Member Info for mwrestle

The Raffa deal involved Adler selling a residential portfolio to Extern13 (GCP) at what Viceroy deemed inflated values, exemplifying related-party manipulation to book artificial gains. 2 peas in a pod.

Historic negative reporting is now all ignored. Grandcity Properties whilst complicit in the 'Raffa Portfolio' whilst trying to remain anonymous as a buyer (Extern13) inflating prices in what Viceroy themselves claimed a fraud. Generating artificial book profits and implied hidden related party ties evaporated. Historic negative reporting (fraud claims, related-party opacity, artificial profits via deals like Raffa/Extern13) seems largely ignored or dormant in recent years from Viceroy's side. Viceroy highly aggressive negative stance from 2021 (including Raffa/Extern13 as fraud emblematic) has gone quiet and ignored in new reporting which supports Aroundtown SA . In a candid admission, Viceroy states: "We were wrong (with our short idea), and now we’re long". The push to change their mind a mystery.

Aroundtown SA (AT1:DE) is a diversified European real estate company with a portfolio heavily weighted toward commercial properties. As of its latest reporting, its asset allocation is approximately 38% offices, 34% residential, 22% hotels, and the remainder in other categories like retail and logistics, with a strong emphasis on value-add opportunities in top-tier cities primarily in Germany, the Netherlands, and London. This mix contrasts sharply with the primarily residential-focused peers cited in the query: Vonovia SE (VNA:DE), LEG Immobilien SE (LEG:DE), and TAG Immobilien AG (TEG:DE). However, this peer group selection is analytically flawed for fundamental valuation purposes, as explained below. The core problem is the mismatch in asset classes and risk profiles. Residential real estate (the focus of Vonovia, LEG, and TAG) is inherently more defensive and stable compared to Aroundtown's commercial-heavy exposure. This leads to misleading inferences when directly comparing metrics like price-to-NAV ratios, yields, or growth prospects without adjustments. Overall, the comparison is misleading because it overlooks these divergences, potentially leading investors to undervalue the risks in Aroundtown's model while overemphasizing its cheapness. Market analysts often note that Aroundtown's narrative complexity (diversified vs. pure-play residential) contributes to its steeper discount. So why shovel it?

A curious 48hrs. Reality sinks in.

A strange realisation for the buyers that the 24hr PUMP followed on only after a hard fact assessment of Aroundtown using the truth. Vacant properties aside, what happens when the men that brought down Wirecard are found to prop up what is later found to be not all it self reported and seemed.

Somethings wrong when the markets pushed to believe what they cannot see over evidenced physical facts. While there is no confirmed evidence of coordination, the sequence of events involving WirtschaftsWoche (WIWO), Viceroy Research, and Aroundtown SA has sparked significant market speculation regarding the timing of these reports and the company’s share buybacks. February 15, 2026: The WIWO Investigation.

WirtschaftsWoche published a report alleging that Aroundtown’s vacancy rates are significantly higher than reported.

The report highlighted specific properties in Frankfurt where vacancy exceeded 30%, with some buildings completely empty, contradicting Aroundtown's claim of having "no vacancy problem". February 16, 2026: Buyback Data Released.

Aroundtown disclosed that it had aggressively repurchased nearly 10 million shares over the prior two weeks (February 2–13), executing these trades just as the negative sentiment from the investigation was beginning to surface.

February 17, 2026: The Viceroy "Long" Report.

Only two days after the WIWO report, Viceroy Research (traditionally a short seller) released a "Long" report, claiming Aroundtown is "massively undervalued" at 0.36x NAV.

Viceroy explicitly dismissed the vacancy concerns, stating their own valuation of the portfolio was 12% higher than what Aroundtown itself reported. Contradictory Data: The WIWO report provided photographic and on-site evidence of empty buildings and graffiti-covered facades, while the Viceroy report insisted the portfolio was "conservatively marked" and essentially ignored the specific vacancy proofs provided by WIWO. Strategic Timing: The Viceroy report effectively "rescued" the stock price from the downward pressure created by the WIWO investigation. Retail investors on platforms like the London Stock Exchange chat have openly questioned whether the timing was intended to neutralize the negative news.

Viceroy's call effectively "canvassed the market" by promoting the buy case publicly (via their site, social media like X, and LinkedIn), encouraging investors to reconsider the stock. This flipped the narrative from persistent short pressure to one of undervaluation and trying to force a potential rerating, whilst canvassing the market to attract buyers and drive the continued rise. A strange position for a short seller to take. Viceroy Research's pivot to a long position (announced Feb 17, 2026) was a genuine surprise to many shortsellers in the community. In short, while the Viceroy long is seen as a strong positive signal, disbelief stems from the firm's atypical stance, sector headwinds, and Aroundtown's hidden skeletons as pointed out by WIWO 15th Feb 2026.

To this day, I never found a reasonable explanation why Aroundtown's Grand City Properties can run maintenance expenses at half the level of peers, while having similar or worse energy efficiency ratios. $AT1.de Aroundtown, technically speaking, why did viceroy research consider LEG Immobilien, TAG Immobilien, Vonovia $VNA as the peer group. That's not even close.

Although the company sold about 3.5 billion euros of assets since 2022 to reduce debt, it has recently missed its targets. Credit rating agency S&P downgraded Aroundtown to BBB, citing slow progress.

Brokers say many large real estate companies want to sell properties but cannot agree on prices. Owners have only slightly lowered their expectations, even though the boom is over. Aroundtown is said to demand “moon prices.” The company denies this and says it is not under pressure to sell.

According to its books, Aroundtown values its office properties at about 19 times annual net rent. But brokers say that buildings with 40 percent vacancy may only fetch 13 times annual rent – if a buyer can be found at all.

The bottom line: Aroundtown is sitting on a lot of empty space, and this is unlikely to change quickly. The office market has fundamentally shifted, as companies reduce their footprints. This leads to more vacancy, yet paradoxically also to higher rents for top-quality buildings.

According to real estate broker Black Olive, new or fully renovated prime buildings in Frankfurt now cost around 54 euros per square meter per month – 10 percent more than a year earlier.

Most of Aroundtown’s properties do not belong to this premium category. To compete, the company would need to invest heavily. But that is difficult because it carries a heavy debt burden.

Officially, net debt is about 40 percent of property value. But this excludes perpetual bonds, which are treated as equity. Including them, the ratio rises to around 60 percent. More than half of rental income in the first nine months of 2025 went to interest payments.

The situation is no better outside Frankfurt, in neighboring cities such as Neu-Isenburg or Eschborn. This is evident from rental listings, broker exposés and site visits. An Aroundtown spokesperson does not dispute the high vacancy rates. He explains them by weak demand for office space: “Vacancy rates have risen both in our portfolio and in the overall market.” However, the company is optimistic that things will improve once government stimulus measures take effect and the economy grows again.

But how can the large discrepancy between reported and actual vacancy be explained? Aroundtown’s reported vacancy does not refer to all properties, but only to the “active core portfolio.” Of the 535,000 square meters of commercial space the company owns in Frankfurt and surrounding areas, only about two thirds – 363,000 square meters – are included.

The remaining third is assigned to other categories, such as “development projects.” These are properties that, according to the company, “must undergo extensive renovation or conversion before being re-leased.” This currently applies to 7 of the 19 Frankfurt buildings, including Karlstraße 16. They are excluded from vacancy calculations.

Yet according to the annual report, Aroundtown has no vacancy problem. In Frankfurt, vacancy across all building types is said to be 16 percent. Across the group, only about 13 percent of office space is supposedly unplanned vacant. It is unlikely, however, that the city center buildings are merely outliers.

On Aroundtown’s website, 19 commercial properties in Frankfurt are listed, totaling about 435,000 square meters. Across all of them, vacancy exceeds 30 percent according to WirtschaftsWoche. Three buildings are completely empty, six more are at least 40 percent vacant.

A 24,000-square-meter office building in northern Frankfurt illustrates the issue. Aroundtown found an anchor tenant there, the construction union IG Bau, for 4,000 square meters. But most of the remaining space is empty. And there is little hope for improvement, since many offices in the surrounding area are also vacant.

Slight office oversupply – Portfolio of the Aroundtown group

Office 38%, Residential 34%, Hotels 22%, Retail 4%, Other 2%

From the beginning, Aroundtown’s strategy was to buy buildings in good locations that were run down and therefore cheap. With manageable renovations, vacancies were supposed to fall and values to rise significantly. Gabay, who still owns about 15 percent of the company, became a real estate billionaire with this strategy. US President Donald Trump recently nominated him to the Gaza Executive Board, which is intended to oversee the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.

The question is whether this business model still works today.

In its latest quarterly report, Aroundtown shows an aerial photo of Frankfurt’s city center with several of its buildings marked. Together, they are said to offer around 200,000 square meters of rentable space.

What the picture does not show: of the six buildings displayed, three are completely vacant. Two of them are currently not even rentable because of their condition. Another building is largely empty. Only two of the marked properties are fully rented.

Lost 8.3% buying at 11am today? Left after the 14% PUMP at opening. Never fear, 2026 promises to be another Aroundtown SA AT1.de wild ride. If you have a vacant property with no clients, and need a profit from thin air, you can check the Aroundtown team balance sheets.

Between 1629-1635pm (just before closing) £299'242.41 share bought!!!!

Between 1438-1712pm (before close and after) £293'800 shares sold!!!!

Wait thats only £5442.41 difference. Strange the buys and sells so close but roll on tomorrow and the massive non-artificial BUYS! at1.de doesn't need reports to sell, its vacancy ratings (and profits from vacant lets) speak for themselves. A great time to buy.

Https://www.marketscreener.com/news/real-estate-stocks-in-demand-a-aroundtown-stands-out-after-report-ce7e5dd8d08af124 - AT1.DE surges 14% at year high, now up 0.14 for the day. Timely to coincide with the buyback to self enrich the majority shareholders who are cash poor with ill-liquid companies and needing the props. Aroundtown SA (AT1) continues to face Sell ratings from analysts, including recent reiterations from Barclays in early 2026, driven by high financial leverage, pressure on asset values, and tight credit metrics. While S&P holds a 'BBB' credit rating, the firm faces challenges from rising debt maturities and a revised liquidity assessment.

Https://www.wiwo.de/finanzen/boerse/aroundtown-eine-gute-lage-reicht-bei-immobilien-laengst-nicht-mehr-aus/100196009.html - Just before the shortseller goes long a report came out. Curious timing to go long.

According to the annual report, Aroundtown has 'no vacancy problem'. In Frankfurt, vacancy across all building types is said to be 16 percent. Across the group, only about 13 percent of office space is supposedly unplanned vacant. It is unlikely, however, that the city center buildings are merely outliers.

On Aroundtown’s website, 19 commercial properties in Frankfurt are listed, totaling about 435,000 square meters. Across all of them, vacancy exceeds 30 percent according to WirtschaftsWoche. Three buildings are completely empty, six more are at least 40 percent vacant.

A 24,000-square-meter office building in northern Frankfurt illustrates the issue. Aroundtown found an anchor tenant there, the construction union IG Bau, for 4,000 square meters. But most of the remaining space is empty. And there is little hope for improvement, since many offices in the surrounding area are also vacant.

After the Shortseller PUMP today for AT1.DE the fall back occurs with only 2.8% rise across the day. Whilst $SFER lost 70% since Viceroy Research last went long (only-28% down after 1 month after their report) the concern is the purposeful nature of a short seller reversing and publishing to prop up what WIWO noted as a vacant property owner only a day prior. Confusion in the media and markets but appearance that the stock is over not undervalued with potential for further freefall incoming now the empty properties have been accounted.

As the shortseller continues to push their rare long citing their prior short thesis encounters 'its most delicious paradox: if Aroundtown were siphoning cash via uncommercial rental agreements, the cessation of such activity would be accretive to equity value, as the leakage runs through the P&L'

The long on Aroundtown SA ignores entrenched balance sheet risks where related-party dynamics likely extend to debt facilities, off-balance-sheet vehicles, and JV structures, draining liquidity without P&L visibility. Cash extraction often bypasses P&L through interest-like payments on shareholder loans or preferred equity, directly eroding net debt and covenant headroom. Even if P&L leakage ends, the short sellers highlight persistent related-party entanglements. Stopping one channel simply shifts extraction elsewhere, as seen in non-operating revenue volatility masking true FFO sustainability. Accretion assumes static shares outstanding, but covenant breaches from unresolved liquidity squeezes could trigger equity raises at depressed levels.

Whilst there were no indications the stock could fall back it appears persisting.

Interesting fact: Aroundtown was cited 48hours ago stating they had 'no vacancy problem' and of the 19 buildings on their website visited they were exposed with 3 totally empty, 6 with less than 40% vacant. So a short seller going long "Technically allowed. Emotionally confusing" shortly after the media publishing the truth is, to say the least, worrying for investors.