Member Info for chase1

“A few of these claims are assumptions rather than verified facts. ENET did purchase components for the $4.6M and $3M orders, but the statement that they received ‘zero cents’ is not supported by any RNS. Also, there is no official evidence that Tarana or any other major customer ‘realised ENET is unreliable’. The only confirmed facts are the ones published in RNS filings — anything beyond that is speculation.”

“Thanks for the clarification — that actually proves my point.

The £29k cash figure does not come from Ethernity’s own filings or RNS releases, but from an Allenby research note.

A broker note is useful, but it’s not an official company statement and shouldn’t be presented as if it were.

So yes, the monthly loss is roughly correct, but the £29k cash number is not an RNS fact — it’s an analyst estimate.”

ExMS

“I’m always happy to dig into official numbers, but if you’re going to quote £29k as a fact, the burden of proof is on you. If it’s in an RNS or a filing, feel free to share the link or exact wording. Until then, it’s just speculation, not data.”

“The ~£250k monthly loss is roughly correct based on the H1 numbers. But the claim that they only had £29k in the bank is not stated anywhere in the official RNS. That number isn’t confirmed — the only official information is that the cash position was low and additional funding was required.”

Based on all publicly available RNS announcements, Ethernity has signed or expanded at least 8–12 contracts over the past 8 years. This is a minimum, because many deals are under NDA. Confirmed contracts include: the aerospace deal ($1.05M + $290k), the $800k networking contract (2023), the $4.6M follow‑on (2022), the $3M PON order (2021), the Fiber‑to‑the‑Room project, and several ongoing 2023 contracts. The real number is likely higher, but these are the ones publicly verified.”

Your statements don't align with Ethernity Networks' official figures. The annual accounts don't show a burn rate of £250k or £600k per month, and there's no evidence of £50m of capital raised through deception. If you have concrete sources to support this, please share them.

Paul Smith previously worked for Glencore, where he served as Head of Strategy. Before and after that role, he also held positions such as:

Buy‑side analyst at Marshall Wace Asset Management. Non‑executive director at companies including Lonmin, Glencore Agriculture, and Trident Royalties. In the context of SolGold, his Glencore background is the most relevant, especially given the current Saudi/Glencore copper‑smelter developments.

“If we clear this zone, I might need a bigger bag 👜… maybe even a full suitcase 🧳.”

“I tried being clever and placing a bid below 0.0049, but the market basically laughed in my face.

After a brief moment of self‑reflection, I pulled myself together and loaded up two bags anyway.

Sometimes you just have to embrace destiny.”

22:23 “Funny how pointing out facts is now considered ‘abuse’. Says a lot about the gang, not about me.”

22:17 “Don’t worry, people who can think for themselves aren’t threatened by tools. Only by their own imagination.”

“Being realistic shouldn’t be a problem. Unless reality hurts.”

Probability analysis: chances of a higher bid; Here is a realistic, grounded probability breakdown based on the situation:

*) Higher bid from BHP or Newmont 0–5% (extremely low) They already support the deal. If they wanted SolGold, they would have acted long ago.

*) Higher bid from Jiangxi itself 10–20% (low to moderate) Jiangxi only raises if someone else enters the game. Right now, there is no competitor.

*) Counter‑bid from another Chinese group (Zijin, Chinalco, Minmetals) 20–30% (moderate) This is the only realistic wildcard. China wants copper — but there is no public sign of another bidder.

*) 28p is the final price 50–70% (high) Given the board support + BHP + Newmont + Mather + 41% committed votes, this is the most likely scenario.

“Always with the front‑line talk… mate, this is a message board, not a Schwarzenegger reboot. Hasta la vista, baby 😎”

1. Ron Hochstein and Jamie Beck have no direct influence on SolGold – This is the gist. Ron Hochstein → CEO of Lundin Gold,

Jamie Beck → CEO of NGEx Minerals. Both companies belong to the Lundin Group, but: *) They have no shareholding, no board seat, and no formal role in SolGold.

*) Therefore, they cannot “hold the Chinese back” in the SolGold takeover process. At most, they can exert indirect influence through relationships with BHP or Newmont, but even that is limited.

2. The Lundin Group has no strategic interest in Cascabel. The Lundins operate in: Ecuador (Fruta del Norte), Argentina (Filo del Sol, NGEx, Josemaría), and Chile (Vicuña District). But not in Cascabel or SolGold. This means: *) They have no financial interest in blocking Jiangxi. *) They have no operational reason to intervene. *) They have no strategic overlap with Cascabel.

3. BHP and Newmont did not challenge the Jiangxi bid. This is crucial. BHP diluted its influence in SolGold. Newmont has no strategic reason to defend Cascabel. Neither party challenged the 28p bid. If BHP or Newmont don't prepare a counteroffer, then Ron Hochstein or Jamie Beck can't do anything at all.

4. InvestorPanda's statement is probably wishful thinking. It sounds appealing: "The Lundins are going to stop the Chinese." But realistically: They have no position in SolGold. They have no mandate. They have no strategic reason. They have no formal power. They have no incentive to intervene. It's a narrative that reassures investors, but doesn't correspond to the actual power structure.

5. What could the Lundin group do? There are two theoretical scenarios in which they could play a role: *) Scenario A — They form a consortium with BHP or Newmont. But for that to happen, BHP or Newmont must first be willing to make a move. So far, there's been no sign of that. *) Scenario B — They want to expand a strategic copper position in Ecuador. But Cascabel doesn't fit into their existing portfolio. Their focus is on the Vicuña district Argentina/Chile), not Ecuador. My conclusion: InvestorPanda's statement is unrealistic. Ron Hochstein and Jamie Beck have no direct influence on SolGold. They have no strategic interest in Cascabel. They cannot block a takeover process. They cannot launch a counteroffer without the support of BHP or Newmont. And that support isn't there. *) **The only parties that can block Jiangxi are: Another Chinese state-owned group, BHP, Newmont, An unexpected third party**,

But at this time, there is no evidence that any of these parties is preparing a counteroffer.

“If every disagreement looks like a ‘wet blanket’ to you, maybe the problem isn’t the blankets.”

“Funny how Copilot makes people feel threatened. Must be tough when software outperforms your best work.”

What all those forum posts really mean — and what it means for your vote.

What those forum posts are actually saying; The posters are frustrated because: The CEO promised important updates (PFS, ExploreCo, CIPA, EISA, drilling results). None of those updates were released before the 28p offer. Shareholders feel they are being asked to vote without full information. Some think the board recommended 28p because the missing updates are bad. Others think the board is hiding good news to help Jiangxi. In short: It’s emotion and frustration, not proof of a higher bid. Does this mean you should vote NO? Not automatically.

These posts express: anger, disappointment, distrust of the board. But they do not provide: evidence of a higher offer, evidence of another bidder, evidence that 28p is not the final price, So the posts do not change the real risk–reward calculation.

💰 Your situation: £ ... profit at 28p - This is the key point. - Voting YES: You lock in £ ... Zero risk - You exit cleanly

Voting NO: You are betting on: another Chinese bidder or Jiangxi raising the offer or retail blocking the deal - There is no confirmed sign of any of these. If the deal fails: the share price could drop back to 15–18p - your £ ... profit disappears - SolGold may need new funding → dilution → lower price

Bottom line; The forum posts are emotional, not strategic. They don’t change the facts. Your choice is simple:

✔️ YES = guaranteed £ ... profit

✔️ NO = gamble for more, with real risk of losing that profit

Only you can decide how much risk you want to take.

**“All three of you make valid points.

Fortissimo is right that if Jiangxi fails to reach 75%, we’re left with a board that has put everything on one outcome. That creates real risk, because the market punishes uncertainty brutally. A counter‑bid would indeed be the cleanest solution for shareholders — except for Jiangxi, of course.

WinstSniffer is also right that patience can pay off, but that doesn’t change the fact that the current offer is weak and Jiangxi’s 28.5% position is far from dominant. They still have a long way to go before 75% looks realistic.

And Smickster is correct that shareholders can vote the offer down. The problem is whether this board is capable of delivering value afterwards — and that’s exactly where many investors have lost confidence, given the silence and lack of updates.

So the situation is simple:

– a counter‑bid remains the best positive scenario

– Jiangxi is nowhere near 75% yet

– and if the scheme fails without an alternative, everything depends on whether this management team can actually execute.

That’s why tensions are so high right now.”**

“I get what you’re saying, Fortissimo. The geopolitical angle surprised a lot of people — especially the assumption that higher‑level political pressure might block or complicate a Chinese bid. But the fact Jiangxi went ahead with a formal offer strongly suggests they believe the political environment won’t stop them, at least not at the government‑to‑government level.

The Solaris/Zijin example is a good reminder: when a bidder misreads the political or strategic landscape, they can end up embarrassed and shut out. Solaris had the management team and the momentum to capitalise on that failure — and look where they are now.

SolGold’s situation is different mainly because of the board. Solaris had leadership that pushed for maximum value; our board seems to have set the bar far lower. That’s the real contrast.

Whether politics plays a role here or not, the bigger issue is that Jiangxi is exposed if they can’t reach 75%. And if they fail, the board’s lack of ambition becomes a much bigger problem for all of us.”**

Https://prodfrontendsamv3.azurewebsites.net/media/mpknrbht/a_guide_to_takeovers_in_the_united_kingdom___december_2023_4871pdf.pdf