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That’s why everything has gone silent. The core point; Smickster is arguing about the logic of BHP’s behaviour. Ortherncopper is arguing about the behaviour of SolGold’s board. Both are right — but they’re talking about two different failures.

BHP’s strategic shift explains why they didn’t bid. SolGold’s silence explains why shareholders feel abandoned. Together, they explain how we ended up with a 28p takeover of a Tier‑1 copper asset.

1. Smickster’s criticism: “Your answer is gibberish and ignores the point.” Smickster is frustrated because he feels the earlier explanation didn’t address his core argument: His questions are: If BHP hates political risk, why did they invest in Ecuador at all? If BHP hates early‑stage mega‑CAPEX, why did they try to take us over in 2016/2018? If BHP is so conservative, how do you explain their earlier aggressive moves? These are fair questions. And the real answer is simple: ✔️ BHP in 2016–2018 was NOT the same BHP as in 2023–2025. Their strategy changed dramatically. Back then: copper was cheap assets were cheap majors were rebuilding their project pipeline. BHP was more aggressive in exploration Cascabel was seen as a cheap optionality play. Today: copper is expensive, CAPEX has exploded globally, political risk is weighted far more heavily, ESG pressure is higher, investors punish mega‑projects BHP prefers buying producers, not early‑stage giants. BHP already spent billions on OZ Minerals instead. So: ✔️ BHP did want Cascabel in 2016–2018, ❌ BHP does not want Cascabel in 2023–2025. That’s not politics — that’s just how mining majors evolve.

2. “Why didn’t BHP or others bid higher?” Smickster summarised the earlier explanation sarcastically: “They’re slow, conservative, hate political risk, hate mega‑CAPEX, prefer producers, missed the timing, China acted first.” It sounds like a joke — but it’s actually exactly what happened. Look at the last 5 years: What did majors buy? BHP → OZ Minerals (producer), Rio Tinto → Turquoise Hill (producer) Anglo → Woodsmith (and regretted it). What did majors not buy? Early‑stage Tier‑1 copper projects in Latin America. Why? Because: CAPEX inflation is brutal, political risk in LatAm is rising, investors hate multi‑billion‑dollar pre‑production projects. China is far more aggressive in early‑stage acquisitions. So yes: ✔️ China moved first

✔️ Western majors hesitated, ✔️ Timing was lost, That’s not a political answer — it’s the reality of the mining sector.

3. Ortherncopper’s point: “The board has stopped doing anything.” This is a different frustration, but completely valid. He says: no drill results, no exploration JV, no updated valuations, no Porvenir updates, no value‑adding news, the board is in “champagne mode” everything has stopped because they want the 28p deal to go through. And honestly? This is exactly how companies behave when they are in takeover mode. When a board wants a deal to succeed, they avoid: releasing drill results publishing new NPV numbers issuing exploration updates announcing discoveries doing anything that might raise expectations doing anything that might trigger a competing bid. Because: ✔️ Any positive news could jeopardize the agreed 28p deal

✔️ Any new valuation could force JCC to raise the offer, ✔️ Any excitement could make shareholders reject the bi

It’s okay — honestly, I get why you’d react like that. Most “AI search engines” do spit out generic, shallow, context‑free nonsense. If that’s what you’ve been exposed to, your frustration makes perfect sense. But here’s the thing: I’m not doing search‑engine‑style summaries. I’m reading the actual arguments people make in your thread and giving you a structured, human‑level breakdown of what they’re really saying — the logic, the subtext, the strategic implications. If something I wrote felt off, it’s not because I’m trying to produce gibberish. It’s because I’m trying to unpack a messy, emotional, contradictory investor debate and turn it into something coherent. That’s always going to be a bit provocative.

You said: “Chase, BHP made an offer in 2016, which in my view rules out point 4.” “BHP’s 2018 investment valued SolGold at £817m — not far from what JCC’s 28p values us at.” “Hardly any added value in the last 7 years??” Let’s translate that into a clean English argument — and then unpack what it really means.

1. “BHP made an offer in 2016 — so option 4 is ruled out.” You’re referring to the non‑binding offer BHP made in 2016 for SolGold/Cornerstone. That’s correct: BHP did want Cascabel back then. But here’s the key: ✔️ That was nine years ago, ✔️ It was rejected, ✔️ It was non‑binding, ✔️ And BHP never followed up with a real bid, ✔️ In fact, BHP later became a seller, not a buyer. So instead of ruling out “option 4” (that BHP didn’t want the asset anymore), the evidence actually supports it. If BHP still wanted Cascabel, they had: 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 …to make a bid. They never did. And in 2025 they signaled they were willing to sell their stake — the opposite of wanting to acquire the company.

2. “BHP’s 2018 investment valued SolGold at £817m — close to JCC’s valuation at 28p.” This is a very important observation. It shows:

✔️ The project (Cascabel) has always been valuable, ❌ But the company (SolGold) has failed to convert that into shareholder value. Why? Because; massive dilution, poor financing, weak governance, constant delays, no strategic partner, no clear development plan, no competitive bidding process, So yes — the valuation today is similar to 2018. But that doesn’t mean nothing was added. It means: **Value was added to the project, but destroyed at the corporate level.**

3. “Hardly any added value in 7 years?” This is the painful truth: ✔️ Cascabel is far more advanced today resource upgrades PFS work engineering, metallurgy, mine design, cost optimization, permitting progress, But… ❌ The share price never reflected that, ❌ Dilution wiped out gains,

❌ Financing was terrible, ❌ The board lacked strategic discipline, ❌ The market lost confidence, So yes — shareholders saw almost no benefit from 7 years of work. That’s why JCC can now buy the company cheaply. The Real Answer Your instinct is correct: BHP once valued SolGold highly, JCC now values SolGold similarly, But shareholders have gained almost nothing, This is not because Cascabel is worthless. It’s because: SolGold failed to turn a world‑class asset into shareholder value. And that is exactly why: BHP walked away, Newmont walked away, JCC stepped in. The board accepted a lowball, Shareholders are left frustrated

Aquinaga’s logic — and what’s missing Aquinaga says: “Any major (BHP or others) would now have to pay more, because the price has risen.” “Unless something negative has been discovered, why would the Chinese bid now and get us cheaper?” It’s a fair question — but the conclusion is actually the opposite of what he implies. Let’s break it down properly.

1. Yes — the price of a bid has risen for everyone. That part is correct. Copper prices have doubled. Tier‑1 copper assets are rarer. Strategic value is higher. Competition (especially from China) is stronger. So any major — BHP, Newmont, Rio, Anglo — would indeed have to pay more today than they would have in 2020–2022. But that doesn’t mean 28p is “fair”. It just means BHP missed the cheap window.

2. If something negative had been discovered… the Chinese would NOT be bidding. This is the key point Aquinaga is missing. If Cascabel had: a fatal technical flaw, a geological problem, a permitting disaster, a political block, a CAPEX explosion or any hidden negative surprise. Then Jiangxi Copper would not be bidding at all. China does not buy broken assets. They buy strategic copper. The fact that they are bidding — even at 28p — tells you: they see long‑term value, they want to secure supply, they believe the project is viable, they think they can outmaneuver. Western majors If something bad had been discovered, the Chinese would be running away, not writing cheques.

3. So why is the Chinese bid “cheap”? Because: SolGold is financially weak. The share price was depressed. Western majors hesitated. China moves aggressively when others hesitate. They exploit weakness, not strength. 28p is not a reflection of Cascabel’s value. It’s a reflection of SolGold’s negotiating position. China is not paying fair value — they are paying the minimum needed to take control.

4. Why didn’t BHP or others bid higher? Because: they are slower, they are more conservative, they don’t like political risk, they don’t like early‑stage mega‑CAPEX, they prefer buying producing assets, they missed the timing, China simply acted first.

5. The real answer to Aquinaga’s question, If something negative had been discovered, the Chinese would not be bidding. The fact that they are bidding means the asset is still valuable — and they want it before someone else wakes up. 28p is not a “fair” price. It’s an opportunistic takeover.

1. “The price has doubled”—what does that mean? Aquinaga probably means: the copper price has doubled, the valuation of Tier-1 copper projects has doubled, the strategic value of copper has exploded due to the energy transition. And that's true. In 2020–2021, copper was around $2.50–$3.00/lb. By 2025, copper will be around $5–$6/lb.

That changes everything.

2. A bid of 45–60p would be ridiculously low today. Why? Because Cascabel at a copper price of $5–6/lb: has much higher NPVs is much more attractive to majors is much more strategic for countries (China, the US, etc.) A bid of 45–60p today would be seen as: opportunistically undervalued, not in line with market conditions, not appropriate for the 2025 copper price

3. BHP could have won earlier at 45–60p. That's true. In 2020–2022: copper was cheap. SolGold was weak. Cascabel wasn't fully developed yet; the market was depressed. China wasn't aggressively in the race yet. Back then, BHP could have bought the whole lot at 45–60p. But they didn't.

4. Today, that scenario is gone—for good. Why? Because: Jiangxi Copper has already made a bid. China wants to strategically secure copper. SolGold is much further along in engineering. The copper price is structurally higher. Tier-1 assets are scarce. A bid of 45–60p wouldn't even be taken seriously now.

5. What should BHP bid now? Realistically: 70–90p to even get to the table. 90–110p to beat China. 110p+ if a bidding war breaks out. And that's precisely why BHP never bid again: they missed their chance.

Scenario: What if BHP had made a bid for SolGold?

Let’s imagine a realistic moment: 2020–2022, when BHP already held a stake and Cascabel was still fully “in play”.

1. BHP opens with a 40–45p bid. BHP is known for serious but conservative opening offers. A 40–45 pence bid would have: delivered a strong premium shocked the market instantly put SolGold on every major’s radar. The share price would have surged toward the offer.

2. Newcrest (now Newmont) reacts immediately. Newcrest already had a strategic position. They would likely: consider a counter‑offer increase their stake or pressure BHP to raise the bid. This could spark a mini bidding war.

3. Cornerstone becomes the battleground. Cornerstone held 15% of Cascabel. BHP would need to: acquire Cornerstone or strike a deal to neutralize their stake or attempt a hostile move. Cornerstone was always the biggest obstacle for BHP.

4. The share price jumps to 50–60p. Once two majors show interest, the market reacts predictably: hedge funds pile in arbitrage funds buy aggressively retail investors go into FOMO mode. The price would rise above the initial bid.

5.BHP raises to 55–60p. BHP hates losing face. They would: increase the offer reassure the market reinforce their copper‑growth strategy

This is the point where SolGold would likely accept.

6. China never enters the picture. In this alternate timeline: Jiangxi Copper never gets involved. China misses a strategic copper asset

Ecuador remains more aligned with Western miners. The entire 2024–2025 story would be completely different.

7. BHP gets Cascabel — but at a high cost - BHP would ultimately: buy SolGold for 55–60p integrate Cornerstone take full control of Cascabel. But they’d also inherit: massive CAPEX technical challenges

political risk a project that wouldn’t produce until after 2030. BHP would be committing billions over many years.

8.Market reaction: mixed. Investors would say: “Good move for long‑term copper supply”. “But Cascabel is a money pit”. BHP’s share price would likely dip after the acquisition.

9. SolGold shareholders are the big winners. In this scenario: everyone gets 55–60p the deal happens years earlier no dilution no Chinese takeover no 28p offer in 2025. Retail investors would walk away with 3× to 5× more than they ultimately received.

The irony If BHP had acted in 2020–2022, they could have:

secured Cascabel at a fair price kept China out accelerated their copper strategy. But by waiting: SolGold weakened the Chinese stepped in and the story ended with a 28p takeover in 2025. Strategically, BHP effectively sidelined itself.

Global market price: Copper is currently trading around $5.65 per pound (≈ $12,450 per metric ton).

In coming months, the 2023 strategy will be tested and re-shaped by the new management team, inclusive of an updated reservoir and development outlook.

according to AI: Comparison of Options for Flowback and Reservoir Analysis

Option: Multiple pressure boosting pumps - How it works: Higher capacity and pressure to recover fluids faster. - Advantages: - Faster flowback

- More stimulation fluid can be removed - Shorter test period - Drawbacks / Risks: - High operating costs - Risk of well or reservoir damage - Does not fundamentally solve water saturation issues - Pressure build-up test (PBU): Duration: 2–5 days per test (shut-in + measurements + analysis) - Including preparation and interpretation: about 1–2 weeks per cycle.

Option: Artificial lift (e.g. gas lift, ESP) (if needed) - How it works: Supports production by adding extra energy into the well. - Advantages: - Effective for low pressure or high water cut - Long-term solution - Can stabilize production - Drawbacks / Risks: - Installation complexity - Extra CAPEX - Requires continuous energy supply - Gas lift: design and planning 2–4 weeks, installation 1–2 weeks → total 4–8 weeks. - ESP (electric submersible pump): design/procurement 3–6 weeks, installation 1–2 weeks → total 4–8+ weeks.

Option: Extended flowback period (cleanup phase) - How it works: Keep the well open longer so fluids return naturally. - Advantages: - Low additional cost - Natural pressure distribution - Better insight into reservoir behavior - Drawbacks / Risks: - Time-consuming - Winter operations expensive (~$150,000/day) - Uncertain if enough stimulation fluid will be removed - Duration: usually 2–8 weeks, can extend to 2–3 months with large fluid volumes or high water saturation. - Factors: injected fluid volume, reservoir permeability, water cut, season (winter slows operations).

Option: Additional interventions (e.g. re-frac, acidizing) - How it works: Extra stimulation or chemical treatment to improve permeability. - Advantages: - Can improve reservoir quality - Potentially higher oil production - Drawbacks / Risks: - Technically complex - Extra costs - Uncertain outcome, risk of damage - Engineering, permits, logistics: 3–6 weeks - Execution + initial flowback: 1–3 weeks - Total: 4–9 weeks per intervention.

Summary; Multiple pumps = faster cleanup, but costly and risky. / Artificial lift = structural production support, but requires investment. / Extended flowback = cheaper and safer, but slow and expensive in winter.

In short: Pantheon would likely combine approaches — first extended flowback and pressure build-up testing, then possibly artificial lift or interventions depending on results. Interventions = potential upside, but uncertain and costly.

ractical combined timeline - Best case: Flowback 4–6 weeks → PBU 1 week → decision; if artificial lift needed, +4–8 weeks. -Conservative: Flowback 8–12 weeks → PBU 1–2 weeks → intervention 4–9 weeks → a

That would be nothing less from FCA considering that SolG's shareholders are also being misled and deceived, gla.

Into 27.2K shares of SOLG.L.

"I’ve covered last year’s £2K loss, closed out my 130K position with a £3.2K gain, and rolled everything into 272K shares of SOLG.L. Let’s see how it plays out—if it works, I’ll be back in TLW.L."

Once sold everything at 39p with a 2k loss now back at 4.24p - my purchase of 130k units was marked as a sale

Owning 51% of the shares means you effectively control the company. You become the majority shareholder and can determine the direction of the business, unless there are exceptional protective structures or special share classes in place.

How it works in the UK

Majority stake (>50%) Owning more than 50% of the issued shares gives you a controlling interest. This allows you to pass ordinary resolutions, such as appointing or removing directors.

Voting rights and decisions

Ordinary resolutions (e.g., appointing directors, approving accounts) require a simple majority. With 51%, you can always carry these.

Special resolutions (e.g., changing the company’s constitution) require 75%. With 51%, you cannot pass these alone, but you can block others from doing so.

Practical power You can shape the board of directors, influence strategic decisions, and effectively control the company. Minority shareholders have limited influence unless shareholder agreements grant them extra rights.

Exceptions

Share structures: Some companies issue shares with different voting rights (e.g., “golden shares” or preference shares). In such cases, 51% of ordinary shares may not equal full control.

Protective arrangements: Listed companies may have agreements or rules that limit the influence of a single shareholder.

Conclusion: In the UK, the principle is the same as elsewhere – owning 51% of the shares gives you control of the company. You are the dominant shareholder and effectively in charge, unless special legal structures restrict this.

Sorry my fault - wrong board

Https://elmercurio.com.ec/nacional/2025/07/24/sector-publico-funcionarios-desvinculados-ministerios/

Https://elmercurio.com.ec/nacional/2025/07/24/sector-publico-funcionarios-desvinculados-ministerios/

I was unable to vote - too late to vote - what now?

"Sidara has too much to gain and too few alternatives to let the deal fail. A 5p increase is strategically justifiable and likely, especially if the vote becomes tight."

And I’m uncertain

❌ Defensible Advantages of a NO Vote

💰 1. Wood now has cash and liquidity

$275 million in financing secured (≈ £225–230 million).

Audit completed, trading resumed.

No longer an urgent need for a takeover due to financial distress.

📈 2. Upside potential from a rival bid

Market anticipates a possible offer of 60–90p.

Rejection of Sidara opens the door for other bidders.

Timeline until court hearing in 2026 allows strategic flexibility.

🧠 3. Stronger negotiating position

CEO Torrens can renegotiate with lenders under better terms.

Wood has demonstrated resilience and operational capacity under pressure.

🏗️ 4. Wood’s strategic value is unique

Petrofac is not a competitor; Sidara has few alternatives.

Wood is attractive due to its expertise in energy infrastructure and consulting.

📉 5. Sidara is unlikely to walk away

Multiple bids show determination.

A small increase (5p–15p) may be enough to close the deal.