Member Info for ZENGAS

RR I've absolutely no doubt that Financial & Co IR are and would be expected to be very close to II's.

8 II's above 3% hold 53.87% and Cavendish that holds the EBT shares is another 5.26% plus the directors 4.79% is just shy of 64% in total and i've no doubt there are smaller II's below the 3% figure.

That's isn't my point about turkeys voting for Christmas but i'm just wondering how they feel about risk and if any of them decided to drop out or demand something for their support v risk since you ask. They know like us there are other deals being pursued so its not like S.Sdn to them is the only opportunity on the horizon.

That's why i posed the question about relying on or expecting govt approval and the adm doc at the same time.

Far from it being 'strange' to pose it - I never rule anything out especially after the fundraisings which came all the way down to 19.35p to get Chad through. They (II's) got more of the pie (inc AK) versus PIs and it's not PIs who call the shots. I'm hoping that everything will be fully debt financed this time around and obviously that all II's remain supportive.

My post was on the adm doc/Govt approval expectation happening in tandem.

There were two more SPAs signed in the last 3 weeks.

M&Prom/Assala in Gabon and a few days ago ENI/Oando in Nigeria with both subject to later govt approval - that's why i asked is there a set protocol or legal avenue that is followed in seeing a SPA through to completion rather than trying to get govt approval prior to a shareholder vote if that is the protocol/legal route ?

Does anyone know the protocol or legal route in taking a SPA through to completion ?

I'm just wondering that in light of what happened in Chad are we fooling ourselves in thinking that in order to prevent similar happening again we are expecting S.Sdn Govt approval along with the adm doc release ? I'm just thinking that it could be a case of the cart before the horse ?

If it was the case that Govt approval came first - but what happens if some (institutional) shareholders don't like it and it doesn't pass the GM Vote at all.

This in the belief that we are trying to tie in govt approval first and all that effort and time waiting to get that done first. What would the govt think that we as shareholders haven't voted on approving the matter first to see if the deal is even over the first hurdle - ie shareholders. I say this particularly with the situation in Sudan which came almost 4 months after the SPA was announced. How do the main shareholders feel about the risk level since then - are they all still fully behind this or instead could AK end up dealt a blow by the vote not being a majority - while we think rightly or wrongly all this time is being taken up trying to get Govt approval along with the release of the adm doc and restoration of trading. We've seen absolutely nothing of note in relation to figures ie even approximate capex, opex, reserves, production, FCF etc some 9 months later so how is an opinion to be informed if it is a good deal or not.

SAVE SPA for Exxon Chad 13/12/21.

Adm doc & Restoration 31/12/21.

GM Shareholders result to approve deal 24/1/22.

Consent deemed given with Completion 9/12/22

Afentra SPA with INA 19/7/22.

Adm doc & Restoration 10/8/22.

GM Shareholders result approving deal 30/8/23.

Recd Govt consent 12/1/23.

Completion 10/5/23

The INA SPA was a minor acquisition to the additional main Sonagol SPA signed in April 2022 and the later July 2023 Azule SPA making up 3 SPAs in total and currently suspended for the 2nd time.

On the remaining 2 SPAs' this is how Afentra set out the timeline to completion.

"The Company will now publish an updated Admission Document in due course, which will also convene a General Meeting at which the resolutions for shareholders to approve the Amended Sonangol Acquisition and the Azule Acquisition will be proposed - ***Subject to shareholder approval*** - the Company will proceed to obtain Governmental approval for both transactions with an expectation to complete both transactions in Q4 2023."

I could be absolutely wrong and to temper possible disappointment i am leaning for the expectation of a similar timeline as the above to how things progress - ie ad doc along with restoration of trading - then GM for shareholder vote - then expectation of Govt approval/deal completion.

The timeline i still believe will be hard to pin down for closure. After the commentary about the state of play re achieving closure here, i've looked at Seplats own issues in getting it's acquisition over the line now 19 months later.

Looking at it in context of South Sudan and in trying to evaluate the 'UP TO' $1250m price tag -

Seplats ongoing acquisition of Exxons Nigerian assets = $1283m + up to $300m in contingency payments if oil above $70/b and paid over a 5 year term. This works out at paying $1.89 per bl produced no matter if oil is $72/b or $85/b+

The base price is $1283m for 446 mmboe 2P (411 oil + 35 Gas) and 95,000 boepd (8% gas) or 87,000 bpd oil.

Total overall cost $2.90/ 2P or $13,500 flowing bl.

If you were to completely remove the gas and apply $1250m against the oil - you get $3.04/2P and $14,370 flowing bl.

Applied to S.Sudan on 55k bopd/300mmbo P2 you get a $790m - $910m range.

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I've now added this to my original 26/8/23 12:32 post with Seplat now making up the 4th EG to the 3 i covered then. There's no reason why i can logically see S.Sudan with all it's risk being more expensive than the most expensive eg in this list.

Afentra 2P = $3.50 + $19,750 Flowing bl.

Petronas/Exxon Chad 2P = $3.15 + $14,450 F/bl.

Assala 2P = $7.84 + $16,250-$17,900 F/b skewed up by inclusion of midstream.

Seplat 2P = $3.04 = $14,370 F/bl.

1. Approx $1050m - $1086m relative to Afentra using both P2 & flowing bl numbers. 

2. Approx $795m - $945m relative to Chad using both P2 & flowing bl numbers 

3. Approx $895m - $984m relative to Assala on the 2 flowing bl numbers (P2 not used) .

4. Approx $790m - $910m relative to Seplat.

In addition - With an effective transaction date of 1/1/22 i would think at least $600m could be shaved off 1,2,3, 4 above by 30/9/23 plus a further $100m off by end of 2023. 

$257m - $275m estimated year end 2023 net debt on existing assets to be added. 

At the most expensive option above, i get a max year end net debt of around $660m. 

Applied on the basis of 300 mmbo 2P & 55k production acquired and if these are more/less then there would be an obvious variation but either being compensatory to that price.

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In theory and looking at the most expensive option above - to reach 100k of acquired production, a further 45k production at the most expensive option could see $1.3b overall net debt for a $3 billion revenue company on 100k production at $70/b oil, Accugas + small COTCo contribution. I think it's a massive transformational and understated prize to go for despite the pain to date. Imo would be fantastic when compared to TLW/KOS at circa $1.6b revenue each with $1.7- $2.3b year end net debt forecasts and valuations.

In 2022 there was 22 opportunities reviewed in 9 countries.

Who knows where those 9 countries were - Are they all Africa ? We simply dont know. They could well be looking outside the region or a different continent - we don't know until they tell us. And they'll hardly say until something compelling emerges.

For what's left of this year the strategy is to

1. Complete the South Sudan assets acquisition. 2. One significant M&A opportunity.

To say we are a one trick pony - we were on Niger (and then into Nigeria).

I'd be concerned if we weren't looking at further opportunities and AK allowed us to stay in that position and NOT going after opportunities. If we want to grow you can't give up after a few hiccups and unfortunately as a listed company thats the price you pay re potential suspensions.

As for Chad - you can't allow for any dirty tricks as was widely mentioned in AI by a certain other oil Co. They also reported that the oil minister had supported the deal and the president keen to wrap it up. Will every country act the same ? You also can't let that experience ruin your plans for growth so fair play for going to the ICC and addressing it rather than give up on it.

All these asset sales were flagged up from majors leaving/selling so not a surprise to governments and i've no doubt we've sounded out the S.Sudan SPA before it being RNSd so as for the Spray and Pray analogy i don't buy it as that would smack of totally unprofessional dd.

It was reported we looked at Seme in Benin and walked away.

Also reported 29/11/22 that Eni had agreed to sell its Tunisian assets to us - but it stalled due to government inaction and put on hold. So imo that's evidence that governments are already sounded out before an SPA is signed - otherwise we'd have an RNS saying we signed one and then go through the motions.

Afentras main SPA with Sonagol has gone on since 28/4/22 and aim to complete after some changes in Q4 this year (18 - 20 months). One condition was improved fiscal terms and licence extension (now recieved) and needs overall final consent

Seplats SPA of Exxons Nigerian assets is still rumbling on since 25/2/22 (19 months).

We don't know what all the workstreams are - Block 5A licence i beleive was due to expire in a few years so i'm sure that's one thing that needs fixed (if it is agreed).

I get the impression some people think that we are the only company doing this or all alone out there - We're not. The only difference is we're building a renewables business (which is expected to be built from the high cash throw off & re-invested along with private equity). All have high 'E' 'S' & 'G' credentials. There's standalone renewables business's operating in Niger, Mali and Cameroon already, the opportunity is huge so why not go after it given our outlay v risk/pvt equity in the years ahead.

I don't get the catiness over it's a wonder AK wasn't doing a proposed deal in Gabon ? I'm sure it's a country of interest.

It's where Tullow gets a quarter of its production. Panoro a third, plus multiple other Oil Cos and its not the only industry with listed companies operating.

I haven't seen any of the listed companies having any problems (miners) operating in Mali or in Burkino Faso. Coups have been part and parcel of most of the continent.

Niger - may be different given the military bases for France/US and why i think more importance attached to it and thus sanctions. Other than delays, i don't see any change to SAVEs interest or Chinese.

There would have been a coup a month ago in Senegal imo (Kosmos) if Macky Sall hadn't stood down after attempting to run a third time which is now the case after really shoddy elections in Gabon. I don't think it was unexpected.

Sometimes i despair of peoples immediate reactions.

'Til' -The desire for an immediate dividend amongst investors would pale into insignificance if that scenario can be pulled off .

On net debt i was looking for $660m end of this year post S.Sudan. That is on the basis of up to $250m being in the form of bonus payments re production/oil price and not on the books as net debt (otherwise possibly $900m).

A further 50-70k bopd at up to $20k flowing bl is going to cost perhaps $1-$1.4b (see my recent post on 3 EGs of flowing bl/P2 cost) but hopefully taking into account the effective date - perhaps at least 1/3rd cheaper or $650m - $930m.

For 100k production across 2 acquisitions and 25k at Accugas the net debt level may be as low as $1.3b with about $3 billion total revenue (at $70/b oil, Accugas sales + small COTCo contribution) about twice that of TLW or KOS and over a third to 50% lower net debt.

In the above scenario it would be absolutely transformational - so here's hoping and some guidance in the half year report in 4 weeks.

If they can pull off S.Sudan at 50-55k bopd there's no doubt in my mind that they could certainly add another 45-50k in acheiving the above and have an absolute critical mass.

Fully agree on the dividend.

Not sure, but I think the lack of dollars to take out may have hit that on the head from Accugas while at the same time pursuing some sizeable acquistions ( it's why i find trustilie comments about a further Nigerian acquisition being interesting. If a decent oil element to it, i would think no bother on getting dollars and the Naira from Accugas sales could be spent on running those assets if that isn't too simplistic to think ?).

$20m dividend was originally touted as capable when Accugas/Nigeria was acquired.

A dividend of $10m+ was pencilled in for payment in 2023 which i presume was on the back of Chad production which was a planned 22.5k bopd -then scuppered.

With the S.Sudan acquistion of 50k+ bopd one would think it would come into play this coming new year.

I keep an eye on Norways Panoro Energy in Africa with production assets in E.Guinea, Gabon & Tunisia. https://www.panoroenergy.com

38 mmbo P2, 7,200 bopd H1 2023. Net debt at end June 23 = $50.4m. M/cap £265m.

Has paid out just over $6.6m for H1 2023 (paid quarterly) so on an annual basis thats over $13m and they intend to pay $20m/yr if oil stays over $80/b - not bad when you consider the net debt and the production in H1.

An initial $10m would be absolutely peanuts for Save and by rights if we are a 55-75k producer it's why i said not too long ago that $50m+ dividends realistically should be possible at $70/b oil.

When you see that at Panoro - by comparrison he's going to seriously have to address some payout to investors and fullfil the objective of a dividend.

For quite awhile now i have thought that an outright figure of $1250m seems expensive for the AI figures of 300 mmbo 2P and around 55k bopd in South Sudan and why i have looked at their 'up to' price of $1250m).

Seems that this weeks M&Ps acquisition of Assala 2P = $7.84 per P2 bl and between $16,250 and $17,900 flowing bl but skewed higher by the midstream assets.

Last 3 acquisitions by comparrison -

Afentra 2P = $3.50 + $19,750 flowing bl.

Petronas/Exxon Chad 2P = $3.15 + $14,450 f/bl.

Assala 2P = $7.84 + $16,250 - $17,900 f/bl (skewed up by inclusion of buying midstream).

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On the basis of S.Sudan having 300 mmbo 2P + 55K bopd production and the UP TO $1250m' price.

Below is what i think it could be with the rest being made up to $1250m in bonus payments subject to production rates and higher oil price points being reached.

1. Approx $1050m - $1086m relative to Afentra using both P2 & flowing bl numbers.

2. Aprrox $795m - $945m relative to Chad using both P2 & flowing bl numbers

3. Approx $895m - $984m relative to Assala on the 2 flowing bl numbers (P2 not used) .

In addition - With an effective transaction date of 1/1/22 i would think at least $600m could be shaved off 1,2,3 above by 30/9/23 plus a further $100m off by end of 2023.

$257m - $275m estimated year end 2023 net debt on existing assets to be added.

At the most expensive option i get a max year end net debt of around $660m which would be fantastic relative to the same production/revenues of TLW/KOS but with higher net debt of $1.7b/$2.3b. this year end.

I am using this on the basis of 300 mmbo 2P & 55k production acquired and if these are more/less then there would be an obvious variation but either being compensatory to that price.

Thanks TrustIlie

A bit more detail in Mauel & Proms own news release with a P2 reserve number.

The SPA has an economic effective date of 30 June 2022, with a Transaction consideration to the seller payable by M&P at closing of $730 million, subject to typical closing adjustments.

40,700 bopd fror H1 2023 and 97 mmbo P2. (45k bopd for 2022). Effective transaction date is 30/6/22.

https://www.maureletprom.fr/en/investisseurs/communiques-de-presse Click 15/7/23

This would work out at $7.84 per P2 bl and $16,250 flowing bl based on 45.7k bopd day (or $17,900 flowing bl based on 40.7k bopd)

"with midstream infrastructure to be acquired including the Gamba oil terminal and connected pipelines, which will allow M&P to control the transportation and distribution of all of its production within the country."

Maybe the mid stream assets are making the P2 figure look high but then again they say it is a low cost production asset so the bls might have better economics to reflect that.

Afentras buy out of 3 interests in Angola for 'block 3/05' last month in July 2023 where they will become non operated partner on 30% to Sonagol, Maurel & Prom + 2 minority partners.

Price - Up to $184.5m.

Initial consideration = $112.5m which has also 3 seperate back dated effective transaction dates.

Licence ext fee to 2040 = $10m (now paid).

$21m payable over 3 years subject to oil above $75/b and capped at $7m/yr.

$6m payable over 3 years subject to oil above $65/b capped at $2m/yr.

$35m payable over 10 years subject to oil above $65/b and in excess of 15k bopd capped at $3.5m/yr.

The acquisition in that block gives a net 5,700 bopd and 32.4 mmbo 2P which is about $3.50 barrel and $19.75k flowing bl.

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If applied to 300 mmbls 2P and 55k bopd in S.Sudan it's a ball park £1.05 billion up front (less the effective start date) and that's why i think there could be possibly around $250m in shared risk bonus payments in arriving at the 'up to $1250m' price.

(Of course that's assuming the A.I figures in their coverage were close to what they quoted and surely with all that's going on in Sudan, S.Sudan must be seen as more risk given the export route and the oil quality is less in some fields relative to above re Afentra).

If we can get something like this on those kind of terms and ultimate net debt mentioned in my previous post i'd be very pleased.

From the annual report and the risk management segment on acquisitions -

*** "Appropriate vendor risk and reward sharing arrangements embedded in the acquisition agreements." *** (Read it again).

I thought the above is pretty significant in terms of financing an acquisition particularly S.Sudan. I also think it's significant in the "UP TO $1250m" price tag.

It would be great if some $250m was based on a sliding scale of much higher oil prices/increased production and spread over X amount of years (Not unusual and seen in the recent Afentra acquisitions of up to 10 years and also in part on the original Exxon deal) .

You could potentially have a base price of $1 billion and perhaps have $600m by now (ie $30m/month) shaved off the base acquisition price - ie $400m to pay on closing.

Along with the $257m estimated net debt year end 2023 on the other assets by Shore Capital and perhaps by yr/end Dec 2023 on S.Sudan if no operational hiccups down to $300m or around $560m overall net debt total by this year end - which is where we were when acquired Nigeria a few years ago on its own.

The 'up to price' of the other $250m would never be seen as debt other than bonus payments on higher output and/or higher oil prices being achieved.

Here's hoping it is something like that in really mitigating the risk and giving us a positive surprise on the net debt front.

Shore Capitals guidance for full year 2022 (Nigeria only)

Revenue estimate $295m versus Save actual $290.4m.

Net debt estimate was $441.3m versus Save actual $404.9m.

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The 5th June 2023 coverage from Shore Capital includes only Nigeria and COTCo in Cameroon -

For this year end 2023

Revenue $361.6m and Net debt of $257.9m.

Net debt falls by around $130m/yr so over the next 24 months should be net cash positive.

As i said it will be interesting to see the effect of all past new gas contracts over a full years production in 2023 instead of cutting in at various times November 2021 and then further contracts starting production at various times in 2022.

Personally expecting net debt to be around $275m this year end in my previous post and any improvement on that i would be pleased if in line with Shore Capital at $257.9m.

South Sudan at $1250m could be down to $600m by 30/9/23 or less if it goes through. If all goes well, it should be cash positive/paid for by yr end 2025 .

Personally i wouldn't want SAVE to sell (if ever) Nigeria until at near full capacity. Over the following 24 months and by then net cash positive and worth at a minimum $800m net - barely 20% premium to what it cost us.

$2b worth of debt free assets in the next 24 months ?.

45p Nigeria. 68p South Sudan = 113p anyone ?

Not to mention much increased profits/cash on a debt free basis and possibility for very substantial divs of $50m+ yr at $65/b oil.

In light of all the ups/downs (more downs) recently - maybe a fair case to be made for just improving ESG on the assets rather than building out too quickly on renewables which in itself don't really come into play until 2025 and when we would assume to be virtually debt free/net cash positive before using the excess cash to fund those renewables - regardless of the huge market opportunity.

Regardless - i think there is much more to be positive about than negative and i can't see the rational case for 15p or less.

$885m was paid for the Nigerian assets in debt and shares with 20% being sold to AIIM.

Net debt was to be $275m end of this year.

When we entered the deal - gas sales were 63.5 mmcf/d gross - last year they were 144 mmcf/d and new customers since joining and revenue substantially up.

I expect it will be worth a NET $800m minimum given there was also a hike by about 23% in reserves allowing for production and the investment in the compression facilities on track for completion.

On the basis of 1.312b shares using £1/$1.30 ex rate = £615m value = 46.8p.

If the 101.1m warrants are excercised it brings in £23.7m = £638.75m. Over a fully diluted 1.413b shares it is 45.2p.

Net debt was decreasing and still in line with the asset since it was bought which was to be $275m this year end and moving to a net cash position (or debt free) within the next 24 months leaving the asset basically paid for. I expect at least a 20% upside over the original purchase price given the additional contracts, upgraded facilities plus a substantial hike in reserves and now the sale and movement of 3rd party gas since purchased.

The current y/end net debt of $257m relative to Nigeria is the equivalent of 14p - so fair value right now for Nigeria shouldn't be less than 31p. I'm basing that also on the recent £1.6m of 6m odd shares at 26.25p by the new Chairman in underpinning a core value.

As that net debt position reduces/closes it will add on incremental value in steps relative to the full 14p to get it to 45p in total - ie $800m.

Although new contracts were signed 2020/21 (i think and stand to be corrected) the first new gas sales above the 3 original contracts didn't actually start until November 2021 with the rest coming on throughout last year at various times - so it will be interesting to see the FULL picture for all of 2023.

There's still considerable upside capacity for new contracts to add material upside/improve the net debt position a little faster over the next 24 months to the original plan.

I would personally have thought that they could at least increase the overall value of the Nigerian assets by 50% since purchased allowing for a further 24 months of activity to fill out further gas sales/transport versus my 20% upside case since purchase.

Not 100% certain but doesn’t Sudan produce around 55k bopd with the refinery using up to 95k bopd ??? So some supply from S Sudan ?

Also might be some skewing of the numbers due to timing of liftings as Port Sudan has about 2.5 mmbls storage.

There were oil field floods in Feb- March but disclosed that production had fallen to 140k bopd in S Sudan and now back close to 158k day. I seriously doubt daily production would have been that low. There can of course be reasons to periodically do pipeline maintenance but none of this is mentioned or available in any press that I can find.

TYB - That's why i said he NEEDS TO get the share price UP by releasing some company changing news beforehand !

At 1p it would be 32m shares

In addition there is an ongoing deal with Stateside which envisages Zenith investing $2m for acquisitions introduced by Stateside

'If' these are done on the same 60/40 cash/equity basis it could mean $800k/£630k converted to equity which at todays price is potentially 148m shares on it's own.

This unfortunately is what happens when you allow a company to go unquestioned and give them free range to issue an unlimited amount of shares.

There should have been questions from PIs to prevent this and ask why he can't borrow against these or pay for them all in cash - the company explanation is to create critical mass quickly.

By doing this the shares in issue can quickly grow way beyond the current 2.31 billion in issue. It hasn't been revealed by the company if cash is needed to start work. Again that's why i drew attention to the accountants report that further capital raises were planned with or without any arbitration wins. If you don't think that's entirely possible - it's why i showed the year on year major increases in shares in issue and he has tied equity into some of these deals already - so it continues.

There has been enough waste on travel and consultants that would have paid for these assets many times over. Any sensible person would say Jeepers come on - you're doing this like you did from 15 years ago making money for nobody only the employees.

It's ok saying if it goes to 1p or 2p - but the more shares he puts in issue relative to the underlying value of the assets they have will actually at some point put a value constraint cap on the company.

You dismissed it previously about more shares or consolidation making no difference - well

At 2.31b shares and a 1-2p share price it's £23m - £46m m/cap.

If this is allowed to creep up through fundraisings for cash and equity given to buy the assets to some 3b shares in issue - the same price target of 1-2p soon becomes

£30m - £60m m/cap. That needs a lot of production and reserves from US workover wells and a small electricity business to justify that value - so you can see how 1p or much less can be the new value constraint if the issue of shares continues unabated and which shareholders should wake up to and make their feelings known.

Shareholders are meant to make money never mind the CEO coming out with the same bluster about delivering value which has been the same message this past 15 years and still in post for such performance.

It's a shame that they can't pay for the full 60 bopd (2nd aquisition) in cash ie $1.0275m in total

Instead it's a 60/40 cash/equity deal. ($616.5k cash/$411k equity).

At the current exc rate $1 = 78.59p means the equity element is £323k.

This will be based on the average share price for the preceeding 5 trading days prior to closure.

If they don't get good news out and get the share price up prior to closure, then at the current price of £0.00425 it could mean that 76m shares will be issued for the 40% equity element.

Who'd have thought it - potentially 76m shares being issued for 24 bls of oil/day.

Like i say, they need to get the share price up significantly prior to closure. If it drops back to £0.003.75 where it was a few weeks ago could mean 86m shares.

The recipient is only locked in for 3 months.

To me it just goes to show how cash strapped i believe they are when they have to issue equity instead of paying it all in cash when it is such a small amount.

Over on the 1st deal they are considering issuing equity as bonus payment to Stateside for reaching 75 bopd (then at 50 bopd intervals). It's not clear how much it will cost to get to those intervals and as yet it's hard to work out how much additional equity could be issued. They should make it clear that no equity would be issued and give a share of the production instead as compensation to stop the dilution continuing as it has done year on year.

Also if they acquire a further block of wells with Statesides help will it involve a further equity dimension as the 60/40 deal above ?

Thanks RR

You would think that with AK saying they expected to get at least one other acquisition over the line before year end, that by now it must be fairly advanced in the background with just a quarter and half remaining.

TYB

Instead of saying the same thing over and over again demonstrating your level of intellect - tell me where my figures are wrong.

My figures are from the accounts. - Where are they wrong ?.

The company has signed them off - Is the company wrong about it's own figures ?

2 posts in 4 mins from you Canary going over the same thing. If you don't read what i'm telling you fine. That's my answer and i have given it to you. There is no agenda against Zenith. If you don't like things that are negative from an investment point of view then don't answer or ask MGS or HH100 what they think or are you the only one with your head in the wrong place still here.

Indeed - the old positives and negatives question when it comes to weighing up a company. A bit like walking in sub freezing temeratures and driving snow and claiming what a beautiful hot sunny day it is at Zenith is how i would describe you.

No 1 Zenith don't generate near enough cash, high debt and repayments relative to its size and by the accountants notes to the accounts re funding they have little cash - so why would they risk similar to Benin by going into a worse region with shareholders cash (if they have or get any) on that basis. Any govt payout won't cover their current debt timeline as shown in the accounts - its there to be read. They say they will need to do raises with or without any arbitration wins - indeed they have said they intend to pay in equity for some of the small US assets. Is that to just be ignored or brushed under the carpet re ongoing dilution - the ability to issue unlimited shares and the permission to consolidate. Fine if u think it's all sunny and rosy i have no bother with that. I however have an alternative view as to the state the company is now in with the practice of it showing no sign of change under the current leadership.

No 2. I don't say it's all good for Save - there is risk too and that is my concern that they complete on S.Sudan after so long with an effective deal date reducing the cost. It's been discussed and put forward by myself on how long Save could deal with a 3-6 month or longer pipeline outage if that happens in the future. Save have access to cash and $350m revenues and other deals in the offing and predominantly non recourse debt. It's also been put forward by me that Saves Niger assets (not producing) and when they would come on next year would be somewhere between 3% - 7% of total revenues on the basis of current deals/assets which should be about $1.8 billion/yr at current oil prices. Niger isn't a worry for me but S.Sudan is and that it continues without incident. Contrary to others posts - there are no other pipelines out of S.Sudan for oil. They have not been built yet nor a shovel in the ground. It is risky and that's why i said it could put a small companies lights out particularly the likes of Zenith given its current profile.

That's the difference.

'Ag Boula’s statement will worry the coup leaders given his influence among Tuaregs who control commerce and politics in much of the vast north'

9/8/23

'Ex-rebel leader Boula moves against Niger coupists, forms resistance group

A former rebel leader and politician in Niger has launched a movement opposing the junta that took power in a July 26 coup.

This is the first sign of internal resistance to army rule in the strategically important Sahel country.

Rhissa Ag Boula said in a statement on Wednesday that his new Council of Resistance for the Republic (CRR) aimed to reinstate ousted President Mohamed Bazoum, who had been in detention at his residence since the takeover.

The CRR supports ECOWAS and any other international actors seeking to restore constitutional order in Niger, according to Mr Boula’s statement,

A CRR member said several Nigerien political figures had joined the group but could not make their allegiance public for safety reasons.

Mr Boula played a leading role in uprisings by Tuaregs, a nomadic ethnic group present in Niger’s desert north, in the 1990s and 2000s.

Like many former rebels, he was integrated into the government under Mr Bazoum and his predecessor, Mahamadou Issoufou.

While the extent of support for the CRR is unclear, Mr Boula’s statement would worry the coup leaders given his influence among Tuaregs, who control commerce and politics in much of the vast north.

Support from Tuaregs would be key to securing the junta’s control beyond Niamey’s city limits.

https://gazettengr.com/ex-rebel-leader-boula-moves-against-niger-coupists-forms-resistance-group/

Reported also by Reuters and ALJazeera.

and

'Why Niger Military Junta should be afraid of Rhissa Ag Boula.'

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nzhaBVYw3lM