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Tombo13, nail on head. No one wants the P2P side, that will be placed straight into run-off when acquired. Too much hassle dealing with private investors. RS is one of the better P2P platforms with a decent management team, which I think MTRO want to take on board as well.

Jinny122. They raised £375m in 2019. Since then they have only used £100m of this money in opening branches. The massive loss in 2019 did not impact CET1 since all the write-offs were intangibles and deferred tax which are inadmissible for CET1 purposes. They can find £30m easily.

Jinny122.
- Metro was only reducing its commercial exposure and not their entire book.
-Their deposits are likely increasing since they have now reduced their interest rates on their fixed rate deposits, why would they decrease them if they have gone negative. Plus in the TA they said April deposits were stab.
- I am not entirely sure they will take on RS's loan book, they may only provide new lending and the old book runs off under the old investors.
-No way will they pay RS £100m. Without a takeover RS are bust. They had ITD paid in capital of £72m, they have a retained deficit of £68m and current shareholders equity of £4m. They make £4m losses in a year so I think they have run out of road. I see this transaction happening at £30m tops.

Eventually I can see all the good P2P platforms being taken over by the banks. Ratesetter also have very good management, which MTRO can leverage from.

Lenders are not withdrawing from p2p, only PI's are. Insti's are charging in. Funding Circle has gated all their PI's and is running their book down. FC now solely deal with Insti's.

What FC and RS lend to are no different than how banks lend and the end consumers are the same. The only difference is these platforms are leaner from a cost perspective and are more scalable.

They will likely buy the debt at pennies in the pound. Remember Ratesetter are bust without this deal. The platform is the main benefit which they want to acquire and will allow them to scale up.

Jinny122, Ratesetter is a well run platform compared to Fundingcircle.

This is no different to what happened with GS. Don't fall for it. They will be at nil tomorrow again.

Jinny, they are stuffed since they have gated their investors who are now fleeing their platform. They had equity of 4m and losses of 4m last year. Without this deal they will go bust

Ratesetter might have been valued at £300m before covid. Now £30m tops, they either get taken over or they go bust.

Cyberdog, MTRO have spent £600m on only 76 branches, I will let you work out how much they have spent in each location and to top it all off they have signed leases which on average are 20 years in duration. If it weren't for Hill's wife MTRO would have been sold a long time ago, this whole thing has been a job creation scheme for her and her minions.

MTRO will buy Ratesetter for peanuts. The whole P2P scene is dead. MTRO will get a great well run p2p platform for loan automation whilse Ratesetter will get a cash-rich parent. This is a win-win for both. This deal has to happen, Ratesetter will not survive otherwise.

Nottingham council own the freehold to the site. Since the project will not be finished due to the capex requirements being greater than the entire MC of INTU, the council should take over the site.

In Hill's US venture, he barely recognised a $1mn NPL provision on a $3.3bn balance sheet, why is Odey expecting £300mn of NPL's in Metro?

"We recorded a provision for loan losses of $950,000 at March 31, 2020. During the first three months of 2020, there was an increase in the allowance required for loans collectively evaluated for impairment driven by an increase in loans receivable as well as COVID-19 considerations that were evaluated when assessing certain qualitative factors to account for potential uncertainty with losses brought on by this pandemic crisis."

http://investors.myrepublicbank.com/Cache/IRCache/86dbdd05-23d3-a83e-b728-cc88fc694544.pdf

BS - At year end they only had 1.15m current account customers, the rest had savings with them. 1.15m * £175 = ~£200m

The current shareholders equity value does not capture the intangibles related to customer relationships. They I assume now have 2.2m customers. If we attribute £100 to each of them then we have an additional £220m which they currently cannot recognise on their balance sheet, since you can only recognise such assets when you have a business combination. Therefore £1,582m + £220m = £1,802m . Therefore IMV the NAV per share is £10.47p and that is how it will be valued in any transaction.

Sain, if KPMG are appointed they will bleed this dry. They do not come cheap at £500 an hour. Intu management are not cheap but it is better the devil you know.

I have of the opinion that the lenders won't call on the admin, simply because it will involve paying too much to KPMG vs. just paying £38k pa for intus staff.

Marcus may sound boring but he is clearly a looker. The consumer banking arm of Goldman Sachs has brought in a lot of UK customers since launching less than two years ago. The US investment bank sees a profit opportunity in UK retail banking. Meanwhile, regulators will welcome more competition in this highly concentrated market.

Since launching its short-term deposit product in September 2018, yielding as much as 1.5 per cent, Marcus has lured in £21bn. No more new accounts will be accepted. Above £25bn in deposits, Goldman would have to ring fence Marcus as a separate legal entity. That would mean cutting off this source of funding from the rest of the group, not to mention the added costs of the separation.

Given it had to dangle such juicy rates — easily double those found with large UK retail banks — one wonders why Goldman bothered. The group can borrow in wholesale markets at near zero, or potentially negative rates. The answer involves two things. For one, the Big Six UK banks — Barclays, Lloyds, RBS, HSBC, Nationwide and Santander UK — have long controlled the retail market. More than 71 per cent of deposits and 87 per cent of personal current accounts were at one of these institutions in 2017, according to watchdogs at the Financial Conduct Authority. That concentration has hardly changed this century. As such, Goldman can expect support from regulators for its efforts.

Marcus says it wants a long-term relationship. Looking at the UK banking arms of Barclays, RBS and Lloyds Bank suggests why, as some profit opportunity exists there. Returns on tangible equity for them were in the mid-teens last year, better than the roughly 10 per cent Goldman earned. Other US banks are coming too. JPMorgan has discussed plans to follow Goldman into the UK with its own digital bank.

The FCA welcomes challengers such as Marcus into UK retail banking. But its review was the seventh by regulators in 18 years. Little has changed in market concentration over that time. It never will if the only way to draw customers away from the Big Six is to offer costly incentives.

Beekeeper, what do you reckon metro's ECL will be in relation to Covid-19?