Sept 13 (Reuters) - Statoil missed warning signsand failed to prepare for an incident like January's deadlyattack at an Algerian gas plant, an internal company probe said,painting a picture of chronic security problems at the site.
Some 40 workers were killed when Islamist militants raidedthe In Amenas facility deep in the Sahara desert, near theLibyan border, taking foreign workers hostage in a four-daysiege that ended when Algerian forces stormed the plant.
BP and Algerian state firm Sonatrach are Statoil'spartners in the venture.
Below are highlights from the 78-page report:
MAIN CONCLUSIONS:
External and internal security measures failed to protectpeople at the site.
The Algerian military were unable to detect and prevent theattackers from reaching the site.
Neither Statoil nor the joint venture could have preventedthe attack, but there is reason to question the extent of theirreliance on Algerian military protection.
Statoil's contribution to the overall emergency response waseffective and professional.
STATOIL'S APPROACH TO SECURITY:
Security is generally not well understood within Statoil'sleadership ranks, and as a result has not been prioritised,resourced or managed properly.
POTENTIAL THREAT TO CHARTER FLIGHT IN 2011:
The U.S. embassy in Algeria warned of a missile threatagainst aircraft flying to oil and gas plants, causing uneaseamong personnel at In Amenas. Some firms opted not to use theregular charter flight between Gatwick and Hassi Messaoud.
The In Amenas joint venture continued to use the charter.The decision was based partly on the view of the British embassywhich concluded: "the UK does not believe that this new threatfrom AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) to target aircraftposes either an imminent or credible threat".
JULY 2012 REPORT ON SECURITY IN ALGERIA:
A risk consultancy report commissioned by Statoil concluded:the discovery in February of a weapons cache near the town of InAmenas, the suicide bombing in March in the city of Tamanrassetand a suicide bombing in June in Quargla indicated that securityconditions in the far south were expected to deteriorate. Itnoted the potential for a one-off high-impact attack.
FAILURE OF IMAGINATION:
Although unforeseen and unprecedented, an attack on InAmenas should not have been entirely inconceivable.
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY:
The joint venture had incomplete information about thecapabilities of the military providing the outer security layer.There was only a limited exchange of information. Furthermore,there has not been any high-level strategic security dialoguewith Algerian authorities involving the companies.
SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT:
Despite the turmoil in the region, the In Amenas jointventure operated on an unchanged threat level from February 2012until the attack.
JUNE-DECEMBER 2012 STRIKE AND INTERNAL THREAT:
The extended strike reduced internal security resilience anderoded loyalty and morale among some employees.
The investigation team learned that there were directthreats from the strikers toward expatriate employees at InAmenas joint venture during this period.
Information from interviewees indicates that the terrorists... knew which sites to drive to, which offices to target, andthey searched for a few people by name.
Some eyewitnesses perceived that a number of the employeesappeared forthcoming towards the terrorists during the first dayof the attack.
SECURITY AT THE PLANT:
There were two parallel security organisations operating atthe site, not always with a high degree of mutual respect, trustand collaboration.
