWh
Package 1 has the first deadline at 4th May and according to the World Bank is due to be awarded by 8th July. Its not unreasonable to expect would the other to follow suit shortly afterwards.
So July is shaping up to be a big month in S.A. and perhaps even in BMNs world.
c. 3 months and counting.
The tender document states ;
"cumulative capacity of not less than 60MW and each contract of not less than 20MW substantially completed within the last 7 (seven) years, and that are similar to the proposed Plant and installation."
I simply can't see how Enerox can be included. Plus if they were, then why ask Rongke Power to step in and build a replacement battery at Eskom Rosherville and not Enerox?
Horse for courses in my view and it surely makes sense to partner with the biggest known player to date, when chasing Eskom and their grid scale projects.
My view only.
services."
Hi Alfacomp,
You are absolutely right the document was written in 2019 and so may not 100% apply to developments achieved by BMN since then.
The key reason I highlighted it was because it demonstrates clear BMN interest in the project and a link to their partners. Since then Unienergy have fallen away and been replaced by Rongke Power, so one does have to make a small leap of faith, over to that new relationship. Given they are installing an updated battery at Eskom, this involvement was heavily indicated towards, so shouldn't be an entire new surprise.
As explained in this updated set of tweets, BMn really has to partner with Rongke because Enerox simply cannot meet the criteria for JV members and without a big player like Rongke, BMN/BE would also be struggling to meet, what are stringent suitability criteria. Infact BMN themselves potentially still are but i suspect they will find a way around this. I accept that other plans or approaches may be afoot but right now, I cannot see that Enerox are big enough or experienced enough, to take part in this tender with BMN.
Where I believe they come in is on the mini-grid roll out and future contracts of this sort, which is another potentially very strong contract source for BMN and their products.
https://twitter.com/BigBiteNow/status/1376845501019140102?s=20
I assume the link between the MUST RNS and BMN, has already made to this BB but if not, then here it is.
https://twitter.com/BigBiteNow/status/1370378258567593986?s=20
Hi everyone,
Here's a further update to my earlier analysis, which was a work in progress but which was cemented, by FM's explanation about where BMN felt Chinese co-production output currently stood.
Whilst the Terry Perles information for Vanitec is very thorough, I am sure that BMN invest and are party to, a great deal more detail than we are able to see. Hence why any discussions on recent prices at the Vanitec webinar, were quickly curtailed by the chair of the meeting.
So its significant that FM not only repeated the message about structural shortages, which itself is interesting, given that Chinese production is up 30% since that 2018 Vanadium 101 webinar but also that he talked about Chinese co-production operating at near full capacity already, due to the move away from blending ores.
If that's really true then it highly likely removes their ability to expand into the supply gap, that will be felt not only outside of their own market but possibly also within it, this time around. So essentially minimum everyone else, including BMN's two biggest markets, US and Europe, with China the icing on the cake.
In essence what he is saying is that the Chinese have thrown their full capacity at that 30% of rising demand at home and it still wasn't enough because they still went net importer...
and they could only do that because ex-China demand, was wiped out due to Covid and so prices were low enough to incentivise importing it into China.
Now that demand is returning and pressure on prices is mounting. However, the incentive to add supply simply doesn't come at $7-8 per lb V205. Its far closer to $15-16 per lb and even then, time is required to implement, hence the overshoot potential, witnessed in 2018.
Nothing is a given but all the ingredients are there, which FM clearly knows because he talked about an expectation that vanadium prices strengthening throughout this year. I would think that he is far more confident about this than he is willing to let on.
It may not be to every investors taste, to see vanadium prices surge one more. In the past it has had a short term feel about it because it suffocates VRFB take up. However, this time around, if prices are going to surge, then at the very least, BMN has its guaranteed supply contracts to Invinity/Enerox and can choose to shelter those longer term, non-cyclical demand drivers, a choice they didn't have back in 2018.
Additionally, significant revenues now, enable significant plans to come to fruition, be they expansion, mine development or VRFB investment.
The share price may not be ready to react just yet and that may be dragging some investors energy levels down but these are genuinely exciting times to be invested in BMN, especially if the above theory/ view point, comes through.
https://twitter.com/BigBiteNow/status/1367442783464804355?s=20
Morning everyone,
Here's some recent research that I have produced on vanadium pricing and what I believe to be, a critical juncture in V205 pricing, which we are now either very close to or about to pass.
If we do then history tells us that we go significantly higher. The slides are taken from the recent Terry Perles presentation at the Vanitec 8th Energy Storage Committee meeting. If you haven't reviewed them in detail yet, then I encourage you to spend some time doing so, as they contain are a wealth of vanadium data, which doesn't come along very often.
https://twitter.com/BigBiteNow/status/1367405410215464964?s=20
http://vanitec.org/images/uploads/3_Vanadium_Market_-_Terry_Perles.pdf
Apologies, I got interrupted before I could add/reiterate, what are for me, a couple of important points.
Whether we like it or not, BMN has got to start delivering on their guidance. As i stated earlier, I got a clear message from FM in the Q4 analysts webinar, that this was something he was acutely aware of, given it was he that brought it up.
There was also a clear indication (when encouraged), that Vametco may well deliver additional output, post the 35 day shutdown.
Despite attempting to make a comparison, no 2 companies are the same, especially when traded on different exchanges. Each has its history, its geography etc etc and we are only talking about a share price moment in time, which alters day by day.
What is absolutely an advantage for BMN, is if they can start to demonstrate their ability to meet guidance, then the next phase of expansion, can be far more readily accepted.
In addition, Largo, whilst expanding again this year, is running out of leg room on their plant, without adding more capacity elsewhere.
BMN don't have that problem. They have a number of stages still to come, which can eventually double their production capacity. A belief that they can achieve it + a clear path towards it, can also add greatly to the valuation.
In addition to all of the above, are the various VRFB/energy storage angles, that BMN potentially has ahead of it. None of that is priced into my very crude comparison. Right now they carry next to zero value but have the ability to act as substantial triggers, by demonstrating BMN is a green tech/transition company.
Finally, what Largo demonstrates, is that an expanded trustworthy vanadium production profile, can allow investors to include much of the future value, in the share price, well before it becomes a reality.
So that (very crude) 45p like for like comparison, at c. $40 FeV, should really be a base case, based purely on a mining business, reacting to an improving vanadium price market and being loved just as much as Largo.
Have a lovely weekend everyone.
@Jvetch
I've recently had an extensive look at Largo Resources and as always, its a very complicated exercise, attempting to define what Largo is and what ultimately, BMN is, can and will be.
In a nutshell, I have Largo at EV valuation of c. £600m, whilst BMN is running at c. £260m, when the Orion CLNs are fully included.
So for me that's c. 130% difference in valuation, not 200% as you have stated.
A review of the accounts for Largo demonstrates, that in the first 9 months of 2020, despite what Largo advertise in their quarterly updates, their break even was around $5.40 per lb V205.
In 2021, Largo is signalling a 20% increase in production, to 12,250t V205.
At the current c. $7 per lb V205 price, that should deliver Largo c. $54m (£38m) in pre-tax profits, when one takes into accounts reduced costs from the larger production profile. (12,250t v 10,260t sales in 2020).
In very simplistic terms, I have BMN achieving roughly the same, when/if the V price hits $40 per kg.
This is based on my estimate of $27.50 per kg total cash cost and 4,225 mtV produced/sold.
However, what we mustn't lose sight of, is the fact that Largo have regularly hit their production guidance, where as BMN, are yet to do so.
In their defense, BMN bought ageing brownfield assets, which have required lengthy refurbishment, whilst Largo built a far more reliable new plant from scratch.
That said, this is the year that BMN needs to start demonstrating that they can do what they say they can.
This is why FM's recognition of this fact and explanation that in 2021, the BOD want to under promise and over achieve, was a critical point in proceedings and something I highlighted at the time.
Personally, I genuinely believe that BMN are finally playing it safe in 2021 and that said guidance is the minimum that we should expect. If true, then the first sign we should of this, is through the Vametco 35 day maintenance programme, which FM has indicated, may well bring additional production from Vametco.
That aside, if FeV hits $40 (which I must stress, is very simplistic, given the complicated mature of BMN product range these days, which itself has additional value, be it that it needs to be demonstrated more clearly), then in my view, BMN should justifiably be matching that current Largo valuation.
So at £600m valuation and c. 1,35BN shares in issue (Orion CLNs fully included), we should be looking at c. 45p
If we are being super accurate, then an allowance has to be made for the reduction in cash, due to the investment in the expanded 4,225 mtV, which affects the enterprise value but in very simple terms, like for like, that's where we should be.
Importantly, this very simple valuation, allows nothing for anything else that BMN owns (Invinity etc) or that it may achieve (VRFB contracts, electrolyte plant, better production etc).
Also, if prices hold into 2022 and 4,225 mtV becomes 6,000 mtV, well then...
2/2
Instead, what FM did at that point in time (Feb 2014), as CEO of the company, was pay himself a base salary of just c. £108,000 and continue to implement a maximum total directors salary cap of £500,000.
His wage and that policy remained the same, until the 2018 financial accounts were released. So well after Vametco came on board and during a year when Vametco delivered its largest ever revenue streams.
All of which should be considered in the following context.
BMN on 28th Feb 2014 had a total of 402m shares in issue, which means that post full Orion draw down, total shares in issue will have climbed by just 237%.
That's against 7 years of operation, of which for 3 years, the company had no operating mine and even when they did, they didn't own very much of it, because Yellow Dragon carried them for most of it, until BMN bought them out in late 2017.
For that 237% of additional shares, long term investors in BMN will receive as a minimum, the following ;
1. 74% ownership of Vametco and 100% ownership of Vanchem, giving them control of 2 of the world's 4 pure play vanadium production facilities.
2. A minimum 6,000mtV production run rate, with the strong possibility of expanding to c. 8,400mtV through future cash flows.
3. A 55% ownership of a minimum 200MWh electrolyte facility.
4. Equity stakes in both Invinity and Enerox, two of the world's leading VRFB players, with a confirmed first refusal off-take agreement to supply all of their vanadium needs.
5. An operational Mokopone mine, feeding into the Vanchem processing facility.
6. Ownership of Brits.
7. A significant foothold and standing, both in the S.A. renewable energy and the wider vanadium/energy storage market.
With the strong possibility of even greater things to come through Eskom, local VRFB manufacturing and the larger VRFB grid/mini grid markets.
Go find me the BOD of an AIM junior, that can deliver even just two fully operational vanadium processors, inside 6 years, for just 237% dilution and I will gladly back it. Never mind everything else.
Past performance doesn't guarantee anyone a permanent future but whatever investors may think about more recent performance, there is no doubting the commitment that FM and his team have, to the people of S.A. and their shareholders.
Those attributes are rare and worthy of some respect. They are also the reason why I let communication failings slide, why i don't allow 'investors' (that BMN have chosen), selling, bother me too much, because that past performance, at the very least, allows me to trust, that the BOD is working hard for my investment.
1/2
Good morning all,
Picking up on the vibe from shareholders, venting some frustration at the BOD on progress, communication and this constant feel of 'investors,' flipping their holdings.
First of all it is not for me to tell shareholders how to feel about their investment or indeed the people that run it for them.
I also agree that there is room for improvement on the communication side of things. The recent Arbengoa development is a prime example, which really should be reported upon, once BMN have details on its affect or a plan of action, to avoid it impacting their mini grid and perhaps wider S.A. based plans.
As a side note, I don't see that having any influence on the current valuation because nothing is factored in for it, given that first and foremost, it is a energy saving exercise for the plant and its wider uses as a demonstration project, simply aren't advanced enough yet, to be exciting the market at all.
What I will offer in their defence is this.
Late last year BMN closed a long fought, long term deal, with Orion finance. Anyone who knows HZM well, knows they are a top mining finance company, that backs projects/businesses, not only with compelling business cases but also because of their ethical leadership.
The one thing that longer term BMN investors will surely have learnt by now, is that FM is building a S.A. mining business, that caters for the needs of the people who work there and those that live on and around its land. This message is repeated many times, through their approach to the BEE policy through Bill Chicane. Their focus on developing a clear fund and open for locals and the upping of the BEE ownership to 26%, immediately after taking control of the full Vametco mine, back in 2018, to name just a few.
It is that sort of leadership that attracts the likes of Orion, who are a long term investor and a significant shift in quality.
Something more.
When Orion convert their $35m CLNs, which for me is inevitable, then there will be a total c. 1.35BN shares in issue and BMN will finally have a significant cornerstone investor, at c. 12-13%.
If I may, I will now take you back to 28th Feb 2014, the closing date of the original BMN financial year, prior to Vametco ownership and also prior to dare I say it Darwin, Lemur cash, Yellow Dragon, Duferco, Vanchem, BE, Orion and certainly Covid.
In Feb 2014 there was essentially no vanadium asset, a vanadium platform yes but . There was tin and there was iron ore, and the bottom was about to fall out of that. Meaning that BMN was going to need to find something else to do, or it was going to go out of business. Or worse still, its directors could strong everyone along for a few years, collect their pay checks and live the AIM high life. After all, thats what a great many others have done and done so well.
Apologies 1/2 published twice for some reason.
2/2
I have read recently that niobium in terms of material required, is currently selling for an equivalent of c. $52 a kg vanadium.
This is backed up in part by TPPs comment on slide 90, which states ;
"A secondary peak occurs at $15.00-$16.00/lb V2O5 representing a point of price stability in an environment where supply struggles to meet demand. At this price level we don’t see very much substitutional loss of demand and so in tight markets
there is support for prices in this range."
Every existing BMN sharholder would be very happy if that came to pass and right now, the prediction is that said "supply struggles to meet demand" scenario, starts to take hold in 2021.
Yes it potentially suffocates VRFB take up but the BMN value chain approach, still has the very best chance of delivering both, even in that elevated pricing environment. In fact as I have said previously, it would probably send even more work and VRFB producers their way.
Some analysts are making an argument that Chinese support finance will begin to fall away in 2021, so steel demand may weaken. I just cannot see how that is true. Its just too early and such investment takes long than 9 months to bear out. The world markets are just too fragile for it to be wise to remove such support just yet. Then we have the Ex-China market demand and infrastructure support, which are markets where vanadium content is at its highest. So their demand can be very influential in 2021/22. So other than a substantial credit crunch, I just don't buy it that demand will weaken in 2021.
If not then the deficit play is very much on and prices should continue to react accordingly, if said inventory truly is reflective, of what TPP Squared have stated.
Like I say, well worth dissecting the detail but it goes a long way to demonstrating that prices will rise this year and an expanding BMN, with +4,000 mtV production on the cards, would be in high demand, should it turn out to be the case.
1/2
Hi Uksteveg,
I would encourage you to have a very close look at the Terry Pearles presentation from the 8th Vanitec Energy Storage meeting. Its a great addition from Vanitec, which allows investors such as ourselves, to get much closer to what is actually happening in what is at times a very secretive vanadium market.
I would refer you in particular to slide 60.
There you will see that in 2020, China were predicted to produce c. 70,000 mtV of vanadium *Q4 outstanding at time of publishing). That's a c. 5,350 mtV rise on 2019, which itself was a year when stone coal was at its most rampant, post the 2018 price surge, which encouraged its producers so much.
As you will also see from slide 67, there was a small surplus in 2019 and a slightly bigger one in 2020 (c. 2,000 mtV)...
and yet as you have seen for yourself, Chinese vanadium prices held steady at around $30 per kg. So China was definitely using more vanadium in 2020.
This is compounded by 2 further facts ;
1. that European demand fell off a cliff in 2020, so the actual demand in China was even greater and ;
2. China became a net importer of vanadium in 2020...
and still we are talking about a Chinese market that managed to maintain a c. $30 per kg pricing level.
What we are now beginning to see is European and US demand coming back on line, as steel production and activity starts to rise again. If Chinese demand stays elevated, then we should start to see that bear out in rising Ex- China prices first of all. However, China stayed relatively stable because they were able to pull in supply, normally meant for other markets (BMN being the prime example with actual production of c. 24% going to China in H2).
As those markets return, suppliers may not be so keen to supply into China and then things may start to get really interesting.
Better still (and as I talked about earlier), if the TPP deficit forecast holds up, then there's a very strong chance that the inventory isn't there to cover it, this time around.
We are all abundantly aware, that 2018 was a massive trigger point for prices because it was the third year in a row of significant deficits (see slide 67 again). Since then the inventory recovery, as understood by TPP Squared, has been around c. 2,200 mtV.
With the 2021 prediction coming in at 5,400 mtV, there may well be nowhere to go for pricing but up but it is all about actual available inventory and China production/demand in 2021.
Slide 63 shows TPPs prediction for Chinese V production and usage. Rather remarkably, whilst production is expected to be up another c. 4,000 mtV, demand there is anticipated to reduce the Chinese overall surplus, from c. 5,700 mtV in 2020, to c. 3,500 mtV in 2021, driven by greater adherence to the very rebar standards, that helped drive the price shock in 2018.
That's a big change, if Chinsa demand stays firm because Ex-China will inevitably suffer.