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Flundra running some AI analysis on the point you made about recycling from Siemens, the read out suggests that on a base-case estimate, the first ten-year window is still relatively modest: about 1,650 tonnes of recoverable NdFeB magnet material, containing around 355 tonnes of neodymium. The volumes become meaningful only from 2032 onward, with the largest year in this window being 2035, when the early 2015 Siemens direct-drive cohorts reach 20 years.

Europe dominates because the earliest Siemens direct-drive installations were concentrated in Europe, including Denmark, Germany, the UK and other early adopter markets. North America follows because Siemens secured early U.S. direct-drive orders, including 3 MW SWT-3.0-101 machines for projects such as Bison 2, due for commissioning around 2012. Oceania appears materially from 2034 because Snowtown II in Australia used 90 Siemens direct-drive machines, commissioned in 2014.

The gross magnet stock represented by these early Siemens direct-drive cohorts is higher than the recovered number. Before collection and process losses, the estimated 2026–2035 end-of-life fleet would contain approximately 2,034 tonnes of NdFeB magnet material, with around 438 tonnes of neodymium embedded in that material.

If they run the turbines to 25 years then this will obviously material push back these projections, with the 2026–2035 recoverable Siemens NdFeB opportunity falling to only around 17 tonnes of recovered NdFeB material, containing roughly 3.6 tonnes of neodymium.

Cotec Holdings Corp. Announces Drawdown Of Amended And Restated Convertible Loans

Vancouver, British Columbia – June 8, 2026 – CoTec Holdings Corp. (TSXV: CTH; OTCQX: CTHCF) (“CoTec” or the “Company”) is pleased to announce that it has drawn down the full $4,000,000 principal amount available under its previously announced amended and restated convertible loan facilities (the “Amended and Restated Convertible Loans”) with Kings Chapel International Limited (“Kings Chapel”) and certain funds managed by Epic Capital Management Inc. (“Epic Capital”, and together with Kings Chapel, the “Lenders”).

Pursuant to the Amended and Restated Convertible Loans, the terms of which were announced by the Company on April 30, 2026, Kings Chapel and Epic Capital made available to the Company loans in the aggregate principal amounts of up to $3,000,000 and up to $1,000,000, respectively. The Company has now drawn the full $4,000,000 available under the facilities. The proceeds of the Amended and Restated Convertible Loans will be used by the Company for general working capital purposes.

Pursuant to the terms of the Amended and Restated Convertible Loans, the outstanding principal amount of the loans may be converted into common shares of the Company (“Common Shares”) by the Company or the Lenders at any time at a price of $1.33 per Common Share. Subject to the receipt of final approval from the TSX Venture Exchange of the draw down under the Amended and Restated Convertible Loans, the Company intends to immediately exercise its right to convert the outstanding principal amount into an aggregate of 3,007,518 Common Shares, comprised of 2,255,639 Common Shares to be issued to Kings Chapel and 751,879 Common Shares to be issued to Epic Capital.

In addition, as required by the terms of the Amended and Restated Convertible Loans, in consideration of the Lenders making the Amended and Restated Convertible Loans available to the Company, the Company has issued to the Lenders concurrently with the draw down, an aggregate of 1,503,758 warrants to purchase Common Shares (“Warrants”), comprised of 1,127,819 Warrants issued to Kings Chapel and 375,939 Warrants issued to Epic Capital. Each Warrant entitles the holder to purchase one Common Share at a price of $1.33 per share for one year from the date of issuance.

Kings Chapel is an existing insider and Control Person (as defined by the TSXV

Rules) of the Company. Julian Treger, a director of the Company and its Chief Executive Officer, is a beneficiary of a family trust associated with Kings Chapel. As a result, the entry into, and conversion of, the Amended and Restated Convertible Loan with Kings Chapel and the issuance of Warrants to Kings Chapel are a related party transaction subject to Multilateral Instrument 61-101 – Protection of Minority Security Holders in Special Transactions (“MI 61-101”). The Amended and Restated Convertible Loan with Kings Chapel and the issuance of Warrants to Kings Chapel are exe

Read out from ChatGPT review of the todays RNS updated filing

What has changed

1. MKAR has filed an amended Form F-4

* Original public F-4 filed: 20 May 2026

* Amended F-4 filed: 8 June 2026

* Announced by RNS: 9 June 2026

2. Nasdaq application has now been made

* Previous wording: MKAR “will apply” for Nasdaq.

* New wording: MKAR “has applied” for Nasdaq listing.

3. Ticker symbols confirmed

* Ordinary/common shares: MKAR

* Warrants: MKARW

4. Still preliminary — not yet effective

* The amended F-4 has not yet been declared effective by the SEC and remains subject to further amendment/completion.

5. Mkango AGM approvals completed

* Mkango shareholders passed all AGM resolutions on 5 June 2026, including a waiver of TSXV review relating to MKAR.

Remaining steps

Step Status

Public F-4 filed ✅ Done

F-4/A filed ✅ Done

Nasdaq listing application ✅ Done

SEC effectiveness ⏳ Pending

Definitive proxy/prospectus ⏳ Pending

CPTK shareholder vote ⏳ Pending

Final Nasdaq approval ⏳ Pending

Closing / MKAR trading ⏳ Pending

Expected timing revised view:

CPTK shareholder approval: likely July–August 2026, assuming the SEC clears the amended F-4 without a long second comment round.

Nasdaq listing / MKAR trading: most likely August–September 2026.

The key point is that the filing of an amended F-4 only 19 days after the first public F-4 suggests the process is moving, not stalled. But the listing cannot happen until the SEC declares the F-4 effective and CPTK shareholders approve the business combination.

@esduk I understand the $400m valuation, my base case is risk adjusted as there is still some execution risk here and MKA has 80% interest which would be $320m before any risk adjustment. In terms PIPE financing I see that as a heavily discounted pre purchase for product so it will come out of future revenues as that PIPE financing is repaid and so does not add value to the SP (more of a downward pressure on pricing due to the discounting on future supply)

But as mentioned the March RNS information does suggest there is a considerable upside on the $400m depending, as you suggest, on sentiment and investor appetite

@snkj68 that is correct base case full diluted £1.42 per share for MKA

@snkj68 you are correct and an oversight on my part, my working assumption for MKAR at the moment is a fully diluted base case of £0.76 per share based on a risk premium being applied to the numbers shared last year.

But this is very conservative against the March 19 RNS information. That update put Songwe at US$339m NPV and Puławy at US$779m NPV, or US$1.118bn combined before any SPAC dilution. By simple arithmetic, c.80% of that would be about US$894m attributable on an unrisked look-through basis. So even the company’s own US$400m MKAR stake marker already sits well below underlying unrisked project NPVs, It will be interesting to see the F-4 once that is finally agreed and made public to see what numbers are being proposed for the listing.

I still think there is substantial upside to the share price of Makango despite this weeks RNS if MKAR actually gets over the SEC/Nasdaq line.

I have been rerunning numbers based on these RNSs , which do two things: they make the European scale-up more financeable, and they dilute the equity. Yesterday’s RNS introduced the 2027 UK/Germany/USA pricing and cost assumptions; today’s result RNS upsized the raise from £10m to £12.5m, with proceeds now earmarked at £4.33m for the German acquisition, £3.95m for German capex, £2.20m for UK capex, and £2.02m for working capital. After admission, the basic share count will be 387,110,284 shares. My read is that the new information is modestly positive for asset de-risking, but clearly dilutive on a per-share basis for the shareholders.

For HyProMag Europe, the new RNS/deck assumptions are materially better than the market cap implies, but they are still forward-looking. The 2027 assumptions are 350 tpa for the UK and 750 tpa for Germany, with average selling price / operating cost ranges of US$55–65 / US$30–36 per kg in the UK and US$60–70 / US$30–34 per kg in Germany. On those numbers, the implied 2027 site-level operating spread is roughly US$26m–42m before group overheads. Mkango’s effective interest is presented as 79.4% in the UK and expected to rise to 79.4% in Germany after the note conversion and minority buyout. But as noted in posts yesterday that the UK is still only at an initial 20–25 tpa, ramping to 100–350 tpa, and Germany is only at an initial 100–350 tpa with ~750 tpa expansion potential.

For HyProMag USA. The presentation says Mkango’s effective JV share is 39.7%, while the Texas Hub study shows US$409m NPV at current prices and US$780m NPV at forecast prices. It also shows a possible HyProMag USA IPO in late 2026 / early 2027, with H2 2027 commercial production targeted, and notes that CoTec has preferential access to initial cash flows until carried capex is recovered.

So my base case is about £287m equity value, or roughly 74p/share basic and 66p/share on an approximate fully diluted basis. This is certainly much lower than I was hoping for earlier in the year, but this could increase if the NASDAQ share price achieves the multiples that are enjoyed by some of the other critical mineral stocks in the UK. The institutional investors got this stock for a real discount ,however I do see the share price rising fairly quickly again unless there SEC timelines slip (unsure), SPAC cash (unlikely) or redemptions becoming an issue, or slippage in the European ramp up (possible).

So here is my reading of this announcement today, it looks like overall as Mkango stacking experienced hands around finance, transactions and investor messaging ahead of a pivotal phase — the kind of move that can reduce execution risk and improve credibility with institutions and drive the share price onwards and upwards! The key points that make me arrive at this are:

CFO transition looks controlled, not chaotic. Tim Slater back as Interim CFO = reporting discipline + continuity. Slater has done the role before at Mkango (interim CFO 2020–2022) and is a Chartered Accountant with experience supporting listed companies. In practice, an interim CFO like this is often brought in for transaction readiness: tighter controls, clean audit trail, reliable reporting cadence, and board-level governance — all critical when markets are scrutinising everything.

Scott Beattie strengthens the “deal engine.” Mkango is bringing in a senior corporate development operator with deep cross-border transaction and capital raise / partnership experience. That’s exactly what you want alongside a US listing push: someone focused on structuring outcomes (funding, strategic partners, corporate actions) while management keeps the business moving.

Montfort Communications adds U.S.-facing capital markets comms experience — including Arqit. Montfort isn’t just generic PR; they’ve been involved in SPAC-to-Nasdaq communications cycles (e.g., Arqit’s SPAC transaction ahead of its Nasdaq listing as ARQQ in 2022). That’s relevant because the US market tends to reward clear, consistent messaging and punishes gaps/ambiguity. If Mkango is stepping up its US capital markets narrative, having advisors who’ve operated in that arena delivers value.

Esduk, indeed and let's hope they have also been doing non-public (confidential) draft submissions to bring it forward as we all are hoping for

On the SPAC Listing the process as I see it is late June / Late July if filed early Feb - there is a big caveat though, the SEC allows non-public (confidential) draft submissions in many cases. So if Lancaster/CPTK have already been through a confidential review cycle, the timeline can compress and a late March / April 2026 close becomes plausible.

Process mapped below

T0 = first (public) Form F-4 filing

SEC first comment letter: typically ~27–30 days after initial filing

1st response + F-4/A amendment: often ~1–2 weeks (depends how fast the team turns comments)

SEC subsequent comment rounds: commonly ~14–16 days per round after amendments

SEC EFFECT (effectiveness): often lands after 2–3 rounds, so ~8–12 weeks from T0 in many real-world cases

CPTK shareholder meeting/vote: the BCA targets ≤30 days after EFFECT (unless agreed otherwise).

Nasdaq listing application review: typically ~4–6 weeks, usually run in parallel with the SEC process.

Close mechanics: typically ~3–10 days after the vote + final conditions.

Great news this morning, but it is just completion of a concept study rather than a full feasibility study and financial close for investment. Nevertheless this should move the share price, in a way the market has not responded to this morning, below is an un-risked sum of published anchors (forecast price case)

(MKAR deal anchor + HyProMag USA 3-hub concept NPV + Europe base proxy at 330/330)

Component Mkango attrib (US$m) US$/share p/share

MKAR stake (deal anchor) 400.0 1.15 86.0p

HyProMag USA (3 hubs, concept study, forecast NPV) 865.5 2.49 186.0p

HyProMag Europe (proxy; 330/330) 233.1 0.67 50.1p

Indicative total 1,498.6 4.32 322.1p

What is still not clear from the published information is

A published NPV for HyProMag UK or HyProMag Germany (none stated; hence the proxy).

A published NPV for Mkango UK long-loop chemical recycling (Mkango Rare Earths UK Ltd).

Any updated MKAR enterprise value beyond the $400m stake anchor (the filing/financing process will ultimately determine it).

If I have missed this information anywhere please let me know.

A simple execution-risked view, my haircut assumptions are (you can allows apply your own):

MKAR 75% (close/timing/fees)

USA Texas 60% (build/commissioning)

USA incremental hubs 35% (concept→PFS/FS)

Europe base 50% (ramp/permits/scale)

Result: ~US$2.30/sh (171p) “risked base”, with

Bear ~US$0.96/sh (72p) and

Bull ~US$4.85/sh (362p)

AIM is way out in terms of valuing this company, lets see if US comes in this afternoon recognising the value in this company or ,as other posters have suggested in the past, perhaps it is time for the Board to look listing somewhere other than AIM.

Esduk - This looks like institutional-style execution in a relatively wide-spread AIM name: keeping visible price impact contained during the session, then cross size off-book and/or in the closing auction.

If they are seeking IFC money, I hope they have done the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment and Management Plans in line with the IFC Performance Standards already, otherwise that money will be a long time in coming.

Below is a sum-of-parts equity value assessment per Mkango share, using the published valuation datapoints (and are attributable to Mkango shareholders).

Inputs used (published)

Shares outstanding (basic): 347,192,907

Fully-diluted share count: 347,192,907 + 2,400,000 broker warrants + 21,660,000 investor warrants + 19,823,267 options + 12,882,023 RSUs = 403,958,197

MKAR (SPAC perimeter) – Mkango’s pro-forma stake value: US$400m (ex-recycling; before transaction expenses; excludes any PIPE proceeds and CPTK trust amounts)

HyProMag USA project valuation: US$409m (current prices) / US$780m (forecast prices) post-tax NPV, at 7% real discount rate

Mkango look-through interest in HyProMag USA: 50% JV × 79.4% (Mkango’s Maginito stake) = 39.7%

FX for £ conversion (15 Dec 2025): US$1 = ~£0.748

Pound Sterling Live

Result: equity value per Mkango share (SOTP)

Case A — Using MKAR stake value (US$400m) + Mkango look-through HyProMag USA

Attributable value (US$m):

Current prices: 400 + (0.397×409)= 562.4

Forecast prices: 400 + (0.397×780)= 709.7

Basis Current /Forecast prices

Basic (347.2m sh) US$1.62/share ≈ 121p US$2.04/share ≈ 153p

Fully diluted (404.0m sh) US$1.39/share ≈ 104p US$1.76/share ≈ 131p

Case B — (Alternative) Using Songwe Hill DFS NPV (US$559m) + Mkango look-through HyProMag USA

(This will not include any Pulawy uplift beyond Songwe’s stand-alone DFS; Songwe DFS NPV is for 100% of Songwe.)

Basis Current / Forecast prices

Basic (347.2m sh) US$2.08/share ≈ 155p US$2.50/share ≈ 187p

Fully diluted (404.0m sh) US$1.79/share ≈ 134p US$2.15/share ≈ 161p

Important caveats (so you don’t get misled)

These are not risk-adjusted (execution/permitting/financing/offtake/timing risk not haircut).

They exclude any standalone valuation for HyProMag UK, HyProMag Germany, Mkango UK chemical route, and other exploration licences because I can’t see a clean published NPV/valuation figure for those in any disclosures.

Case A mixes a transaction pro-forma stake value (MKAR) with a project NPV (HyProMag USA), so treat it as a published-data SOTP, not a banker’s fairness valuation.

Operational / newsflow catalysts to watch

SPAC / MKAR

Form F-4 filing (major gating event; also triggers the additional US$250k sponsor note investment per Mkango’s note-purchase disclosure).

SEC effectiveness (Q1 2026 anticipated) and shareholder meeting ≤30 days after effectiveness.

Any announced PIPE / committed financing that credibly satisfies the $25.75m target and supports the $5m minimum cash at closing.

HyProMag USA

Texas Hub economics + strategic review: NPV uplift to US$409m / US$780m and stated evaluation of a potential separate US listing (late 2026/early 2027).

Site/lease + schedule: lease finalised; commissioning targeted mid-2027 (subject to permitting/financing).

Non-dilutive financing signal

US DFC reimbursable

Very bullish post on Linkedin by Will with a fly through image of a 750t NdFeB magnet recycling and manufacturing plant https://www.linkedin.com/posts/william-dawes-50881352_hypromag-gmbh-3d-fly-through-of-the-750t-activity-7402358254502309889-1-QX?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAAAlE69kBNvKzOopPqW1xjR9wQq7MaXjT6Ws

TSX website very clearly says $3.01 https://money.tmx.com/en/quote/MKA

Jdbanzi, all makes sense and is understandable- but in terms of whether the board can make those determinations without having to refer any changes in capital structure to shareholders to me is the real issue. Whilst the BoD have acted incredibly well over the years in the interests of the shareholders, I do end up asking myself why do they want to weaken governance / oversight on what is really a shareholder matter rather than a BoD matter and what happens in the future when this board ultimately moves on at some point in the future and we have a fund manager that does not hold the same values as the current team. I have asked in an email to the board what is the strategic intent and necessity of this amendment, it will be interesting to see their response.

A few pointers

Board power to change share structure without a shareholder vote (Special Resolution)

The proposed Articles amendment would let directors, by “special directors’ resolution,” create/eliminate classes, change the max authorized shares, subdivide or consolidate (including fully-paid issued shares), change share names, and otherwise alter the authorized share structure in cases the BCBCA allows—plus change the company name—without coming back to shareholders (while still needing a 2/3 vote now to adopt this framework). That’s materially more flexible for the board and can affect value (e.g., future consolidations, new classes), so it’s the biggest governance item to scrutinise.

Rolling 10% equity overhang (Stock Options, EMI Options, RSUs)

All three plans together are capped at 10% of outstanding shares (rolling). Current outstanding awards are close to that cap: Stock Options 18,143,267; EMI Options 1,680,000; RSUs 12,882,023 = 32,705,290 total, ~9.73% of 335,992,907 shares outstanding. That’s standard for TSXV issuers but leaves limited headroom and implies potential dilution if/when they settle in shares.

Bottom line - the Articles amendment is the one to focus on: it meaningfully expands board latitude over the capital structure. If you’re comfortable with the rationale and safeguards, fine; if not, consider pushing for limitations or clearer guardrails before supporting it. I would ask the board to justify why directors should be able to subdivide or consolidate issued shares by board-only resolution and where they expect to use this power.

I have averaged down to a certain extent. I do not disagree with yours comments on value and lost confidence. But that value is, in truth, a shadow cast by what used to be.

Not sure what you are trying to suggest is suspicious , I tend to keep my own council but as a shareholder in Goldstone since 2020 who has seen considerable loss in the value of my investment, contributing to the discussion raised by others and highlighting within that discussion what is in the public domain is neither inappropriate or suspicious. I find silence from the board on the matter as suspicious, it seems you do not.

The board has a fiduciary duty to the AIM-listed entity and its shareholders and their silence on these issues is concerning . In this case, the Chair has been accused of fraud in the press. The board, if following best practice and the obligations / spirit of the UK Corporate Governance Code, should seek the chair to step aside temporarily whilst the allegations are being resolved in order to protect the company’s integrity and maintain some market confidence in the company — even if the allegations concern actions around other unrelated business.