The latest Investing Matters Podcast episode featuring Jeremy Skillington, CEO of Poolbeg Pharma has just been released. Listen here.
JD-Nau, entirely endorse your account of Benin. As a geologist with many decades experience of field operations in several African countries, I find the ignorance and prejudice expressed by some on this chat board, deeply shameful.
It is however consistent with the standard to which contributions here have fallen.
The Dec 2022 Investor Presentation which can be accessed via the company website, includes on page 7 the following note relating to “Anza – leases and applications”, “Several new applications on southern margin may be added.”
Since the most southerly targets, APTA, Roble [Charrascala], Cedro [Guaimarala] and Aster, are all within areas for which applications have already been granted, this reference to “new applications” must refer to areas still further south, and if such additional applications are being sought, would presumably be part of the current JV negotiations with MMA [Newmont/Agnico]. Intriguingly, the area immediately to the south includes the Oribella prospect on which I posted details as far back as 19.12.2018.
Outcrop Silver & Gold Corp, which is prioritizing its Santa Ana, Colombia, silver project, currently describes the Oribella Project as one of four potential world-class gold prospects in its Colombian portfolio, for which it is open to offers. In a SEDAR filing dated 30.11.2022 it refers to Oribella as
“Adjoining Orosur Mining Inc Anza Project, which contains the APTA vein deposit and the Charrascala porphyry-epithermal anomalies. The APTA structures are inferred to project onto Oribella. The Oribella mineral system appears to include epithermal veins and replacements superimposed on a large breccia and basalt hosted 'wall-rock' gold and copper porphyry system. The projects surrounding Oribella appear to also include epithermal and porphyry-style mineralization.”
LTH's may also recall that I posted during 2019-20, details of the Exploration Agreement which Miranda Gold [Outcrop S & G] had with Newmont for the Lyra/Pantagora project which effectively resulted in Newmont applying its BLEG [Bulk Leach Extractable Gold] sediment survey technique to most of the area from Buritica south to ANZA. On the basis of that agreement having been successfully concluded it seems highly likely that Newmont will also have been in discussions with Outcrop regarding the future of Oribella. The addition of Oribella to the 8 ANZA targets would appear to be a clear possibility especially in view of Newmont's stated objective of developing 'large-scale, multi-component,autonomous mining complexes' as described in my post of 02.03.2023.
AGEOS.
Yes Sharetrader, and as announced in February, Argentina also, but before these recent additions 70% of their interests were in Colombia and 30% in Nicaragua. The significance of prioritizing GNM is their declared objective of henceforth concentrating on a single potential tier 1 prospect in each of a greater diversity of global jurisdictions. In choosing GNM they have rejected or down-graded 15 other Colombian prospects in their portfolio and no doubt with a data input from Agnico. .
A recent strategic reassessment announced by Royal Road Minerals has resulted in its GNM Project {Guintar-Niverengo-Margaritas, a 50/50 JV with Mineros SA] situated within the ANZA area, being prioritized for development above all other prospects in Colombia. This is of considerable significance to Orosur.
Agnico [50/50 JV partner with Newmont in MMA, operator of ANZA] acquired a 19.9% equity interest in Royal Road in 2019 and a Directorship on the RR BOD This was immediately prior to Royal Roads acquisition of AngloGold Ashanti's Colombian portfolio which included GNM and 15 other gold prospects.
For RR to have now prioritized GNM over all other Colombian assets throughout the Middle Cauca mineralized belt and elsewhere, implies a high level of confidence in the gold/copper potential at GNM, and is a decision which must have been supported by Agnico's expectations of the adjacent ANZA project. The Agnico representative on the RR BOD would have access to all the relevant data relating to the ANZA area potential.
I have posted details of the GNM Project on numerous occasions, most recently on 08.02.2023, from which the following extract is especially relevant:
“The significance of the concession contract integration is that the process of integrating a mining Concession Contract in Colombia requires certain regulatory approvals including the approval of a unique plan of exploration and exploitation (Plan Único de Exploración y Explotación, PUEE) which, amongst other stipulations, requires the applicant to prove that mineralization is continuous across relevant concession contract boundaries.” This relates to integration of the Guintar and Niverengo concessions, the potential significance of which I emphasised by stating: “With an inferred W-E orientation to this metalliferous domain, its immediate proximity to La Virgencita and APTA West, has obvious implications for possible further extensions of mineralization into those concessions also.”
The potential significance of RR's prioritization of the GNM Project is further emphasized by the fact that a “Titleholder” [El Aleman Mine] and an unnamed “Mining Concession Applicant” with interests “located proximal to the Guintar copper/gold project” have Agreements with RR allowing the company, on completion of a successful feasibility study, to purchase their remaining 20% interests, or the 2% net smelter conversion royalty, for a total of US$30m.
This latest initiative from Royal Road, which must have been endorsed by Agnico, provides further indication of the potential at ANZA.
AGEOS
Bhargav, the most recent Research Report for Orosur on the Turner Pope website is dated 02.12.2022, and clearly states in the introductory paragraph the following:
“negotiation and execution of the joint venture agreement (the JVA) between MMA and Orosur remains ongoing, with TPI presently anticipating completion by late Q1 2023.”
If you have access to a more recent report which states Q3, as you have posted, I and I'm sure others would appreciate confirmation of the source of that information. It may be there is a more recent report only available to subscribers and it is from that you are quoting, if so confirmation would be appreciated.
Conversations with colleagues within the mining industry have revealed the intriguing possibility that the need to “advance a variety of licence processes” at ANZA, including “integration of smaller licences” is , in part, driven by long term contingency planning which allows for the possibility of an integrated mining complex. Newmont especially, have for a decade, been progressing their global portfolio towards large scale, multi-component, autonomous mining which has been proven to reduce costs and boost productivity substantially. For maximum flexibility in implementation it is essential to ensure simplicity and conformity in the licensing regime for the whole potential mining complex, including connective tunnelling, electricity generation and supply, logistics and all surface infrastructure.
Somewhat fortuitously, in view of OMI's Argentinian interest, Newmont's latest initiative in this regard is the Cerro Negro mine complex not far from El Pantano. This incorporates three operating underground mines, with two others in development and a further five prospects under evaluation. Initial implementation based on a Sandvik/IBM AutoMine platform ensures autonomous loading and haulage throughout the complex with plans for robotic mining using AI, which would minimize the exposure of the workforce to underground hazards. This futuristic model is seen as the ideal for developing multi-component mining complexes as a replacement for the decreasing number of single large mines which have dominated the industry to date.
ANZA with its 8+ exploratory targets could well be envisaged as a potential multi-component mining complex, so the current focus on rationalization of the licences might be an indication of Newmont/Agnico planning towards that possibility.
AGEOS
Part of the 02.03.2023 RNS update which referred to the Anza Project – Colombia, concluded with the following paragraph: “Following completion of drilling, exploration work at Anza has been wound back to allow for the required corporate restructuring of the joint venture agreement to be completed, and to advance a variety of licence processes such as integration of smaller licences and conversion of applications to granted status.”
Leaving aside the observation that this should have read “Following completion of Phase 1 drilling.....”, this statement has been interpreted as meaning there will be no further exploration work at ANZA until the “corporate restructuring of the JV” and all the “licence processes” have been completed.
This interpretation is clearly incompatible with the following statement from the 17.01.2023 RNS re Columbia Update: “The process to create the Mining Company has now commenced and is expected to take several months to complete. During this process, MMA will be able to continue exploration at the Project, and any expenditures incurred by MMA during this interim period will form part of the Phase 2 qualifying expenditures.”
The latter statement confirms that the process of forming the JV and all that is associated with it does not exclude the continuation of exploration work at ANZA. However it is MMA which will determine what, if any, further exploration work, including drilling, takes place at ANZA during the JV forming process, and Orosur will be informed according to whatever protocol is agreed relating to the sharing of such information. Only then would Orosur be in a position to inform the market of impending plans for further work including drilling.
I conclude therefore that further exploration work could be initiated at ANZA at any time during the JV forming process and that the market will be informed of such plans and/or their implementation, as and when OMI are free to release such information.
AGEOS.
Yesterday's RNS update includes reference to the results, to date, of the ongoing exploration work at the La Esfinge prospect in the El Pantano II licence area, Argentina. The recognition of “very large zones of Hg [mercury] and As [ar*enic] anomalism along more than 8km strike of a major NW trending structure” is, together with other evidence, a strong indicator of a potential mineralized target. This conclusion is reinforced by confirmation that geochemical and geophysical field work is continuing and, most significantly, that “environmental permitting work is also underway that will allow drilling to be undertaken later in the year”. Exploratory drilling will presumably conclude the requirement of US$1m expenditure for the Phase I, earn-in necessary to acquire 51% equity in the Project.
For the benefit of those who still fail to understand the potential at La Esfinge, Patagonia Gold has a prospect, the La Josephina Project, 40km due west, which shares very similar geological characteristics and has proven “bonanza” grade gold, multiple-metre intercepts in excess of 100 g/t [max 3m @ 177 g/t au & 7m @ 114 g/t au], in breccias associated with a silica-sinter capped ridge of the same origin as that which caps the La Esfinge ridge. This is an example of the vertical zoning of gold developed in low-sulphide epithermal systems as referred to in yesterday's RNS. The silica-sinter horizon is the upper limit of a hydrothermal mineral system below which gold with some silver accumulates in breccia feed-pipes, joints, faults and porous rock, grading down into a silver rich zone and below that a base-metal zone, all within a few hundred metres depth. In addition, the El Pantano and La Josefina prospects have the same, though parallel, NW-SE structural characteristics and share similar geochemical signatures, which at the latter have proven, with over 500 holes drilled, to be evidence of several gold/silver quartz-vein systems.
Whilst the mineralogical potential of La Esfinge can only be confirmed by drilling, all the field and lab evidence to date is supportive of a possible positive outcome.
AGEOS
Regarding the discussion around cash-flow, arising from yesterday's RNS, there appears to be some confusion relating to the total sums involved and more importantly no reference to the value accruing to the company from that expenditure.
As quoted by others, the RNS of 30.01.2023 states “as at the date of this announcement the Company has a cash balance of US$3.540k”. It also confirms that as at 30.11.2022, the end date of the financial period to which the RNS relates, the cash balance was US$2.906k. Unfortunately neither it or the statutory SEDAR filing of the Financial Statement, provides any information as to where the additional cash inflow of $643,000 during Dec-Jan came from. The “subsequent events” section of the SEDAR filing includes nothing to that effect, so we will have to wait for the next Financial Statement for clarification of whether this sum was a “material cash credit” or a transitory “credit/debit” transaction.
Leaving the above 'confusion' aside and assuming the cash balance at 30.01.2023 to have been $3.540k, then yesterdays “balance sheet of over $4m” inclusive of the $2m option inflow payment, implies a cash outflow of up to $1.5m maximum since end of January. A portion of that, averaging $140,000 per month based on the SEDAR filing, is attributable to “corporate and administrative expenditure” but the remainder will be apportioned to “exploration expenses”, as detailed in yesterday's RNS. This confirmed completion of work at El Pantino by an Orosur team and a consultant structural geologist, and of a “large-scale regional sampling program...over several months” at Ariquemes. Further field work is described as ongoing at El Pantano and “near term” at Ariquemes.
This exploration expenditure will contribute significantly to the US$1m first phase option payments due on both the El Pantano [Argentina] and Ariquemes [Brazil] 'Exploration and JV Agreements'., and should be valued as contributing significantly to realisation of the Phase one 51% ownership it will bring in two potentially very valuable assets.
AGEOS
continuation:
It is this NW-SE oriented fault zone which dominates the structural trend and through its influence on the metallogenesis, determines the location and characteristics of the mineralized vein systems. A similar parallel major fault zone probably exists as determinant of the La Esfinge- San Antonio structural trend and likewise may have been the feeder for the vein systems already identified at both those locations.
Whilst El Pantano is early stage exploration and therefore of secondary importance news-wise, the anticipated update may be of some significance as an indicator of potential.
AGEOS
On the subject of pending news, an MD & A filed on SEDAR on 30.01.2023 referring to the 3 & 6 month periods ending 30.11.2022 summarised the work in Argentina and concluded that “the work has defined a high priority target to be followed in the coming two months”. This also implies that the “wider geochemical analysis, ground magnetics and mapping” mentioned in a 28.06.2022 RNS could have been completed within the December-February peak field season and be ready for release fairly soon.
Although the “high priority target” is presumably the La Esfinge ridge located within the Pantano 2 licence area it is possible that the “wider” surveys may include the San Antonio region first identified by Minsud Resources Corp pre-2011 as including three geophysical targets, all within the three Antonio licences in the SE of Orosur's Exploration and JV Agreement licence area. The three targets are quite diverse in type, including a deep potential mineralised feeder and other resistive and conductive signatures indicative of an epithermal system. What is especially significant however is that the host rocks are of the Chon-Aike formation, the host for 90% of the major epithermal mineral prospects and mines of the Deseado Massif mining province, and that there is a SE-NW structural trend to these rocks indicated by airborne magnetic survey, continuous from San Antonio to the La Esfinge target over a distance of 30km. La Esfinge appears to be within rocks [La Matilde Formation] which are immediately overlying, or laterally equivalent too, the Chon-Aike formation. The structural trend also continues further to the SE and includes the Atlas prospect 1-2km south of Antonio II and within a licence area probably still held by Colque Exploraciones or Golden Minerals.
For those who may not appreciate the significance of geological structural trends in mineral provinces, there is a parallel NW-SE trend immediately south of the La Esfinge – San Antonio trend, which runs from Anglo Gold's Cerro Vanguardia mine, 35km to the SE of San Antonio, to the Austral Gold, Pinguino prospect c10km south of San Antonio I. Cerro Vanguardia is a gold/silver quartz-vein complex hosted by the Chon-Aike formation, occupying a 15 x 10km area and comprising c60 economically mineable veins, 0-200m in depth and totalling over 100km in length. The veins comprise two sets, a predominant one at c320 degree strike and 65-90 NE dip, and a secondary at c105 strike and 60-80 SW dip. The Pinguino prospect is predominantly a silver [25M oz] , with secondary gold,zinc and lead, quartz-vein complex, 14.5 x 4km in area, comprising c70 veins, 113km in total length, up to 150m in depth and up to 13m width, in three sets of 330, 300 [both with SW 60-80 dip] and 70 degree strike. A major SE-NW trending fault [Tranquilo Fault zone] appears to have been the main mineralizing feeder, both for this and the Vanguardia veins, but the host rocks at Pinguino are of pre-Chon-Aike age.
To be continued
Ezhik, apparently awarded 100% to ETAP for a period of 20 years backdated to 01.01.2020 according to a 29.10, 2022 entry in the official Gazette of the Tunisian Republic, as first posted on here by 123tor on 24.12.2022 and discussed in detail in my posts of 8, 19 & 20 Jan.
If EPZ had, as many here appear to have assumed, been an unnamed beneficiary of this concession award, it should have been RNS'd by now. In the absence of such an RNS, what conclusion seems most appropriate?.
MarketGS, impressed by you tenacity, so agree that there are connections between the two companies at management level. Maybe this is time to be reminded of the old adage “beware of not seeing the forest for all the trees in the way”. I've been guilty of that myself with some previous investments and paid a hefty price. Best of luck, and luck does play a part however thorough the research.
MarketGunslinger, just for your information and to assist in your research, the Helioparc, Pau, France address you quote for both Olive Energy and FracGeo does not mean they are one and the same company. They are simply registered here to comply with French company law. If you access the helioparc website at https://annuaire.helioparc.fr/fr/annuaire and scroll down, you will find hundreds of companies including many geo-science enterprises head-quartered or with subsidiaries here, but that excludes those without web-links such as Olive E and FracGeo. Surprising what can be revealed by browsing such websites but if a predictable query arises my answer will be “no comment”,
You are correct that the Sawdust Rd., Montgomery, Texas address is shared by both companies but that is the sales tax and franchise tax permit holder address and business address as registered with the Texas Public Accounts Office, on 01.02.2019 for FracGeo and 10.08.2016 for Olive Energy. They are not one and the same company. I don't know but my guess is that this is simply the address of a franchise holder acting on behalf of both companies for tax purposes and who need not necessarily have any other connection with either.
Keep up your comprehensive work but I suggest you dig deeper re Tunisia especially into the recently announced “Ezzaouia New Concession” and the Sidi El Kilani 22.5% former CNAOG interest for which the published “Concession Expiry Date” was 24.12.2022 ref page 131 “Secrets of Hydrocarbon Contracts in Tunisia” www.atcp.org.tn click on publications. Best of luck with your investment here.
Doubts regarding ZEN's negotiating position in Congo [Brazzaville] first appeared in my estimation in early 2022 when, as I posted on 06.02.2022, it became apparent that the MKB Fields which had previously been the potential “second, third and possible fourth” acquisitions which AC had referred to on several occasions, and which I had reported on throughout 2021, had been conceded to Trident OGX with the probable involvement also of Orion Energy.
Significantly, Trident OGX had employed the services of Houston based FracGeo in its MKB assessment, FracGeo being the geo-tech service provider to Olive Energy E & P which as we now know has won the Tilapia II operator licence.
There is a great deal more background information I could add but which I will simply summarise as being indicative of failure by AC and the BOD in understanding what was necessary to achieve a successful conclusion to negotiations for the Tilapia II concession and for other opportunities in the country. Those who resort to claims that ZEN is “well out of it” are clearly clueless as to the potential now lost. The Council of Ministers Report from which I posted details of the Tilapia II award yesterday [now removed from this BB I see] included details of awards to ENI, TOTAL and WING WAH Petrochem [460+ wells to date], three major international O & G operators, and there have been similar developmental and operational concessions awarded in recent years to Perenco, Hemla E & P, Africa O & G, Petro Congo, Orion, and others, all of which reflects the potential seen by others in the industry. The sub-salt Vandji play on which I posted recently was a substantial potential addition to the Tilapia resource, also now lost.
For ZEN to have been owed US$5.3m by SNPC, via its subsidiary AAOGC, and to have failed to negotiate award of the Tilapia II licence, with that as a bargaining chip, does not reflect well on management. The Azerbaijan venture failed through insufficient understanding of the geo-technical challenges inherent in a tectonically dynamic mature field. This current failure probably owes much to a related cause, inability to enlist third party expertise necessary in exploiting technically challenging mature fields. If Trident OGX, FracGeo and Orion could do it for the MKB Fields and FracGeo with Olive Energy do likewise in convincing SONAREP [research & operational arm of SNPC] of their competence, why did ZEN fail.
AGEOS
Those familiar with the concession contracts within the ANZA region will know of Royal Road Minerals' interests in the Guintar and Niverengo areas immediately west of OMI's La Virgencita and APTA West concessions, sharing a common boundary with the former.
Yesterday Royal Road announced the integration of its Guintär and Niverengo mining concession contract areas into one new concession area of 1848 hectares, and the consequent renewal of the relevant exploration term for a further 19-years and 11-months. This is subject to the existing 50-50 exploration joint venture as part of a strategic alliance agreement between Royal Road and Mineros S A, with RR as the operator,
The significance of the concession contract integration is that the process of integrating a mining Concession Contract in Colombia requires certain regulatory approvals including the approval of a unique plan of exploration and exploitation (Plan Único de Exploración y Explotación, PUEE) which, amongst other stipulations, requires the applicant to prove that mineralization is continuous across relevant concession contract boundaries.
Drilling results to date at Guintar have established gold, silver, copper mineralization with gold[e] intercepts of 303m @ 1.0g/t, 126m @ 1.4g/t, 118m @ 1.0g/t and 181m @ 1.1g/t in 4 holes indicative of a possible intrusive or porphyry-related source, similar to the postulated scenario at Pepas. Drilling at Niverengo has produced additional intercepts of 22m @ 1.3g/t, 14m @ 4.1g/t and 10m @ 1.3g/t with the possibly structurally contiguous area of the El Aleman Mine, 1.5km to the west, producing an intercept of 80m @ 1.0g/t au, including 18m @ 3g/t au.
With an inferred W-E orientation to this metalliferous domain, its proximity to La Virgencita and APTA West, has obvious implications for possible further extensions of mineralization into those concessions also.
AGEOS
Having just listened again to Brad's two 2022 LSE Webinar presentations and Q & A exchanges with Donald Leggatt, I am reminded of how highly informative and positive these are. As they should be mandatory listening for any investor, present or prospective, I've added the links below:
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LSE Investor Webinar March 8th 2022 duration 29 mins
www.youtube.com/watch?v=YHXMukKXPyA
LSE Investor Webinar Sept 6th 2022 duration 32 mins
www.youtube.com/watch?v=DXcp0NROZPo
The March webinar confirms the 5M+ oz au minimum target interest of Newmont/Agnico [repeated in the Sept webinar also, at 32mins.], which is significant in that it leaves open the possibility that APTA remains a contender for that role, assuming no other ANZA prospect proves to satisfy the minimum resource requirement. That possibility is alluded to by Brad's reference to the potential significance of the anticlinal structure proved in the exploratory holes [92 & 95], and which I have previously posted as providing a possible westward displacement of the high-grade zones at depth. Proof of such an extension, which would require considerable deep and therefore expensive drilling to establish, could elevate the potential resource at APTA nearer to that 5M+ oz target.
The September webinar account highlights the ANZA, Pepas initial drill results and the potential for further exploratory drilling along the Aragon trend scheduled for Phase 2, but also emphasises the significant potential which the Brazilian and Argentinian opportunities offer.
Impecunious2, you're not alone in having trust and confidence in Brad as CEO.