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The revenue comparison was probably the most important part of the video. Hedge-adjusted revenue was around £10m for the year ending September 2025, and this year, with the new hedges and increased production, they are guiding to around £25m. That is more than a 100% increase, and it changes the financial profile of the company if production remains stable.

I also like that management were clear about the use of free cash. The plan is to repay debt as quickly as possible and move value from debt holders to equity holders. Based on current commodity prices and the cash sweep mechanism, they said there is potential to repay the loan within three years. That would make a significant difference to the equity case.

The placing proceeds also appear to be going into the right areas: surface upgrades at Saltfleetby, the Brockham workover, and long-lead items for the fourth Saltfleetby well. That is spending linked directly to production and growth rather than vague corporate use.

Brockham could be a useful near-term addition. They are planning to recomplete a suspended well this summer and bring it back into production, with the aim of doubling output from the site. It is not the main asset, but extra oil production and cash flow would still be useful.

The fourth Saltfleetby well is the more material catalyst. It is fully permitted, with planning and EA approval already in place, and is expected late Q4 this year or Q1 2027. This is a development well into the existing reservoir, not a high-risk exploration drill. With 3D seismic, existing well penetrations, 21 bcf of 2P reserves and another 17 bcf of contingent resource, there is still proper running room at Saltfleetby.

The reserve life point was also encouraging. At current production, management referred to a reserve life index of around 10 years. That gives Angus time to work the field properly, drill the fourth well, reduce debt and build around the asset.

I also thought the comments on M&A were sensible. They have looked at a number of opportunities, made offers on some, but now seem to be focusing on smaller cash-flowing assets rather than chasing big transformational deals. That feels like the right approach. Build from the producing base, add cash flow where it makes sense, and avoid overcomplicating the story.

Overall, I am pretty happy with the video. Improved production, better hedges, royalty dealt with, Forum cleaned up, Trafigura aligned, Brockham workover coming, fourth Saltfleetby well lined up, and a clear plan to use cash flow to reduce debt.

For me, Angus is coming back as a cleaner and more focused UK producer with real production and a much better revenue profile. The market has not had the chance to price that properly while the shares have been suspended. Now it comes down to execution, but the setup looks far better than it did before.

I am pretty happy with the video. It explained the Angus position much more clearly, especially when you put it together with the recent RNS releases. For me, the company now looks cleaner, more focused, and in a much better operational position than before.

Saltfleetby is still the main point here. This is not a paper asset or some early-stage story. It is a producing UK gas field, selling directly into the national grid, with condensate also being sold as an additional revenue stream. There are three producing wells feeding into an established facility with compression, separation and gas treatment already on site. That gives Angus a proper producing base.

The workovers are a big part of the update. They went in with coil tubing, cleaned out two wells using acid and mutual solvent, and are now reporting around a 30% uplift in field production. Current production is around 6 mmscf/d, which is a strong number for a company of Angus’ size. That is real production and real cash flow.

I also liked the detail behind the workovers. They did the reservoir engineering, geological assessment and chemical compatibility work before choosing the service provider. That suggests the uplift was not just a lucky result, but the outcome of a properly planned technical programme.

The hedge book is now much better as well. The old hedges at around 40p/therm were clearly a major drag on cash flow. The new hedges run to around June 2027 at an average of over £1/therm, covering roughly 45-50% of production. That gives Angus decent revenue protection while still leaving upside if gas prices remain strong.

The Trafigura alignment is important too. They have worked through the restructuring with Angus and agreed to roll the facility and hedge position into one package. Trafigura are not a passive lender, so their continued support says a lot about the asset and the cash flow they expect it to generate.

The debt position is also easier to understand now. The £20m facility and legacy hedge liabilities have been rolled into £26m of debt, with a five-year amortisation profile. Interest is SONIA plus 8%, and Angus has the option to settle 4% of that interest through warrants, which could save around £1.7m to £2m of cash. That gives the company more flexibility while it focuses on production, workovers and repayment.

The royalty restructuring is one of the more important points for me. The overriding royalty over the existing gas wells has been crystallised into fixed debt of £2.5m, with £550k issued in shares at the placing price and the balance paid out of cash flow. Management said this could save around £7.5m to £10m over the life of the royalty on an undiscounted basis. For Angus, that is a very meaningful saving.

Croqman every board needs a village idio t, lucky for us we have 3

You sound like two people and you use chatgpt to respond to my posts. You’re a walking contradiction.

WG On the ORRI drain - fair point, £2m a year is a real cost and I dont disputed it. But at Q2's revenue run-rate of £69k/day, annual revenue is tracking toward £25m+. The ORRI takes £2m of that. It's a drag, not a killer.

On the hedge renegotiation - you've stated this as fact but it's pure speculation. None of us have anyidea what the restructuring terms are and you are just making up miserable numbers to fit your agenda. Don’t present fantasy as fact.

Likewise with the made up 0.05p valuation - you've presented this as a creditor model but you haven't shown a single input. No decline rate. No reserve estimate. No discount rate. No capex schedule. Without those it isn't a model, it's an assertion. The £5m equity figure has been pulled from nowhere and the rest of the arithmetic follows from it. That's not how valuations work.

The production numbers are not "hope dressed up as analysis." They are publicly available National Gas Transmission entry data. Q2 is running at close to double Q2 last year in revenue terms. That is a fact, not a fantasy. Whether the restructuring captures that value for existing holders is a separate and genuinely uncertain question - but dismissing the operational improvement as irrelevant to the asset's refinanceability is where your analysis falls apart. You present positives as dreams and negatives as fact. And undermines the rest of your argument.

Put simply, you won’t agree with me saying that there is real positivity in the current state of Angus and I won’t agree with you that the whole company is screwed and going to go under. One of us is very wrong, but luckily we have the simplest possible test of the entire argument becoming evident in the next few weeks or months...

You are saying the asset is essentially worthless and the liabilities are unsurmountable. If that were true, Trafigura and the ORRI counterparties would have pulled the plug long ago. They haven't. They are still at the table, the accounts confirm that principal commercial terms have been agreed, and these are not naive parties.

Trafigura and Kemexon understand the Saltfleetby asset considerably better than either of us and the fact that sophisticated, secured creditors with first charge over everything are choosing to restructure rather than appoint receivers tells you something important about what they think the asset is worth. If your 0.05p model were right, they wouldn't be restructuring - they'd be enforcing. The moment that restructuring completes, your entire negative case collapses - not because the debt disappears overnight, but because the people who actually own the security have looked at the same numbers you have and reached the opposite conclusion.

LOST your savings

Of course you did you post your savings and you’re trying to claw it back LOL

Peter they’re just bitter because they lost their life savings here and will resort to distorting truths whilst using chatgpt because they are clueless with no argument

Wg818 you should reply so you resorted you chatgpt lol you are nearly as pathetic as Bubblepoint you haven’t got a clue and lost all your money here

WG you opened by saying the 31 March position is "the only audited, verified financial position we have." It isn't. The front page of the accounts says in large letters: Unaudited Interim Results. So the foundation of your argument - that this is a verified, audited position - is factually wrong. It also raises questions about how carefully you've actually read the document you're citing.

On the going concern note - this gets cited as a red flag by people who haven't read many sets of small-cap accounts. Going concern disclosures are standard boilerplate for any company carrying restructuring risk. They are required to include them. The absence of one would be more surprising than its presence.

On the trade payables and the £12m figure - look at the notes properly. Of that £12.093m, £5.391m is crystallised and deferred hedge settlement balances that were reclassified from the derivatives liability during the period. They were always owed - they've just moved between line items. The accounts note this explicitly and state the derivative liability is therefore not directly comparable with prior periods. Presenting the payables number without that context is misleading.

On the gas price risk - yes, prices could fall. They could also rise. This is true of every commodity producer always and proves nothing specific about Angus. What it ignores is that 12.3 million therms are already hedged at an average of 100p through to June 2027. That's roughly 44% of forecast production with guaranteed revenue visibility regardless of where the spot price goes. The bear case on prices is already substantially mitigated.

On decline curve - you're actually making a positive case here without realising it. If the field needs new wells to maintain production, that's the argument for drilling them - which is exactly what Angus intends to do. You can't simultaneously argue the wells are unaffordable and that without them production falls. Those two points together explain precisely why the restructuring gets done and why the creditors have remained supportive.

On the relist price - you're right that dilution happens and the placing price sets the relist. But the placing price is a function of asset value. A field producing 61,500 therms/day consistently at current prices, with Q2 revenues running at close to double the equivalent quarter last year, commands a higher valuation than one producing 40,000 therms/day erratically at 87p. New money comes in at a discount to that value - not to the suspended price. Existing holders get diluted, agreed. But the asset re-rates regardless. Stop at March 31st - on unaudited numbers - and your negative case looks reasonable. Look at what the asset is actually doing right now and the opposite is true.

Stop at March 31st and your negative case is reasonable. But if you look at what's happening now the game has changed. That's the re-rating case - not that the debt doesn't exist, but that the asset generating the cash to service and ultimately refinance it is performing considerably better than the accounts suggest.

The one genuine unknown is the refinancing timeline - and I won't pretend otherwise. If it doesn't complete, the equity is worthless. But if it does then it means that the lenders agree that the game has changed too. A refinanced company coming out of suspension will be producing materially more gas at higher prices into a stronger market than the one that went in, with a balance sheet that has been restructured. Dilution will undoubtedly happen - but it puts cash in the treasury alongside revenues that are already running at a rate that answers the new well question. That's a very different business to price – but its not difficult to guess that the price it comes out of suspension at will be much higher than the one it went in at.

W818 in response to your AI generated response….if you stop the clock at 31 March 2026 thee quite a lot of what you've written stands up. The balance sheet is not fixed. The restructuring isn't complete. Cash is tight and the debt hasn't been reduced.

But here's the problem with that framing: the accounts are already nearly three months out of date, and those three months change the picture considerably.

On the £29m vs £39.8m comparison the November RNS figure referred specifically to the debt subject to restructuring negotiations, not total group liabilities. Comparing that to total liabilities including decommissioning provisions and trade payables timing is not apples-to-apples.

The derivative liability point is also worth separating from the cash reality - the mark-to-market position at the balance sheet date is not the same thing as what the hedge book actually generated. In H1 FY2026 the realised hedge position produced a £900k cash gain versus a £5.4 million cash outflow in H1 FY2025. That's a £6.3 million swing in actual money between the two periods and that is going to have a huge impact on profitability as we go forwards.

On Brockham - agreed, not a meaningful cash contributor. No argument there.

On well funding - Sure the company did not have the cash to drill a new well on March 31st but looking at the amount of gas they are producing and the current revenue coming in then that will change pretty quickly. In order to see what is happening you actually have to look at the production figures for this year we all know where to get them.

Compare Q1 2026 (January to March) with Q2 2026 so far (April 1 to June 21, nine days still to run): Q1 2026: 4,971,267 therms over 90 days - avg 55,236 therms/day at 92.96p - total revenue £4.78 million Q2 2026 to June 21: 5,048,533 therms over just 82 days - avg 61,567 therms/day at 112.52p - total revenue already £5.67 million with nine days still to go

Q2 is already producing more total gas than Q1 in eight fewer days, at a price 21% higher, and is on course to deliver around £6.3 million of revenue for the quarter versus £4.8 million in Q1 - roughly 30% more over the same period. Daily revenue has jumped from £53,000 to £69,000.

Now compare to the same quarter last year. Q2 2025 averaged 40,767 therms/day at 86.55p - about £3.2 million for the quarter. Q2 2026 is running at 61,567 therms/day at 112.52p and heading for £6.3 million. That is not a marginal improvement - it is close to doubling the revenue of the equivalent quarter in a single year.

The question for a lender, investor or farm-in partner considering financing new wells is not what the balance sheet looked like on 31 March. It's what the asset is producing today. A field averaging 61,500+ therms/day consistently, with daily revenues of £69,000 and rising into a strengthening price environment, is a materially more financeable proposition than the one that went into suspension.

False allegation? I didn’t say anything you got all defensive and hormonal lol. :) shame you lost all your money and can’t let it go. Embarrassing everyone laughs at you

Bubble pint did i trigger you ? :)

The interim results may look underwhelming on the surface, but beneath the headline numbers they point to a business that is operationally stronger, financially better positioned, and potentially on the cusp of a major re-rate. Yes, revenue is down, there is a small loss at the bottom line, and the accounts appear softer year-on-year — but that misses the real story. The revenue decline is primarily a gas price issue, not a production issue. Average realised gas prices fell around 23%, from 111.65p/therm in H1 FY2025 to 85.53p/therm in H1 FY2026, flowing directly into the 16% reduction in group revenues. Yet despite Saltfleetby being partially offline for workovers, production was virtually unchanged versus the prior period. In other words, Angus effectively produced the same amount of gas with less available operating time. The National Gas Transmission entry volume data makes the operational improvement very clear: output moved from around 37,500 therms/day before the field came back online to 56,955 therms on 10 February, then 66,491 therms by 12 February — a 77% uplift within 48 hours. Just as importantly, post-workover production averaged 64,422 therms/day versus 48,980 therms/day before, with lower daily variability. More gas, produced more consistently, is exactly what matters for cash flow, hedge management and confidence in the asset.

The financial picture also looks far better once the hedge book and current trading momentum are properly understood. In H1 FY2025 Angus paid out £5.4 million on derivatives; in H1 FY2026 those same instruments generated a £900k gain — a £6.3 million swing that is hugely significant but easily missed in headline commentary. The real upside becomes even clearer when comparing April–June 2025 with April–June 2026. Q2 2025 averaged 40,767 therms/day at 86.55p, generating roughly £3.2 million of quarterly revenue. By contrast, Q2 2026 had already delivered around £5.1 million by 21 June, with nine days still to run, on 61,567 therms/day at roughly 101p. The full-quarter run-rate points towards approximately £8 million, driven by 51% higher daily production into a stronger pricing environment. That puts Angus on a very different trajectory: higher output, better realised prices, a hedge book now generating cash rather than consuming it, and a current quarter revenue rate that could materially change how the market views the business. The H1 accounts captured a deliberate investment period at a weak point in the gas price cycle. What comes next looks considerably stronger. Angus is not the same business it was when suspended — and when the shares relist, the market may finally have to price that in.

I smell a loser who lost his money on Angus and like Bubblebutt posts absolute gibberish every day. I said DYOR, only reason I listen to her is she called the suspension correct.

Followed her for a while and she just posted good news if it’s true as always dyor

“ Angus shareholders may finally have something to smile about.

After more than a year in suspension, relisting is now imminent. With restructuring agreed and record profits banked from the Iran conflict I suspect it will open far higher than where it closed. 🚀 #ANGS “

The company has confirmed that good progress continues on the legally binding documentation and that it remains confident the process will conclude in the coming weeks. For me, that is the key takeaway.

Once executed, the proposed restructuring is expected to materially strengthen the Group’s balance sheet, improve liquidity, and create a much more sustainable long-term capital structure. That is exactly what the market has been waiting for.

Yes, the process has taken longer than expected, but the language remains positive and the direction of travel looks clear. Once the final binding agreements are signed, I expect Angus to come out of suspension in a far stronger position than before.

With the balance sheet reset, liquidity improved, and the uncertainty finally lifted, I believe the market could react very strongly when trading resumes. Given how much has been priced in during this long period of suspension, I am expecting a significant rerate.

Very positive update in my view. The restructuring now looks close, and once confirmed, I expect Angus Energy to move materially higher, potentially multiples of where the price currently sits.

Q1 shows where they were. Q2 should show where they are now.